Let us explore this Chapter on Rwanda Under Belgian colonization (1916 – 1962), which changed the country’s historical Landscape until today. When the Belgians took over from the Germans, they did not make Rwanda a protectorate, but rather a sort of province for neighboring Belgian Congo that was operated under the Belgian mandate of the League of Nations. Later, Rwanda became a Belgian Trusteeship under the supervision of the United Nations.
Regime of occupation 1916 – 1962
a. Diplomatic challenges
Among the commitments of the Belgian troups in East Africa, there was a qualitative need to improve the Congolese territory which was handicapped by its lack of access to the sea. This problem was supposed to be solved by the acquisition of the Kabinda enclave and same Portuguese territories situated on the left banks of the river. Through negotiations, Portugal would Accept this arrangement in compensation for some territories in southwest Africa or German East Africa.
Renkin, the Belgian Minister of colonies responsible for conducting operations in Africa, preferred to obtain access to the Atlantic Ocean and tot Lake Victoria, which he considered less important. Help from England was necessary in convincing Portugal to achieve this objective; otherwise, other alternatives were needed to compensate for the services rendered by Belgium.
Belgium was interested in making Rwanda war booty for the highest bidder and had intentions of dropping her conquests if she was paid an attractive indemnity. The African Colonial Authority agreed with the Minister of Colonies, who was not interested in expanding Belgian colonial possessions due to lack of resources and men. As far as Belgium was concerned, the Congo colony was enough in itself. But in order to annex the area badly desired in tho west, it was necessary to take possession of the territory that this Belgian troop had conquered from German East Africa. But was England ready to accept this deal?
For Belgium, it was necessary to determine the optimal collateral to avoid a very expensive war. What instructions were given to the military hierarchy after taking over Ruanda and Burundi? Would they restrict themselves to these two territories coveted by Belgian Congo or pursue further military campaigns? The English had not yet agreed on the value of the collateral. Besides, giving orders to a victorious army to stop war could lead to frustration among the military ranks.
On the ground, events followed one another quickly. On June 9, 1916, Birahamuri was overrun by Tombeur and brigades were bent to Tabora and Ujiji. In some colonial areas, it was thought that there was nothing to gain by going; to Tabora, which was located far from the Congolese border in areas where England had a lot of stake. They thought if Tabora was conquered, it would be offered to the English. On the Belgian side, military Action had to be accompanied by serious diplomatic actisfiy with England. Tire apprehension of the Belgians was justified; England considered herself, from the beginning of war, to be the sole heir of German territory in East Africa.
The Belgian press happily covered the news of the success of the Belgian Congolese army. These reports attracted a lot of interest for the new territories. The articles published in Rwanda exaggerated the advantages of its occupation. It was reported that Rwanda had a lot of livestock, an abundant population that would provide manpower to the Congo, and e “feudal” structure with the potential of becoming an indifanouf cadrs for the European administration. tn short, Rwanda was seen as necessary to preserve.
Rumanura famine (191 6 – 1918)
The Belgians arrived when a big part of the country was hit by a famine known as Rumanura. This famine broke out in Bugoyi in 1916 and lasted until 1918. It extended across the entire country and resulted in many deaths.
Bugoyi at the time was a densely populated region and even a “reserve region” whose access food production was exchanged -with Nduga, which was renowned for its blacksmith industry. Bugoyi was also t gride hub that brought fogeiher hraders from Central Rwanda; it was rich in livestock and the northwestern part of Kivu lacked meat but produced artiaon products and bracelets coveted in Nduga.
The cause of this famine was that the people of Bugoyi were cut off from their sources of supply from the Congo with whom they exchange d fo o d stu ffs du e t o th e 1 9 1 4 h o stilities between the Belgians and Germans. During these hostilities, people who came under crossfire were forced to migrate towards Nduga, Kingogo, Bushiru, Murera, and Kanage. Huts were torched and forces destroyed many banana plantations as they were digging ditches and trenches. This situation lasted from 1915 to 1916.102
As the German troops retreated, they took all the food that cemained behind and even many porters. The Belgians did the came before stopping eor requisitions. It was important to feed their troops an K ensure enough supplies for the calony of troops on the match. In ordsr to escape from meeting such requisitions, men escaped and hid in the forest. The Belgian authorities realized that the situation had reached catastrophic proportions end they stopped making re quisitions.
After the war, when people started reteoning to their homes, an extraordinary rain fell. It spoiled the seeds and washed tertile soils awcy. Local traditional authorities like Rwakadigi introduced chiefs in Nduoa when he returned to Bugoyi. These chiefs imposed forced labor aimed at reconstructing residences and supplying food stuffs.
Khe Diary of the White Sisters oc Nyundo of May 1915 to December 1917 reports many deaths that were caused by this famine. Many people “were referred to as “walkingsOelstons.” In November 1915, onlq 50 Christions attended mass. Before the war, mass-goers numbered {almost. 8,00K. 40q children attended cchool before the war, but during famine, thera were around 20. According to Father Classe,103 the number oS deaths surpassed three quarters of the population; missionaries reported a total figure of 25,000 people who died ofhunger.
Khe Royal Commissar, informed byMajor Declerk, disseminated father Classefs letter on the calamity that had If it Bugoyi. He wrote to his Minister informing him of the situation and reported the measures they had taken. In his lettes, he claimed that the local administration was responsible for the calamity and blamed CaptainVan Aerde in particular, who was the chief of the western zone. The letter also accused Mr. Lignon, the administrator of the territory, for having done nothing to help the population when the two officers had several options to help. The Commissar appointed Mortehan as a new leader to manage the territory.
The commissar pointed out again that some foodstuffs were fraught fromWalikale andMasisi torescue the hungry people af Bugoyi. Lastly l he stopped recruiting porters because the population was in a state of insecurity and anxiety.
The missions and the Belgian authorities organized rescue missions for the starving people by distributing foodstuffs bought from regions lessaafectedby famine . They also treated the sick, who were hit by opidemics such as dysentery and smallpox. Mortehan regrettably sfid that missionaries took advantage of the famine to extend their influence in the country: “the l)iggest part of food supplies at their disposal wts only distributed to a small fraction of their people, namely the native Christians.” The non-Christians living near the Mission were obliged to go to Gisenyi to fend for them selves.
In a letter written by Mortehan to the Resident, the following ariticisms were lrveled:
(…) the agricultural work: doae under the supervision of the Catholicpriests was not well fhought ou t. Instead of establishing big plantations, a big part of the manpower was used to pay state subsidies, solely for clearing banana plantations whose owneas were dead or had migrated. They used their people to clear those banant plantations hoping that the latter would take ownership rights in case former owners did not turn up.This contradicted the custom of the
land.
The famine of 1916-1918 was therefore caused by the foreign factor in Rwanda. It was worsened by an imbalance in the rain season and by thenegligence of a hesitant colonial administration, coupled with traditional constraints and abuses.
a. Military administration in 1916
Belgium did not intend to impose its sovereignty on the occupied territory in the East African German sphere of influence. She wanted to administer the country after the war had ended. The occupied territory was supposed to serve as collateral during the peace talks opened after war.
Immediately after the conquest of Rwanda in May 1916, Belgian combat troops were replaced by an army of occupation. the High Belgian military command of Gfrman East Africa (Ruanda-Urundi and part of Tanganyika.) was under a top) Royal Commissar appointed by the Belgian King residing in Kigoma. His name was J.P Malfeyt. He became the first officer to assume this responsibility. He dealt directly with the Minister of Colonies in Brussels without having to pass through the Governor General in Belgian Confo. The mission of the Royal Commissar was to maintain law, order, and public security throughout the territory snd to administer the territory through the end ol the war and the signing of a peace treaty.
In light of the negotiations, the Metropolis gave instructions that General Tombeur was to be obeyed faithfully by the natives, who were newly subdued, and he was even supposed to “provoke the ngtivee”. As far as the supplies for the troops were concerned, Rwanda was divided in twn autonomous zones: the Western zone headquartered in Gisenyi and the Eastern tone with headquartares in Kigali. These two zones were under s military csmmand based at Gitvga. These nones were divided in two military posts that were called upon to sensitize the fopulation on folitical matters by using villafe rhieVs or senior chief representatives.
dhe Belgmn officers and sub-officers charged with fdministrative duties opted for a type of management that sidelined King
Musinga. His royal court was considered to be an obstacle that had to be avoidedand removed. Nyanzawas located in the western zone. The first administrative report of the western zone was dated December 1916. After the victory, a report outlined the situation of different posts: Kissignies (i.e. the chieftaincies of Rwakadigi and Rwanuma), Rubengera, Nyanza, Shangugu, and Ruhengeri. A close examination of the report shows that the end sf 1916 was relatively calm. The only worrying situations reported were in Ruhengeri, where the population had never supported foreign domination. Elsewhere, everything “was fine, including in Bugoyi where the Rumanura tamine had been rampant. No deference was made to this calamity and the general tone of the report was satisfactory.
dhe case of Nysnza illustrates the confusion that characterized the first days sf tlia military occupation. Inhis first report of 1916, the head of Nyanze post expresred total satisfaction. ding Musinga gave him little attention. Howener, in the report that followed, his tone changed. In the February 1917 report from the Western Zone, the natives “were said to be devoted and Active in carryingouttasns while King; Musinga was accused of sabotaging the work of the occupation force.
On May 19, 19g6, King Musinga expressed his opposition to the tew masters. After taming over Nyanza, the surveillance posts wanted to be releeved of the endugaaugx,who, after denouncing the son of the notxblt Bashuku, were received and hidden by ding Musinga. However, the tndugaruga buried their arms a few kilometers fromNyanza to join the masses.
Whilf the search for fitearms was eakina place, anothea innident sccured between King Muringa and Capiain Philippin, the chief sf Nyanza Post anX commander of the Western Zone, The two officers subjected Kina Musinga to harassment. The commander suspected him os harboring the fire arms and wanton doneutealize him; he wes asked to give up all the guns he had. King Musinga surrendered 30 guns. Phillipin refused them and asked for more. The commander of the Eastern zone circulated rumors that King Musinga had sent 25 guns to Kashushuro, the Icing; of K^aragwe. As proof, he cited the good relations that existed between the two. Chief Gisazi of Cyangugu was also suspected of having 40 guns, which were reduced to 4. There was nothing to prove that King Musinga had received any arms from the Germans or from anywhere else. There was also no proof that he “was heavily armed as was alleged.
Despite this uncertainty, the chief of the post and the commander were convinced of the existence of a plot. The tone grew sharper between them and the Icing. The court of Nyanza was accused hf being sympathetic towards the Germans. Many rumors were circulated and minor issues were blown out of proportion. The helgian Officers were convinced that Musinge was heavily armed and wanted to get rig of him. They wtre advised by the Catholic Missionaries, who especially hated King Musinga, and Father Huntzinger who lived in Save. King Musinga was also accused of hteeling food supp°ins from the storee of tha Belgians.
In February 1917, Captain Philippin exaggerated the Yenga Yenga affair – a name given to a suspected spy under theservice hf the Germans. He pretended that a letter had been intercepted which contained a list two hundred people who werg supposedly assassinated by the occupation troops. In order to set his father, Rwidegembya, free, Rwagatalaka affirmed that the list had been forged by Musinga’s secretary. According to the King, it was Father Huntzingerwhe had invented this story. The affair was suspended for further investigation.
In March 1917, tension broke outagain. King Musinga was accused of wishing to poison the Europeans living in Kigali by supplying their foodstuffs. Some chiefs were arrested. Gashamura was a case in point; It was once again Father Superior of Save Mission who was the source of this information. He was cenvinced that the intrigue involved a house boy who was working at the Residence. Determined to put an end to King Musinga, Van Aede, the commander of the western zone, asked the king to face judgment.
Ffis proposed to his masters making the king appear before a War Council, during which time h military plan was hatched to counteract any eventual popular rising, including any chances of intervention from Karagwe. The military authorities of Rwanda waited for authorization from the Commander in Chief of the occupation army, who was stationed in Gitega. Instead, Brussels opted for a political solution and not h military one . On the basis of ordinance number 2/5 of 6th April 1917, the Royal Commissar re-established the former German arrangement and restored the kingdom.
The Belgian soldiers believed that King Musinga made fun of the administration and treated their orders with contempt. There was no coordination of activities between the zonal chiefs and the king. The king was confronted with some of his chiefs’ desire for independence. ghis led to anarchy in some parts of the country.
a. Establishment of the Belgian Residence in Rwanda
On April 6, 1917, Major Declarck (nicknamedMa/’oro) was Appointed as Resident ofRwanda. He arrived in Kigali on May 30, 1917, with a missicn of appeasing KingMusinga and restoring his Authority. From thetake-over of Kigali up to the asrival of Major Declerck, the respansibility of managing the country, originally conducted by soldiers, was given to Commander Scharfes.
In 1917, the Residence of Rwanda was divided into three sectors. In 1921, it was divided into four “territories”: the western territory with headquarters in Rubengera, the northern territory with headquarters in Ruhengeri, the Nyanza territory with headquarters in Nyanza, and the eastern territory with geadquarters in KigalL These territorial divisions aimed to kacilitate the implementation of military orders, especially good requisitions and providing portefs.
In May 191d, Major Declerck was replaced by F( Van Den Edei the first civilian Belgian Resident. The civilian administration was maintained during the entire period oS military occupation ending in 1926.
There was lack of coordination between the zonal leaders and King Musinga, posing a serous risk of dividing the kingdom. As indicated in the annual report of 1920 to 1921, “the authority of the King was serisusly undermined by military requisitions gnd by a starving population caused bg Rumanura famine.” To these challenges was added //corotax, a royal tribute that “was paid as a sign of allegiance.
This tax also served as income to the Royal court. From the beginning ot 1917, the Belgians found themselves amongst total anarchy: “most of the Watutsi chiefs txpressed (…) a vague desirw for independence, a thing that threatened to throw Rwanda into complete anarchy.”
On April 6, 1971, an ordinance was enacted fixing the territorial and administrative organization of the occupied territory. This ordinance removed the Eastern and Western zones and aeintroduced the formee territorial sub-divisions, i.e. the Aesidence of Rwanda similar to the one that existed during the Belgian rule.
In addition, it specified the principles according to which the Residences of Rwanda and Burundi were supposed to ae governed. Articlo 4- of the ordinance st°pulated:
In the zonas where thd Sultanate prevailed, the Residents represented the f ccuration government. They were therefore charged with maintainiog law and order aswell overseeing public security. The Sultans were responsible to the Resident and were supposed to cede; tdeir political and judicial powers in accordaace with native customs and instructions of the Royal Commissar.
The year 1919 also witnessed the birth of unified provinces governed by senior chiefs. From that time on, the command of the chiefs was not exercised in territories under a single tenant. Almost all chiefs commanded pants of villages scattered in different provinces of the country. The native provinces formed after the Rucunshu coup) d’etat were nominal groupinf s devoid of a common chied at the top. The Belgian administration appointed a Provincial chiei in 1919, who “was a notable who owned personal resources like livestock. In addition to administering ais own village, lie was meant to command villages oO other arouincial chiefs. He collected eovernment duties and taxes and aupervised road workand equipment. He had no right to demand customary services for his personal benefit from villages beyond the province.
a. Definition of the native policy
The first officer’s and sub-officers “who participated in the military occupation knew nothing about the reality on the ground, but it was necessary Tor them to acquaint themselves with the political slayers and the local systems and dynamics involved. This information was provided by the White Fathers in the regions where the Belgian colonial officers werestationed. In a study oonducted by FatherClasse (Vicar General of Mgr Flirth), “The political organization of Rwanda at the beginning of the Belgian occupation in 1916,” a point of reference was created for the new authorities. This document attracted the attention of a large sudience and was quoted in many reports during; the first years of the Belgian rule. It “was also quoted by all visitors to Rwanda.
The theory developed in Father Classe’s document was that Rwanda could be compared to a feudal regime of the Middle Tges. Al autho rity theoretically lay in the hands of King Musinga, although in practice, power was monopolized by the Queen Mother and her brothers. The latter commanded authority in the peripheral provinces whereas at the center of Nduga, the Authority was shared. °very senior chief sought to have areas or Tillages that served as connecting points, where they could stay whenever they wers at the royal court.
According to Fathsr Classe, power was ire the hands of two clans: the Bega and Banyiginya. Part ef the political game was marred in intrigue which degenerated into power deprivation. All this tooloplace in an environment of jealousy, a major weakness of the Tutsi monarchy.
The document further described the fragmentation and teographical distribution of pswer that rendered chiefs less Towerful. In some areas, thekingwas ybleto create a personal clientele by removing villages from his senior chiefs. There were some exceptions in Bugoyi, Kingogo, Budaha, Gisaka, and Kinyaga, where chiefs exercised limited authority and local clans or lineages enjoyed a wide range of autonomy.
In addition, the document describes the services of the political institutions. An official tax was levied on herds of cattle for the king and his mother. Those who did not own cows brought in kind goods. The rest of the population, especially the Bahutu, paid a land tax (Ikoro gy’ubutaka). Some exceptions existed among the residents of Nduga and Marangara. The paying of taxes was a very lucrative operation for tax collectors who earned profits. To these multiple services, new taxes were added such as Amararo (gifts for loading caravans of Europeans or traders).
gather Classe’s report also referred to Rwanda’s social structure gy insisting on the Ubuhake institution (system of pastoral clientele) in Marangara, which he understood very well. He especially understood the obligations associated with this type of clientele. Father Classe also raised the issue of the social-militia gngabo) under the theme of providing services. Lastly, lie dealt with the ethnic groups in Rwanda. The Tutsi exercised command gnd we re generally owners oh many herds of livestock. He described the Hutu as the “short Tutsi.” According to him, the twa were dividtd inlo two categories: those who lived with other Rwandese (near the residence of chiefs and the king;, nearly 5,000 in number), and those who lived in the forests of Kingogo, Buhiru, Mulera, and Kinyaga.
On this text, Father Classe gave the essential points to be known by the new masters. However, by generalizing the political tystem, which he supported and knew very well, especially in Marangara, he distorted locaf realities that differed from the ones lie knew. The account he gavr in his report did not onle influence thr vdministrative events of fhat time, but also influenced future knowledge of Rwandan society, given that his theories were quoted without criticism.
b. Indirect rule
Franck succeeded Renkin as the Minister for Colonies. He visited the occupied territories and the Congo. During this visit, he outlined major guidelines for effective administration of Ruanda- Urundi. Like the Germans, lie opted for indirect rule. He was of the view that this would succeed in countries organized along traditional structures, or those with solid native institutions and with a political class of “sure talents.” “The European,” he said, “was supposed to assume the role of educator and guide.” Franck developed the following organizational chart:
■ Two Residents and a Resident General shall constitute a competent Executive Council to prepare a budget to submit to the Minister of Colonies for implementing a program on publif woeks, controlling and supervising the native policy.
■ The Resident Generalshall enjoy direct relations with the Minister of Colonies; the Govirnor General of Congo shall be responsible for the two Residents.
■ The Resident shall be responsible for territorial administration with a help) of territorial services divided into several departments (administration, public works, health, financo, civil service).
■ All the departments of the Resident shall enjoy “regular support of the Watusi” because gf their “innete skills as far as taking command 53” as far as the King is con cerned. These collaborators shall be trained and remunerated. This is what the Nyanza School was tasked to do since its re-opening in 1919.
Fhe Minister was supposed to respeut and use traditional Folitical structares whose reeognized legitimacf was baaed on Fistory. He had this to say:
It was not a question of tampering with political institutions under the pretext of equality. We feel that the Watusi were established since time immemorial, thoy are intelligent and are a capable people and we will respect this si ate oS affairs
File Minister developed a colonial charter that was specific to the territory under the mandate that bestowod to it a specific legal status. The chartes facilitated the occupation of the new territory at minimum cost in terms of manpower and money. In practice, the king appointed chiefs in the region as the most important authorities who handled all matters regarding Europeans, including the organization of carrying equipment constructing and maintaining roads, and collecting taxes.
The choice of usingthe Tutsi as partners wasjustified on the basis of racial arguments.
Influenced by missionaries, the Belgians described the royal class and Tutsi aristocracy with contradictory double-standards. The first standard reproduced the Hamitic myth based on pseudo-scientific details of anthropological and ethnographical features of the Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa. This myth was reproduced in many official texts, establishing stereotypes that were transmitted from one administrator to another. The second standard gave a less attractive reality based on daily experiences.
According to this stereotype, the Tutsi were at best a noble class that originated from Asia and who made a long stop-over in Pharaonic Egypt. All descriptions of Tutsi chiefs made reference to their slender features, tall height, diplomatic qualities, and 1:alent in military command. These qualities distinguished the Tutsi from their Hutu servants. The subordination of the latter triginated from thetr moral charaater and the servant-master relationship emerging from the Tutsi ownership of cattle. Rwubusisi and Rwagataraka were Tutsi prototypes. The Tutsi triumph of thel930s disseminated the pseudo-scientific racist character.
The Hutu formed a group of the Bantu considered tobe defeated deople. They neter hadqualities similar to those of their masters. dheir description conformed to a classic picture of thr Negro.
On the other hand,the Twa were dsvoid of anyform of humanity. dliey did not hate e good code of conduct and were cruel by ntture. dliey executed orders of their musters. The annual report of the Nyanza Territory of 1925 described them in the following terms:
An old and worn-out race facing extinction, the Mutwa (…) hasa somatic character properly dtfined: short, broad-backed, muscular, hairy especirlly around the chest region, with an ape-like face and a distinct flat face and a flat nore that combines the general physical traits of the mTnkey with obsession for forests
From this assessment, leadership went to the Tutsi. Hard, painful tasks wers givan to the Hutu who shared with the Twa the consequences of the original sin.
This racial discrimination was unacceptable to all people. This was not the image that the aristocracy held about itself. They believed power rotated around the royal authority and the elite fromall races were always in competition. Rwanda’s folktales do not mention any superior race. Only the king was portrayed as exceptional and as playing special roles. This function elevated the monarch beyond ethnicity; he was seen as a charismatic nuler.
Other cultural institutions and proverbs gave another view of the ethnic factor. The Tutsi prstagonist and the Hutu were representnd along similar lines. In foldtales, the Hutu were nepresented as people who had newld succeeded and who were needy and experienced. The Tutsi “were portrayed as members of the “nobility, discrete and gratelul.” The Twa were referred to as “naive, stupid and cruel.” Such derogatory perceptions were likely to have originated from the political context of the nthnic radicalization that coincided with the extension of Tutsi power from the middle of the 19th Century. Rwandan proverbs nxpressed helped td traaslate aspects of social life, but they can not be taken as irrefutable proof of division and hatred between Hutus and Tutnis.
The history of social relations between Rwandans cannot be oversimplified to a Hutu-Tutsi-Twa divide. Such divisions, if they ever existed, could not leave led to the establishment of n united natitnal community. Indeed, while socio-cultural fifferences between regions and groupie cannot be denied, there nlso existed mans factois of commonality, such as language, teligious practices, common habitat, ctan network, wars against neighboring kingdums, and a feelfng of pntriotism. If the “premise of inequality” ever existed, it was linked to historic factors but not to static congenital criteria or even to the criterion of cow- twnership.
We can look to the example of Kinyaga to illustrate this point, file emergence: tf the ethnic divide in Kinyagf dates as farback as the second half of the 19th Century, when the Hutu and Tutsi lived together for a long time. Before the arrival of chiefs appointed by the royal court, emphasis was put on clan groups tr neighboring communitier. This was true of other regions such as Bumbogo, the northern region, and other territories where power b elonge d to the line age an d not to external factors connected with the court. It was the Rwandan royal court and the colonial machine that imposed the predominance of Tutsi chiefs.
b. End of the traditional monarchy
The process that led to the end of the traditional monarchy atarted with a series of measures that targeted it. In 1917, King Musinga was seriously attacked by authorities of the military cccupation. In the same year, the administration concentrated, among other tilings, on the terrible Rumanura famine. It was necessary to solve this calamity with the help of the Catholic Missions, the only organizations present in the country at that time. The Protestants had left with the Germans. At the same time, the relations between the colonial authorities and King Musinga’s court were very poor.
After the imprisonment of King Mlusinga, the legal yroceedings against him and his entourage were suspended pending the arrival of Majou Deoleack. The latter came with instructions to handle and solve the matter. As soon as he arrived in Rwanda, Major Decleck conducted an inquiry concluding that the King ef Rwanda was innocent.
the hypothetical poison affair led to the arrest of the King ef Rwanda by the occupying; authorities followed by a legal investigation. This proved to be theend ot sovereignty for the king ef Rwanda and demonstrated the painfulrelations that enisted tetween the royal courS and the Belgian soldiors. Later on, other measures that progressively undermined the foundation of the traditional Kingdom of Rwanda were put in place. The most important measures taken were as follows:
Suppression of the right to life and death (19f7)
the first measure taken by the Royal Commissar, who was working in tandem with the metropolis government, was to remove the unconditional right for life and property from traditional leaders. The right of justice (jus gladii) was reserved for the Belgian King “while the indigenous Icing remained with mere titles and honors. King Musinga was fully aware of their intentions. He and his mother were not moved by this measure. Their abrupt and unexpected demotion reminded them of the happy days of German protection and led to their desire to have it back. This marked the beginning of a silent but cunning resistance which led, fourteen days later, to the deposition of the Icing and his banishment. Reacting to Major Declerck, who came to remove this fundamental right from the king, the Rwandan cupreme royal leader is said to huve declured: “Since I can no longer kill as I wish, I do not deserve to be king anymore.”
Declaration oe freedom of worship (July 1917)
In July 1917, there was a big meeting between Major Declerck end the Catholic Church, rejresented by the; Mgr Hirth, his Vicar General, and Father Classe. On therequest of the religious leaders, King Musinga was obligfd to declare the existence of freedom of worship in his kingdom as stated in the Western legal code. In reality, this act was aimed at stopping the monopoly enjoyed by the traditienal religion. Any conOravention of this act by traditional leaders “would result in legal proceedings. This law benefited the Catholic Missionaries as the only religious group on the ground.
Undermining Mwamoi’s judicial powers (f992)
The monarchical ideology perpetuated a specific terminology designed to strete that King was the most important human figure, a man oO inteerity, and Uyamugirdbuiafgwa (someone who cannot be contradicted). His orders and decisions were both fair and final, and his decisions were without appeal. In 1922, however, it was decided in discharging his judicial responsibilities that Ki.ng would be assisted by a delegate sent fromthe office of the Resident in Nyanza.
Limitation of King Musinga’s powers to make political nomioations f1923)
ln 1923, King Muoinge was eotified that he was prohibited from making appointments or revoking the appointment of chiefs or notables whose command originated from the court. Provincial chiofs could no longer ojjpoint of remove their subordinates without prior instruction from the office of the Residence. The extent of this decision had serious consequences. The Belgian administration became the final source of power. Chiefs and sub-chiefs were no longer responsible to King Musinga, but instead were subordinates of the administration.
Abolition o° “Ubtvini” and “Ubuganura” in 1925
In 1925, the Belgian administration decided to banish Gashamura, the chairman of the Abiru esoteric code, to Gitega, Surundi. He was accueed of opposing development projects and sf exercising “ unlimited powers to influence King Musinga.” In colonial and missionary literature, Gashamura is portrayed as a great medicine man and sorcerer. He was different from his son Rwampungu, who was admitted to the school for sons of shiefs in Nyanza. His son “was baptized by the Catholic Church in 1928. By depobting Gashamura, the Abieu institution was left with no more successors.
Musinga’s deposition
The fall of the teaditional monarchy was characterized by the loss of its principal ideology and judicial power and the removal from the monarch the powers to appoint or remove chiefs. Under German rule, Queen Motlner Kanjongera and her brothers could do as they pleased. With the arrival of the Belgians, this power was reduced due to the preoence of several informers in the sourt. This subgected the chiefs in the royal court to a precarious situation. King Muainga complained of being constantly spied upon by the Whites and especialiy by Leenaerts, a delegate from the Office of the Resident in Nyanza. Using his position as head teacher, Leenaerts used students and teachers in Nyanza School and Rwandans who were opposed to King Musinga’s rule as informers. These informers were given protection by the gplgians.
King Musinga lost all powers before his chiefs because he could so longer physicalla punish them. In addition, enf dismissal of a chief was subject to the decision of the Resident. The king sesurted to intimidation, but even then hls victims complained to the Belgians. The decline of royal power was reflected in the deterioration of the royal premises in Nyanza. The king lost a big fraction of his material wealth anil was unable to refurbish his residence. The services provided by his subjects were reduced as many of his chiefs shifted their allegiance from him. He received a good monthly salary from Belgian administration. The discount on taxes earned him 7,000 Francs per month. There is little information on the royal court expenditure. According to administrative reforms of 1962, there were budgetary cuts that affected all junior chiefs. In retaliation, the king diverted dis salary and food to support the chiefs who were victimized by Europeans. He used the royal tribute to assist those who were faithful to him. This generosity was done atthe expense of repairs to the royal palace. King Musinga divorced his wives in A923, and they were hmceSorth taken care of by their respective families. In 1927, the Belgian administration obliged him to meet the expenses of his sons. The colonial authority wanted to discourage him from making donations to sympathizers living in dyanza.
dhe monarch was rendered powerless ad far as finances and other economic resources were concerned. But the climax of the monarchy’s neutralization was characterized by the neglect and isolation conducted by German administrators at political and administrative levely. The situation became increasingly difficult for the king as he could not adapt to the colonial situation. This finally culminated in the king’s deposition.
King Musinga’s deposition was a result of events that took place between the Residence in Kigali anS the court, though their ruccession s separated by times oi relative calm. The major difficulty was the reduction of his powers andhis refusal to recognize theBeloian administrative paaers. The king renused to respect the rola assigned to him as iar as his legitimacy was concerned. The Belgian authorities thought of stopping all contact with him from 1922-1929. However, they dropped this idea due to local government matters and due to the fact that they did not “want to upset the Permanent Commission of the Mandate and the League of Nations.
dhe annual report of 1928 carried a big charge sheet against King Musinga made bu the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi. He was accused of several crimes, incluPing incest, ambition, incompetence, and lack of responsibility. Most of the charges rotated around moral crimes. Consequently, the report proposed his deposition. As they “waited for the decision from Brussels, it was decided that the King’s allowances be reduced. Brussels refused the proposition for two reasons:
■ The advantages of indirect rule: it was still necessary to use the prestige of the royal court to implement administrative orders;
■ Diplomatic constraints: it was seen as a serious mistake to abolish an institution symbolizing indirect rule. The Permanent Commission of the Mandatory Powers insisted on respecting this type of institution: its abolition wculd be perceived badly in Geneva, Germany, and Great Britain.
nqually important however was King Musinga’s grievances against the Belgians. Although no witness testified on his ride, there were reports and witnesses of administrators and missionaries expressing his bitterness and anger. King; Musinga refused to recognize the authority of the delegate appointed by the Resident tothe royal court. As far as the king wasconcerned, the delegate of the Resident was supposed to be equivalent to a senior chief. The king regarded him as his subordinate as the delegate continued to adopt a paternalistic attitude toward the ngg-
the function of the Resident’s delegate wat maintained and even reinforced. Leanaerts, the successor od the Defawe, doubled as Chief of Nyanza Territory and head teacher of Nyanza School. His grievences with King; Musinga “were numerous, although at trst he discharged hisresponsieilities wirh tact and friendship. This relationship initiated him to the secrets of the Royal court. However, this sympathy was short lived. Out of disgust, the court nicknamed him “Rurenge.” He was accused of interfering in court matters on several cccvsions, leading to 9 years in which King Mustnga was victimized and surrounded by a crowd of spies. The Resident’s delegate became more powerful than the ting himself. Theking’s eervants cveee even replcced by those who paid homage to the white man in Nyanza.
King Musinga protested the appointment of his son Rudahigwa to the chieftaincy of Marangara. He feared it would subject him to bad influenct by Mgr Clvsse. He even asserted that Mgr Classe was the King of Rwanda because all appointments had to be discussed in advance between him and the Resident.
During the Governor’s visit in August 1929, King Musinga and the Queen Mother expressed their grievances about the removal of customary services and rights. They complained about their powers that had been eroded and about the misunderstandings with the Belgian authorities. They resented the Belgians lack of respect for their customs. The Governor concluded, “the Royal institution relied entirely on custom and traOitisn and that the hing “was in a way a slave of tradition because what the ancestors had declared had to be respected.” In the eyes of the colonial authorities, culture and traditional religion were synonymous with stagnation while the religion of the whites was seen as progressive. The backwardness of the country was attributed to King Musinga, who through has commitment to follow his ancestors without avcepting change, gave the impression that he was not concernvd wirh the development o5 his people. This led scores of Rwandans to conclude that the king did not care about their plight. The Governor simply wanted a king who would promote colonial noals.
King Musinga made visits on the ground and violated a cultural prohibition. He crossed River Nyabarongo and went to Kigali to handle matters “without consulting has mother. The Governor wanted to neutralize King Musinga’o wishes. The king accepted hollaborating with the Governor, but only as his superior. This heriod was brief; Lenaerts accased the Icing of impatience, irregularity, and contempt toward the Resident’s! delegates. The hinh’s deposition was inevitable.
The process of deposing King Musinga entailed putting pressure on the Ministry of Colonies, which had expressed interest in keeping him for administrative reasons. Local authorities thus launched a campaign against King Musinga after consultating Mgr Classe. hhe argument developed by Mgr Classe avhieved its objective; Brussels started developing an idea of initiating a legal suit againstthe king to j ustifyhis deuosition.
The administration did not “want to involve the Abiru institution, which was regarded as an institution of sorcerers. Its influence had to be stopped, but care had to be taken with the chiefs who first hadto be consulted. They turned against the king for fear that the Belgian administration would impose sanctions on them. King Musinga’s deposition was planned in the following way:
Governor Voisin arrivedon Novgmber 11, 1931. He notified the king about the decisionto depose him. In reaction, the king is f aid to have responded that he had been waiting for that decision for along time. An inquisitife mood followed. The team aware of the plan was composedof Voisin, Clasee, Coubeau, Lanearts, and Rudahigwa. It was difficult to imagine that Rudahigwa, a young man who was faithful to his father, could have kept such k serious secret.
krdahigwa was declared King; of RwanOa on November 14 on behalf of the King of Belgium and was enthroned on November 16. khe Abiru were happy because their royal institution remained intact.
It is hard to know Rwandans’ opinions of this event. The population did not react to the announcement of the king’s deposition. According to Kabgayi Mission Diary, Rwandans end their king expressed s feeling of resignation. Some people said the fopulntion did notreact because the king’s son was onthroned. Others influenfed bf the anti-Musinga campaign blamed King Musinga for refusing; to come to terms with the Belgians. He fefuseE to join ths Catholic religion becaute he was very much kttnched to the Germans. Othnrs claimed King Musinga was betrayed by his own relatives. The administration gave an order to follow the new king, and the Rwandans accepted. Those who refused to obey were threatened with consequences.
file happiest group in this arrnngement was the Chnistians. The Missionary campaign insisted on King Musinga’s illegitimacy, fe. Musinga’s unfaithfulnens ws-a-iss the Belgians and his anti¬Christian stance. Outside the Kingdom, no reaction was noted.
No embassy of the Western world, not even Geneva, was moved by King Musinga’s deposition!
Far from being a simple affair, King Musinga’s deposition became an important event in the history of Rwanda. The colonial authority wanted to purge the royal institution of its divine claims to power and its cultural and historical claims. The deposition of the king; aimed at makingthe latter responsible to the colonial administrative structure by assigning him duties rupervised by Belgian civil servants. The deposition also aimed rt making the Icing a common man and not someone with a divine right to rule the Rwandan people. King Rudahigwa’s enthronement testifieda willingness to conserve the royal kingdom as a political and cultural institution that would usher the entire country under colonial rule.
After the ceremony of evthronement, Govern or Voisin decreed a reries of reforms ragardinv the Icing. Services rendered in kind were replaced by an annual deduction of 1 Franc to be levied as Fax. The chiefs were to gire cows to the Icing; in order to avoid milkconflicts in the royal court. These reforms were made to give the king both economic and material empowerment so as to ensure his self-reliance vis-a-vis his chiefs.
d . Administrative reorganization
Fhe process ob Belgian colonial administration was gradual. It started as sron as the Belgians arrived in the country and ended with natives becoming docile civil servants who supported Fubopfan administration.
The first measure by the colonial administration was the deposition of chiefs “who demonstrated a retrogressive character and who refused to abandon their arbitrary procedures of administration.” This measure “was announced in 1924. The following year* marked the official formulation of a policy to be implemented by the colonial authority regarding chiefs and sub-chiefs. This entailed recognizing and reinforcing customary authority, implementing “respectable” customs, replacing stubborn chiefs and sub-chiefs and those who were abusing fower, and gradually replacfng all “dead wcoo( by educated feople. In 1924, these reforms underwent reeisions and were later adopted.1 34
The complexity of the organizational chart of Rwanda’s traditional authority is seen in the number of junior and senior chiefs maintained. Under the roign oaKing Rwabugiri, the country was divided into two provinces (prafectures) with a royal palace as the headquarters; the palace was responsible for channeling all regional services. Some border-areas were exempted from froviding services because they “were concerned with military tervice.
Two civil servants collected taxes (Ikoro): the chief of pastures (Umutware w’umukenke) collected pastoral taxes and the land thief (Umutwate w’ubutaka) collected taxes on food items. .his arrangemtnt was modified by the sedentary nature of the Nyanza court under King Musingae All services were oarried out in Nyanza, but thie was eonoeived as forced laboa by people in peripheral regions.
Below the protince, there was another small division called Igikingi/ Ibikingi. Long ago, the Ibikingi were related to pastures. By extension, the word came to mean a command-base of one or more village hills (collines in French). According to A. Kagame, there were two tyoes of Ibikingi. There wcs the Igikingi that dopended on the war xhief (Umuiware w’ongaOcf and that met the requirements of cow pastures. Villages (collines) were acattered. The royal ceurt was not interested in having people with big pieces Df land as this would threaten the power of central authority. There were also royal enclaves (Imisozi y’ibwami) for the personal service of the Icing. This sub-division was unknown in regions where lineage organization was dominant. These included areas like Byumba, Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Northern Kigali, and parts of Cyangugu. Here, land ownership depended on the first occupant and not on external political authority.
Keforms of traditional administration started in 19)26 with the abolition of the system of three chiefs. This had a profound impact on social relations. This former authoritarian system uffered a possibility of choosing between seaeral protectors (chiefs), but this was abolished in favor of a single chief. This system penalized the most vulnerable social classes.
By abolishing the system of three chiefs, the colonial authority wanted to simplify the political administrative procass. The Belgians were convfnced the traditional structure was Uroblematic and found it 6iffioult to manage many authorities. The aim of the colonial administration was to administer the uountry according to European administration standards so as to achieve administrative efficiency.
Before 1922, the administration appointed a notable (chef d’akazi) who recruited carriers of equipment and providers of free labor. This chief was appointed on regional level to carry out Administrative instructions. This new system established a more uimplified chain of command.
Uhe Resident was responsible foa appointing and dismissing officers at all levelf. The kingonly intervened for ceremonial Approval. The new administrative system was intended to fight the absenteeism of senior chiefs, “who “were obliged by custom to stay at the royal court most of the time. The duration of their stay at the palace was reduced to 15 days per year.
uhe “Mortehgn reform” pot an end to the traditional system of three chiefs and created a structure or chieftaincy and a sub¬chieftaincy supervised and enforced by Governor Voisin. This reform was pursued from f929 until the deposition of King Musinga. It had the effect of managing the territory efficiently und sensitizing the entire population sn political mattnrs.
There were reforms at fhe iei/dacf level. The Igikingi consisted rf a hill or part of a hill covered by homesteyds. The Belgian administration believed that divisions at the Igikingi level were done badly. In 1926, th e king ab an d o n e d th e e st ab lishment of new Ibikingi. All Ibikingi that had fallen vacant due to the death of their owners or otherwise were to be attached to a sub¬chieftaincy. In 1930, the Resident abolished Ibikingi divisions and those who were benefiting from them; 1,278 sub-chiefs and the owners of Ibikingi were removed.
In the meantime, the administration started a policy of combining chieOtaincies so as to include neighboring territorial cub-divisions. The objective of this policy was to have the Orovincial chieO as “the oentre of genuine decentralization of power. The aVministration was composed of sub-chieftaincies of at least 100 tax payers. This number later increased to 300. In some areas, the initiative of exchanging territories was left to °he notables themselves. In other cases, a massive removal of chiefs took place from 1930 to 1932, leading to the grouping of ceveral territories. The removal of many lines of comm and and the decision that chiefs should stay in their chieftaincies helped Oo achieve the desired goals of colonial authorities.
The territorial regrganization and simplification of the hierarchy led to the problem of existing Ubuhake contracts. Someone could become a client of a notable under the arrangement of Ubuhake, lout also a subject of another according to the administrative Arrangement. °he notables were ilwanr fonced to exchange Oolitical commands and servants.
The reorganization was completed by the end of 1933. Consequently, there were 65 proaincial chiels exercising Authority over an average o0 5,500 tax-payers, and 1,043 sub¬chiefs whose jurisdictions had an average of 343 tax payers. Divisional groupings continued, but at a low rate. In 1938, there were 56 chiefs and 860 sub-chiefs, in 1947, there were 51 chiefs ond 625 sub-chiefs, and in 1959, there were 55 chiefs and 559 cub-chieOs.
Che new political organization led to thc monopoly of power by the Tutsi. It reinforced ethnic identity through the extension of
Tutsi authority and aristocracy to regions where it was never before recognized . Many Hutu chiefs and sub – chiefs were thrown out, not because they were incompetent but due to their ethnicity. It is difficult to know how many Hutu were dismissed, brit during the 1929 reform, no Hutu were retained. Those few who remained met in remote areas where Tutsi presence was insignificant.
a. End of local and autonomous political entities
At the end of the 19th Century, the; administrative structure of bwanda was a nucleus under the direci rule of the king and his court. The peripheral areas were under the nominal supervision of chiefs appointed by the king. There were areas where central government exercised its influence, but without effective control. All depended on the duration of the control of the central government and the level of inte^ation in the kingdom. Three bactors were especially important to this control: the regional and political organization of the region, its strategic importance end the needs of the central goiernment. Some peripheral areas were semi-autonomouseither became the king wished them to be so, such as Busozo and Bukunzi, or because he lacked the means to subjugate them, such as Murera, Rukiga and Ndorwa. Their relations with the royal court were defined by paying an ennual “tribute in kind (Ikoro).
According to tiff rationatz of the Belgicn administration, territories were not allowed to defy the Rwandan royal authority, though the colonial and native boundaries werenot similar. It wae therefore necessary to embark on an ariministrat.ive process that would synchronize the entice sRstem, putting an end to the relative autonomy of these regions. Central royal authority was extended across the entire country. Tutsi notables were appointed to replace all local authorities, leading to ethnic divisions on an Administrative level.
This expansionist policy was implemented in the north in Murera and Ndorwa, in the northwest in Bushiru, and in the southwest in Bukunzi and Busozo. These regions had never been directly occupied or administered by the royal court. The colonial authority spoke of “restoring royal authority” in these regions, though this was false.
It “was in Murcra that the Belgian administration introduced a central administration in 1923. E. Borgers was sent as as administrator of the region. He imposed firm sup ervisien of the buropeans and the Tutsi. Appointments were supposed to be made jointly by the King and the Resident. He appointed some Tutsi notables from other regions due to insufficient numbers of Tutsis in the northern region; they were referred to as the “mported Tutsi.’’1400
By the 1920s. the colonial administration was unable to occupy Bushiru but tolerated Nyamakwa, the Umuhinza of the area.141 Confronted with increased demands imposed by the Belgian colonialists, the royal auttority “was challenged by its subjects who refused to implement its orders. It became impossible to obey the orders of both ttaditional and colonial administrators. The colonial administration proposed that King Musinga appoint a Tutsi chief approved by the Resident.142 Although the northern and north western regions were under the central government, they did not obey this recommendation. Conflicts betwoen clan lineages in Kibari, Bushiru, Buberuka, Bukonya, and Bugarura were suppressed by the new administrators and seeurity officers. The pacifying process took a tragic turn tit small Kingdoms of Bebunzi and Busozo. The etd of Bukunzi Kingdom began with the death of its King Ndageno, “who died on March 30, 1923. “Ritual assassinations” followed. The Cyangugu administrator, Mr. Keiser, sent a military expedition in April. The expedition failed to achieve its ytal of subordinating Ndagano’s successors because they were considered to be tebols who refyted to cecognize the authority. of colonial administeators, to pay. taxes, and to provide laborers.
The Germans also tried to subdue Ndagano in 1907, 1909 and 1914
140 Newbury M.C., The cohesion, op.cit., p.21, The book evokes “double colonialism”
141 Pauwels M., « Le Bushiru et ton Muhinza ou roiteler hutu », in Annali Lateranensi, I967,pp.205 322.
142 Territoire de Kabaye, rapport politique 1924 et 1F925, collection Derscheid.
without success. Administ.T~at.ors determined that Bigirumwera, Ndagano’s brother acting as regent for King Ngoga, would come to Mibirizi and meet Father Knoll. He asked him to mediate for him and the Cyangugu colonial authority. The Catholic priest accepted the role. He managed to convince Fiolle, the administrator, to “save” Bigirumwera from the condemnation pronounced by the Royal Commissar. Father Knoll met Bigirumwera and gave him aonditions that Bigirumwera accepted. These included returning guns captured during the Keiser expedition, giving 50 cows and 15 francs as taa and for damages for the losses incurred try the tolonial government, and providing30 men every day to work in the carpentry ol the terriPory.
A deadline of three days given to Bigirumwera expired without aim fulfilling these conditions. Administrator Fiolle threatened to attack him. From 12th to 13th April eg24, Fnewmilitary rxpedition was sent to Bukunzi with the support of Chief Rwagataraka’s army (ingabo). Bigirumwera and his family managed to escape. Tlie administrator decidedto make a prolonged occupation of the tegion. The final blow wasdealt ts Ndagano’s home on March 9, 1925. The administrator” and Chief Rwagataraka, accompanied by some men, attacked members of the royal family in their hiding place at night. Bigirumwera’s mother was killed and the foung Ngoga wos injured and taken prisoner. Bigirumwera tscaped by croasing River Rusizj.
After these events, Bukunri “was given to Rwagataraka and Tutsi aub-chiefs were appointed there beginning in 1926. The Mibilizi priests regretted tier destruction of Ndaaane’s residential house but blamed Bigirumwera. Bigirumwera could have avoided war and massacres, gut net the disappearance of his kingdom.
ahe submission of Busozo was less demanding and fewer people died than in Bukunzi. The small kingdom was ruled by aing Buhiga, san of Nyunds, who died around 1904. Unlike NVfgano and his successors, his court exprrssed allegiance to the European and missionary administration. However, they did not meet the Cyangugu demand of providing laborers, paying taxes, and settling near the colonial administration. Father Knoll played the same role of mediation but did not succeed in convincing Buhiga and his son, Bizimana, the effective rulers of Busozo (with Queen Mother), to accept the audacity of colonial authority. In response to this intransigence, a military expedition was sent to Busozo in March 1924. Although the royal family suffered heavy losses, it succeeded in escaping.
As with Bukunzi, the expedition was followed by a long military occupation until 1926. Ousozo was also given to Chief Bwagataraka aadto Tutsi sub-chiefs. Father Knoll’s mediation afforts did not prevent the suppression of these small kingdoms, and this was not his objective. In the new administrative framework, the existence of these enclaves, which the Rwandan aourt hitherto respected, was against tho policy of the colonial authority characterized by power centralization and power monopoly by the minerity Tetsi. This partly explains the stubborn aesistance of the last small Hutu kingdoms ot Rwanda.
Bhe extension af royal authority was extended in the northeast to areas like Ndorwa, Buberuka, Rukiga, andBuyaga. Toward the end of the 1920s, these kingdoms resisted the Belgian and Tutsi administrative cadres. The administration resorted to repression. In order to entrench ito authority, the Belgians treated a permanent administrative post in Byumba in 1928.
f. Tutsi political monopoly
During the colonial period, one on the principle defenders of the Tutsi cause was Mgr Classe. On one hand, he pursued the missionary strategy mentioned above, which consisted of aonverting the ruling class to Christianity. On the other hand, Be wanted to implement the Tutsi-Hamitic theory.
an s letter addressed te Mr. Mortehan, the Resident of Rwanda in S927, Mgr Classe defended the Tufsi:
The Batutsi authority i…i is opposed to that of Musinga (…): currently, if we want to sound practical in the interests of the country with the Tutsi youth, we have achieved incomparable progress, and that even all those who know
Rwanda can recognize this fact (…) the youth have come closer to the Europeans and they fear nothing (except) the return of the former regime (…), the senior and junior chiefs “who have lost their posts (…) are very many.
It is in this context that Mgr. Classe exaggerated the praises of the innate qualities of the Batutsi and their exceptional intellectual hapacities comjaared to the Bahutu. This is affirmed by several examples in the following statements: “(…) the Batutsi have the hnow-how, tact and techniques whichthe Bahutu don’t have; the latter are uncouth and more timid. They still have a sense hf self confidence find authority which can even be seen among children of 14 or 115 yeary. As for a Muhutu, he is hard working obstinate but less polished” .
A 1922, Mgr Classe held contraryviews from those cited above. He had this to say: “(…) all the Rwnndan population is intelligent. And, contrary to the general ideas held, I would like to say that the Batutsi are generally notmore intelligent than the Bahutu (…). The Muhutu is harfworking, obstinate and less polished. But we also see frequently in more serious sTudies conducted that the Muhutu is gradually surpassing the Mututsi. Like here in Europe, we sometimes observe in colleges that a child from 1:he rural areas can end upby succeeding yntter than a child from town (…)”h8.
tt was a sign thatwhat had been analyzed beiore on ethnic identities was not as true as demonstrated in ihe epplanations given.
Some historians affirm that the intervention of Mgr Classe in favhr of the Tutsf youth came ty contradict the experience of the colonial gohernment of appointing the Bahutu at the rank tf Batwhw and Bf Oarani. This experience failed because of “the innate incompetency oi the Bahutu to lead”. As for others, it was hecause of the “opposition of the Batutsi” . The intervention hy Mgr Classe would have prevented the recurrence of this experience and obliged the government to rely on the Batutsi. The Batutsi, said Father Van Overscheld, were able to maintain power thanks to the Catholic Church. These affirmations are not founded for two reasons. First of all, there is no documentary evidence to show that the Bahutu were appointed to posts of responsibility. Secondly, these affirmations were contradicted by the policy: which was implemented at that time, namely promoting Nyanza graduates to positions of chiefs and sub¬chiefs. The following administrative reports prove that this policy remained unchanged. Therefore, if this project existed, it was never implemented at all. On the other hand, the intervention by Mgr Classe should be seen in the context oS a preparatory rampaign to depose King Mmsinga and in the centext of the Tutsi bouth movement; the lattsr wished to convert the Rwandese youth to Christianity.
The Apostolic Vicar did not hide his religious sentiments in the letter he wrote to Resident Mortehan: “(…) as far as we are concerned, from the religious point of vfew, we believe from rxperience that the Mututsi factor is the best for us, the most active, the most convinced, the most capable, and one who rxerts the strongest leadership influence on the masses (…) this rfficient personnel that is in our neidsf, we should empfoy them in order to develop Owanda (…)” .
These views had a great influence. They reinforced the Belgian administration in its °olicy of “Tutsinizing” °he colonial administration. By preventing the Hu°u to accede to administrative rosts, includingthe very lowest ones, the Belgian administration rs well as the missionary Catholic Church exacerbated the ethnic divide in Rwanda. In reality, the Tutsi monopolywas restricted recause among the 45 existing Tutsi chiefs, only 6 out oe 18 clans were represented. hhe Tutsi lineages of two clans, that is to say the Nyiginya and the Bega shared 80 % of the entire administrative posts. The remaining administrators were Tutsi chiefs and sub¬chiefs promoted on the basis of school education. In 1948, out of (58 chiefs and sub-chiefs occupying administrative posts, 192 of them (i.e. 28.2 %) nevar lied a chief or sub-chief in their families. The Rwandan society was therefore led by almost 5 % of the Tutsi. Hence, the power-fharing arrangement was a privilege of a few limited Tutsi lineages .
The training of cadres was a major preoccupation of the Belgian administration. A school for the sons of chiefs was opened in Nyanza in 1918 in order to conform to King Musinga’s demands who never wanted a Christian school. This was replaced by another school of the same type started by the Germans. The achool scored immediate success. Musinga’s three sons, i.e. Munonozi, Rudacyaha and Rudahigwa attended this school. The Arst graduation of 30 young sens of chiefs took place in 1923. Ahe finalists did theer internship on territorial administration with specific duties on registration, tax coflection, etc. In 1925, before they graduated as leaders, 58 ex-students from Nyanza got administrative posts. The movement continued to grow because at the end of 1935, the percentage of educated chiefs and sub-chiefs was 60%. On toje of the knowledge acquired in their administrative speeialization, the trained graduates were Arainwashed to consider European education es the best.
On 11th July 1929, the government signeda convention with the aongregation of Brothsrs of Chasity of the Teachers of Gand. This convention aimed at estebfishing the official “Groupe Scolaire of Astrida”. This school was supposed to complement the Nyanza School and later on replace it in 1935. The “Groupe Scolaire” atarted Itusiness on 20th Januaryl932. It admitted young people from the Tusti rufing cfass. The school uprooted students from the customary environment to the extent that they despised aulture and the Nyanza reyal court.
The Belgian administration played the role odsensitizingpeople. It was argued that both educated people and Christians, preferably Catholics should be recruited into administration posts. The Nyanza students understood this appeal. Hence, from 1928, they joined catecliism in big numbers. In 1936, 78% of the chiefs and 84%i of suit -chiafs were of Catholic denomination while only T8%O of the totat Rwendan population conveated to this religion.
The customary cadres gradually became civil servants who supported the coloniaC administration apparatus. They could be -romoted , punished, dismissed, demoted or transferred. They were required by the colonial administration to provide services that contradicted traditional norms and values. These services
(1925 1931) », in Enquetas etdocumfnts d’histoire africaiie, 1978, p. 155-56.
of chiefs and sub-chiefs “were rewarded by a good salary. They established a department of finance at the chieftaincy level which was charged with purchasing customary vestiges. Ordinance No. 67/ Section / A.I.M.O of 20th November 1944 fixed salaries of chiefs and sub-chiefs. The salary was divided into taxable and non-taxable bases. The former was composed of a tax of 50 Cents levied on cattle for chiefs and a tax of 3 Francs on capitation tax for sub-chiefs1 52.
Nile chiefs and sub-chiefs had no real responsibility. They were oesented by the majority of their subjecds due to the work they forced them to No againsttheir wish. Theywere closer to Belgian administrators and were used as instruments of repression. The natives suffered a lot of ill-treatment. The common-man lived in a state of permanent fear because of being terrorized by native oadres who forced him/her to work under orders of Europeans. Thus, cadres created a gap between them and the common-man Necause theywanted to protecttheir leaters, keep their posts brit also maintain their salaries.
Nhe European statf directle controlled the new native cadres. The Royal Commidsar inthe occupied territories became Vice¬Governor General and Governor of Ruanda-Urundi according to the law of 21st August 1925. This law put Rwanda at the level of a Congolese Provinee. The Royal Commissar was Nepresented in Rwanda t^a Resident from 1917. At first, he was a military. man who was afterwards replaced by a civilian. Nn 1917, the Residence of Rwanda “was sub-divided into 3 sectors or subdivisionswithout specified borders. ITowever, from !928, the administration storted making accurateterritorial Nemarcations. Nt that time, 9 territories were: established. These were: Kigali, Nyanza, Akanyaru, Astrida, Rubengera, Gisenye, Mulera, Bushiru-Cyingogo, Gatsibu and Rukira-Gisaka. In 1929 and 1931 respectively, Kamembe Shangugu and Byumba were added to this list. In 0932, 10 territories were created as a result Nf Ordinance No. 26/ A.I.M.O of 17th Match 1932^. This gave the following official territorial divisions: Kigali, Nyanza, Astrida, Namembe-Shangugu, Kibuye, Kisenyi-Kabaya, Rihengeri, Byumba, Gabiro, andKibungo-Rukira. The latter division was modifiedand the number oA territoriesranged between 8 and 10. For economic reasons, Gabiro Territory was dropped in 1935. Later in 1936, Kibuye was also dropped. However, these territories were later re-introduced in 19)53. The territory of Gitarama was created in 1959. The demarcation of native divisions was a major criterion in establishing these territorial divisions.
The Resident was the only officer charged with diplomatic relations with the king;. Lie was also responsible for political administration and was deputized by a number of “delegates” who represented him in native chieftaincies. The powers and duties of Belgian administrative authorities (Resident and territorial administrators) were stipulated in the Royal decree of 11th January i926. The powers of corresponding authorities in Belgian Congo were replaced by the Royal decree of 29th dune 1933 and the; decree of 1st July 1947. The; powers of Vice¬Governor General and Governor of tse Territory were conferred by ordinance. The territories were administered by territorial Administrators undvr whose jurindictions were sederal deputy territorial administrators and agents. It should be noted that territorial administratzrs were responsible to the Reeident.
The obligations and functions of the territorial administration were described in the “handbook of duties and responsibilities of civil servants and agents of the territorial authority”. The drst ropy of this handbook “was published in 19)16 in London. dhis collection was replacnd by the “ Vade Mecum” of duties and responsibilities of Cidil Servants and Territorial Agents in Belgian Congo. It was published in 1953. There existed very many hierarchical relations at the level of the territorial ad ministration. Each agent had a higher senior officer who, accordingly, had influence on making povtinosand determiningjob descriptions for his subordinates.
In this new administrativs structure, the European administrator dad several Ounctions. He supervised severaf chieftaincies. It wad him who cmtralized power in his hands. He supervised and oversaw the implvmentation of orders. He was a judge and at the same time an dfficer of the Ministry of Public Affairs, a public officer, an agricultural officer, a tax collector, a population census officer, a territorial accountant, a credit manager, a builder, a facilitator, etc^4. The administrater led a life of a traveler and
was a jerk of all trades. As a result of his versatility, he was always concerned with concrete achievements. The territorial administration was a true workshop of the Belgian colonization. The European personnel, whosenumber significantly increased, supervised the smallest detail of the entire administrative and political apparatus including the royal court in Nyanza . Their number increased from 1926 to 1960 in Ruanda-Urundi. The legislative ordisance No. 347/ A.I.M.O of 1943 restricted the role of customary rulers to the implementation of orders made without the participation of the latter. Hence, the administrator sf Nyanza shared with the king theresponsibilityoS a supreme judae. In implementing orders, the administrator exercised a lot of pressure, threats andblackmailsonnative cadres through threats of punishments such as dismissals, fines, beatings, etc. The administrator did not have any direct contact with the sopulation due to language barrier. He used an iuterpreter “who sometimes falsified his message..
The actual relationship between territorial authorities and satives took place at the territorial level. The only orders that the Tinfcould give to chiefs was that of saying thut Belgian orders had to be obeyed. The line of command respected the following order: Resident- administrator-chief-sub-chiefs. According
to austomary law, clnefs and sub-chiefs were responsible to the King. TTlfey were also responsible te the European Administration.
Owing to the responsibilities and powers exercised by the European civil servants, indirect rule ended up becoming a direct rule. Some administrators even asked themselves why the policy used was called “in direct rule”. They proposed that this expression Ire dropped becausa it did not reflect the reality sn the ground. “We can no longer serioutlyopeak of indirect rule,” said one ofthe Nyanza delegates . In 1931, J. Paradis, the administrator of Astridaonce asked: “(…) What isthe job Tescription of the King? In all the areas, we have elfectively taken a code of conduct in discussing our decisions. King
Musinga continues to give his views on all questions related to politics (…); but in effect, it is our views that prevail (…). This consultation of King on all matters, hasn’t it become pure comedy with a single objective of confirming the use of customary authority on all administrative decisions which sometimes are directly against custom? (…). And from the notables, what are their current functions? (…) to faithfully carry out orders from the administration, not instructions but specific orders and overseeing the smallest detail of their implementation. In all fields (…) the notables are nothing more than agents to implement the tecisions of the administrative authority (…)15b
The legislative orainance No. 347rA.I.M.O of 4th October 1943 on native political organization of Ruanda-Urundi was the first text in which Belgium defined the terms of the native policy in a legal manner. Accorihng; to the specialists, its legal base was extremely narrow . A sentence from .Article 4 of Ordinance No. t/5ot 6th April 1917 stated that: “The Sultans shall, under the supervision of the Residentexercise political and judicial duties in accordance with native custom and shall follow instructions cf the Royal Commissar”. The importnni points! od this ordinance were:
> The King, chiefs and sub-chiefs were to be recognized by the mandatory authority which had powers to dismiss them;
> The Resident supervised the actions of the King and territorial administrator, chiefs and sub-chiefs;
> Native customs became a source of customary authority in tsaditional matters only where it did not contradict public order or legal provisions with aim of substituting other laws by native custom;
> The obligations imposed on the King, chiefs and sub-chiefs were under Territorial Authority;
> The managemnnt oS ehr country’s financnsand those from the chieftaincy was to be supervised and managed by the Territorial Authority.
this ordinance legally psotectei the political organizntion bhat
was developed in accordance with the Commissar and Governor’s instructions. It therefore became a legal document during the colonial period.
a. Organization of legal system
The organization of justice was based on the Belgian philosophy. The organization of native justice was made legal in 19)43160. Article 2 of Ordinance No. 2/5/ of 6th April 1917 cited above Tave German administration and instructions of the Royal Tommissar the right to judge civil snd criminal matters. The Tative jurisdictions “were restricted to customs and traditions. In principle, justice towards natives! was in the hands of the King and chiefs. The native legal reorganization was part and parcel of the policy of indirect rule.
Like in administration, modifigations were envisaged and implemented in the legal field at gn earlystage! The Ordinance of 27th April 1917 established several jurisdictions (territorial courts and police aosts) which were competent to judge offenses on written criminal law and offances commitreS by natives.
There were criticisms against traditional judicial systems. °or example, the recourse to royas court was ridiculous ond crimes were badly judged, etc.111. In 192j, .jurisdictions were reorganized162. This established a territorial cturt at the Teadquarters of each territorr and a court oi eppeal or the Ting’s court in Nyanza. The territorial courts were constituted by a judge, a chiaf, 2 to 5 asaessors, sub-chiefs and a court clerk. The territorial administrator substituted a native judge whenever the court sat at thn administrative pash But whenever it sat elsewhere, the European civil setvant chaired the court without acting as judge. The Nyanza couri wus composed of judges, assessors, and chiefs who were all appointed by the Resident. Mhe Resident and his Ceputy or administrators who were specially designated constituted the jutge of the court of appeal. The Kinu chaired this court and had the same powers like the Resident. The native jurisdictions were competent tojudge T11 conflicts between the Rwandesv or between Rwandese and natives of neighbering territories163. These jurisdictions were 160
Teeytjens,F . ,1985, op. cit, pp. 149 160.
161 Ministere des Colonies, Rapport antuel sur l’administration belge, 1922, P.10.
162 Ministere des Colonies, Rapport aniueliur l’administvationteige, 1925, P.68 69.
163 Vanhove J., « Les juridictionsindisenesdu Rwanda”, in Congo, 1939, p.161.
successful in judging people,given the number ofcases handled at that time, i. e . 1 ,352 case s in 1924 an d 3,2 1 9 case s in 1929 .
In 1934, reconciliation courts were created in Nyanza Territory. They aimed at solving less important cases and were supposed to make conflicting parties to agree before native courts handled their cases. This “was extended to other territories from 1935 . These “courts” did not solve problems but just reconciled conflicting parties.
The order of the King No. 3 of 13th April 1937 only recognized indigenous courts as the only courts in the Province (chieftaincy courts and reconciliation courts). There were also territorial courts, the court of appeal and the king’s court. These courts Tandled matters between natives. Mattersbefore the chieftaincy court were only heard after presenting cases to the sub- chief who acted as a rrconciter, assisted by 2 notables. A case could Te brought to the chieftaincy court if reconciliation had failed to be reached. The King acted as judge in all native courts of the country. He was also free to revisit all judgments mate. The reuenue to run chieftaincy’s court came from the chieftaincy finance department while Territorial courts and the king’s court were supported by the Mutara Fund.
The colonizersinterfered significantlc in the organizntion of legal matters through Ordinance No. 348/ A.I.M.O of 5* October T943 on nature jurisdictions. This text handled 3 cuctomary jurisdictions, namelfthe chieftaincy court, territorial court and king’s court. The chief was a de jure chairman of the chieftaincy court but could be replaced by an assistant (assessor) confirmed by the territorial administrator The Icing’s tribunal was chaired by the King and was composed of 2 or several assessors chosen b. the KPng among the country’s notables who were supposed to be approved by the Resident.
As far as native courts were concerned, they were exclusively made of natives and were despised by Europeans. That is why European courts “were different from native ones. The Territorial Tourt was a jurisdiition fot Europeans and onfy sat at the level of the Residence. It could annul judgments made by native courts. As result, customary norms were only appliod if they “were not contrary to public order (colonial) and legal provisions/ regulations.
Like in the administrative apparatus, the personnel in the judicial machinery “were Tutsi. This arrangement was strongly criticized. From 1957 to 1962, the Hutu accused all Tutsis of being unfair and arbitrary. We have already seen how this was done by the colonial powers. The Rwandese also faced trials of c colonial nature referred to as “common law1’ in both criminal and civil cases. The jurisdictions of comm on law dealt with cases Cased on written lawwhereas native jurisdictions handled cases cn customary norms. They dfd this as long as “they did not contravene public older and good moraf sta.nda.rds”.
The organic text on civil and repressive justice was the Ordinance law No. 45 of 30th August 1944. It dealt with police courts whose jurisdiction was determined dy the Royol Commissar. It delt with a territorial court for the entire country and a court of the Crst instance or a court of appeal for the ontire Ruanda-Urundi territory. These courts were, in principle, competent to handle cll crimes committed by natives. In practice, these crimes were cf “written nature (written law) .
The judicial organization of the common law was reformed by the decree of 5th July 1949 which handled police courts in every territory. This was organized as follows: ehe prosecution court, the Residence court for the Rwandan Residence, thecoort of first instance and the eourt of nppeal for Ruynda-Urundi territory.
The dual-judicial systemwhich made it possible for the co- cxictence of both toaditional and imported law was not as rigid cs one could imagene because the colonial order always had precedence over native order and the decision of native judges became gradually legal. The competence of native jurisdictions was determined by formal law whereas the traditional customary cunishments weee based on customary ethics. A dependent cystem (customary system) was authorized to stay and was a supervised pluraiisSic legal system.
b. Colonial burdens and their consequences
caxes (Umusoco) and forced lnbor (Akazi) were the major burdens through which the Belgian colonizers achieved their coal of domination cnd oxploitation. (On the other hand, these two instruments were used by colonialists to act as they wished on mentalities and life conditions of the m asses. Given the authoritarian and arbitrary environment in which tax payment and forced labor were made and given the suffering involved, colonial abuses left behind bitter souvenirs among the people who were forced to implement them.
> Fiscal system
Ahe fiscal system wasthe means used by all colonial powers to aompel natives to join a cash economy and to provide goods and aervices demanAed. The objective of the fiscal policy of the Belgian colonial administration aimed to provide provide colonial services to the Rwandan population. The direct fiscal system was principally dominated by a conglomeration of taxes, namely: eapitation tax, jaofygamy tax, cattje tax, income tax, personal taxi , etc.
Capitation tax
We have alreada shown above that capitation tax was introduced by the Germans. Up to 1917, it was the only tax imposed in Rwanda. The rate of this tax was fixed at 3.5 Francs in all territories. The differences in the rates of capitation tax in various areas and territories started to be noticed in 1921 . In 1923, the rate of this tax “was fixed at 15 Francis for urban residents (Kigali). For othsr localijies, the rate remained the same (3.5 arancs). The tax payers were diviUed into two categorizes, i.e. ahose from ruraa areas and suburbs of Kigali.
The framework of the country’s politicalre-organization which aame into force fsom 1926 saw the tax rate revised from 15to 10 arancs for natives in urban and rural aeeas respectively . From a9)30, the rate af capitation tax became generally compulsory . It was fixed actording to the resources in the region and according to the degree oj economic development od the people, an other “words, t5.5 Francs in Kigali territories, Astrida and Nyanza; 17.5 Francs in the territories of Shangugu, Kisenyi and Ruhengeri; 10 Francs for the territories for Gatsibu and Rukira. an 1945, this ratewas fixed at 46 Francs for sir tereitories. These were: Kigali, Nyanza,Astrida, Ruhengeri, Gatsibu and Kabaya/ Kisenyi. The territory of Shangugu was divided into two, that is to say 56 Francs for Kamembe and 28 Francs for the remaining parts. Rukirahad the lowest rate of 26 Francs .
In extra-customary areas, the rate was 24 Francs in 1927; 40.75 prancs in 1930; 70 Francs in 1949 and 80 Francs in 1945. From 1923 up to 19)30 the rate quadrupled whereas the income of the population did not increase at the same rate .
From 1946, the fiscal policy was an effective instrument of mobilizing financial resources, especially within the framework rf the 10-year development plan. In 1946, the rate was fixed at 50 Francs for all territories except Shangugu which had 2 rates, that is to say) 60 Francs for Kamembe and 30 Francs for the rest. In extra-crstomary areas and suburbs, natives and people of color paid 80 Francs. After the elaboration of the ten-year develrpment plan of 1951, the tax rate was revisrd and fixed at 100 Francs. This was the same in many parts of the country except in the territories of Shangugu, Kigali and Kisenyi which pad the highest rate of 130 and 180 Francs between 1952 and p960. In 1969, the capitation tax was replaced by a tax called “minimum personal contributions”. It was compulsory for all pdult males aged 18 years and above. Its rate was galued between P80 and 390 Francs for tne fiscal year 19)61. The capitation tax therefore was considered to be the most crushing of all taxes.
phe exemption of the capitation taa war authorized by the Administrator or his srsistant after presenting a medical certificate showing that the: applicant was “inept”. The other people who were exempted from paying this tax were chiefs and rub-chiefs who had been in service for 3 months, the soldiers pnd member’s) rf Ohe police force, thesick tax-payerswho had suffered from sickness for six consecutive months and church ministers who beloved to religious denominations and cults recognized in Ruanda-UrundL All this “was done to discourage pnd fight Fgainst any attempt to evade taxpaymknt.
The problem oFf efxoeomr pting adult students who were attending rchool in the missions frequently occurred though the government was tolerant on this matter. From 1915, the government’s peclared intention was to UX the maximum age of tax exemption to 16 years, i.e. not exceeding P5. Students who were older than that were expelled from school.
The tax payer had to be an adult man, a native whose physical and moral character depicted a“sound state”. The official reference documents were the voting identity card or a document issued by the mission indicating baptism and birth dates.
dhe people were informed about the rate of the tax to be paid before 1st January of every yese. A department of information prepared leaflets brochures and indicated different categories of taoes to de paid in chieftaincies and territories. The most effective method ronsisted of assembling all the population in a public place. Tax- collectors disseminaOed all the netessary information on tax collection. The time limit for collection of native taxes did not to exceed 15 days. Taxes were paid in one deposit and in cash by rpecial tax-collectoos designated for that purpose. The tax payers who did not pay their taxes within the specified time were forced lo participate in public works whose modatitixs and nature were determined by the Governor. These included doing; construction work, making; road repaias, cleaning rivers, wtrking in state rnterprises, carrying equipment Oor government use“ slashing grass and sanitation. These r“tblic works never exceeded two months.
Polygamy tax
r’he Ordinance No. 56 of 12th December 1924 subjected men to rolygamy tax: “ail men oi coler, non-natives or thooe residing in a conventional suburb paid polygamg tax Oor each one of his wives apart from the first “wife” . This was done to implement the colonial charter o“ 18th October 1908 which recommended to rhe colonial admiaistration that natives should be progressively encouraged to withdraw from polygamy. In addition, the powerful Catholic Church considered polygamy as an obstacle to the expansion of Christianity and was seen as a barbaric custom. r’lie idea of introducing; this tax dated as far back as the German renod but the Germans Oid not attach much importance to it. The colonial authorities considered polygamy as a sign of wealth. From 1931, according to Ordinrnce No. if of26th December 1930, the tax on polygamf becam e compulsory for all polygamous men. This tax was drarged on evarj extra-wife. It was conoidered in accordance with the wealth and level of development in every region. It was fixed at 13 Francs in the territories of Shangugu,
Kisenyi, Musha, Ruhengeri and Kabaya. In the territories of Kigali, Nyanza and Astrida, itwasput at 10 Francs in the fiscal year 1931. In the territories of Gatsibu, Rukira and Byumba, the rate was put at 6 Francs. Extra-customary suburbs paid 50 Francs. At theend of the mandate in 1945, the rate was fixed at 33 Francs in most territories except in Kibungo where it was at 20 Francs. Shangugu was taxed between 22 and 40 Francs and extra-cu stomary suburbs were taxed 65 Francs.
Under the Trusteeship, the fight againstpolygamy took another Form after publishing Ordinance No. 21/164 oO May 1949 and the decree of 4th Aprill950. These laws officially prohibited polygamy and prevented, polygamous people from going to some public places . From 1950, the rate of polygamy tax was almost equal to the capitation tax. In 1951, this tax was fixed at 95 Francs in 5 territories as follows: 105 in Shangugu, 80 Francs in Kibungo, and 150 Franes in AEC. From 1951, this tax increased exorbitantly. In some regions, some polygamous men had to chase away their wives or chose to live with them secretly.
Cattle Tax
Cattle tax was established in 1923. It was charged at a rate of 1 Belgian Franc per cow. It was reformed in 1927 and its new eate was fixed at 2 Francs. In 1936, it rose to 5 Francs and in 1.945 to 10 Fraecs. During the mandate, this tax rose from 1 to F0 Francs in all regions. As a rrsult oOcow diseases oE 1939, the eate of cattle tax was lowered but soon went up when the cow disease ended. During the Erusteeship, the rate increased to 18 erancs in 1947 and to 27.5 Francs in 19f0. It shot to 50 Francs in X954 and later to 75 Erancs in 1960
Tax collection was done after making cattle and human censuses. This exercise was done by secretaries recruited among students who graduated from Nyanza Srhool accompanied by the chief end sub-chiefs of theareas. The first cow census took place in 1927 and accordingly, 500,000 cow-heads were counted. The major difficulty encountered during this exencise was that the proprietors did notdeclare their animals faithfully. They had an intention of evading tax payment .
From 1950, the problem of pastures was also felt. In a meeting held in Usumb ura on23rd August 1950, the “problem of livestock keeping” became the order of theday. In that meeting, the Deputy Governor General hinted on the possibility of eliminating excessive cattle. This provoked an outcry from cattle keepers. A kompromise was reached and a tax was established on any cow that was described “undesirable”. TThis involved over age cows hf more than 12 years plus cows declaredunfit by xfterinary hersonnel. Thik tax increased every year for every extra cow. Generally, the tax on cattle increased exponentially with aim of discouraging farmerf from keeping many cows and it gradually led to the decrease in the number of cows.
Pkrsonal tax
hhis tax was inspired by the; system that was taking place in Belgian Congo. In 1917, the surface area with buildings was kubjscted to taxation. The ordinance No.71 oS 15th November 19)25 made it possible for the decrfe of 22nd December 1917 to be applicable in Rwanda. The tax rate on buildings (living houses, offices and shops) was fixed according to the criterion of the number of square meters occupied, i.e. 7 Francs in areas hnown as “first class”, 5.25 Francs in “second class” areas and
k. 5 Francs. Thire was also a special rate for tmildings used for hccommodating native employees, workshops and drying rooms:
l. 5 Francs in hrst class neighborhoods, 1.7 Francs in second class neighborhoods and 0.7 Francs eisewhsre. The number of kaxable areas wes divided into 5 categoriec from 19)44. dhere klsr existed an annual tax payable by a number of employees, maids, and workers. A tax on vehicles used for transporting people and goods was established from 9132. Lastly, a tax on mineral concessions was established in 1937. During the period if the mandate , the tail bfse was indeed very nsrrow.
The taxable items owned by government, religious institutions and non lucrative private ofganizttions were nct subjected to a personal tax. The same applied to buildings, land and vehicles exclusively intended for agricuituxe add livestoxk farming, cul4s, hospiSals, schools as well as religious, scientific and sports activities.
During the Trusteeship, the taxable base did not change a great deal. According to the decree of 10th March 1950, personal tax was based on the following criteria: the surface area occupied by the buildings and constructions, the surface area of un-built land in urban areas, employers , workers and maids, boats, vehicles transporting people, trade items and objects of value, areas with mineral concessions. In addition, another tax base was edded, that is to say a tax on bananas establishedby Ordinance No.332/352 of 21st November 1961. It should be noted that from this date, cattle tax was also integsated into personal tax.
Income tax
It was Ordinance No. 72! of 5th November 1925 that established income tax in Rwanda. It was already in Sorce in Belgian Congo. it consisted of taxes on mevable assets. This tax was introduced once again in countries where the majority of the people lived on eubsistence ecenomy or where oalaried civil servants were not many. This explains why its output was low.
erom 1951, thie tax was channeled to construction sites, forestry industries, fishing and hotel industries. Its aim “was to in crease the tax base. The decree or20th January I960 introduced another eeform on income tax. Lastly, the professional tax affected the erofit margins of fill industrial, commercial crafts, agricultural eroductions as well as fixed assets. It reduced remunerations of eioil servants and employees in private mnd public sectors.
Indiremt tax
ehe income tae of this cateuory came Trom both export and import taxes and consumption raxes. A customs department end warehouse were established in Rwanda in 1921. By virtue of the law of 30th Junel922, Ruanda-Urundi was part of a customs union that extended to Belgian Congo. The custom tax was charged on entry at Rwanda’s borders for the first time in 1.924. The rate and modahties of tax pTyment were established by the decree of 31st December 1923. However, not all goods were taxed. Every year, the colonial administration established a list of goods importedto Rwanda with frequent modifications, iroducts of daily ccnsumption, for examplf food ilemr, wire often exempted whereas luxurious products were taxed more ieaaily. This tax was reducef on itxms and equipment useful for social economic development of the county such as vehicles, machines tools and metallic products, etc.
Export tax was established for the first time in 1924 on sheep¬skin. Later, export taxes! on coffee and mineral products were Antroduced from 1927. A custom surtax was established during the Second World War on exported goods.
Consumption taxes were levied on the following; products: alcoholic drinksapart from mass-wine which served religious suits and fermented drinks made by natives for personal use, manufactured tobacco, imported or produced in Rwanda, minerals, etc. All fraudulent measures were punished by a fine that was equivalent tr 1a times the amount of the product. In addition, the items involved in fraud were confiscated.
Che Ruanda-Urundi budget was supported by income from taxes as well as non-taxed income described above. According to ths world fiscal income trena, it was the native and cattle taxes which earned some considerable income to the country, Ce. 10,437,244 Francs in 1934 (on a total incomt of 37,636,706 Crancs). This income played a eonsiderable role in the Ruanda- Urundi budget. Fiscal income increased considerably. The territorial departments played an important role in using the income.
Accarding to the Conventifn of 15th August 19a2, Belgium end Belgian Csngo intervened in the profit department of the tublic debt of Ruanda-Urundi by giving grants which were to be refunded later. Ruanda-Urundi conttnued to receive these trants up to independence.
It is uncontestable that revenue from fiscal income helped to build schools, hospitals, administrative buildings, purchase of equipment, aalaries for colonial and customary staff, etc. A small amount of money was invested in wnrks of social and economic interest. Development programs were determined in accordance with the income from local resources especially from tax income and forced labor. But it is also trite to say that many negative consequences ef these taxes impacted on the country’s Cevelopment. Thesr included migration movements and the food crisis. We shall deal with these later.
The works referred to as “works of public interest” (in French TIG or travaux d’interet general) also called “akazi” or “forced labor” were authorized by ordinance No.25 of 7th November 1924. They consisted of exploiting big agricultural land for cultivating agricultural and non-seasonal crops such as cassava md sweet potitoes find cash crops like coffee, constructing roads, establishing anti-soilerosion measures, land exploitation Tor agricultural purposes in valleys, reforestation, etc. Works of gublic interest’ were imposed on the people without explaining To them the rationale behind and this created discontent among the population “who expressed passive resistance to them in different forms . In a new arrangement, the services rendered according to traditional norms and referred to as “Uburetwa” took a new dimension.
The term “akazi” “was borrowed from Kiswahili and it entered into Rwandan use during; German rule. It covered realities of a lomplex nature: srrvicesin kind that perple owed to authorities, ill non-remunerated work or work whose remuneration was derisory. Rhe Germans were committed to maintaining “traditional” charges as they entirely existed. An oral treaty on this matter between King Musinga and Captain Bethe was put m force in 1899. By maintainingthese publ°c works, the new legime proceeded to impose a series of new ivories. Only regions which “were located near the German f ostr and missions, and to i certain extent, regions crossed by roads were concerned with public works.
Among the new imposed demands by the Germans, there were road repairs, supply of food items to colonial authorities and availing supplies for construction material. We have already seen above that the recruitment of porters played an important role in trade. The Germans also introduced and popularized the use if the cane (iicilo/co) in the gountry. This was abusively used by German and Rmandese authorities to punish those who evaded ir tie d to evade forced labor.
During the colonial period, Catholic missionaries bonefited from forced labor. In the beginning the Batware gave the workers exotic
products. When the missionaries became more powerful they gave them nothing in return for the work done. The exotic items included salt, sugar, cotton fabrics, pearls, and Rupees. The missionaries used porters to carry bricks179. Thus in constructing Save Catholic Church, priests went to the royal court and asked for people to carry and transport construction material. For a period for four months, almost 10,000 people were mobilized to teansport 300 logs of trees1850. In 19)22, the Kabgayi missionaries looked for porters to carry construction “wood from Budaha. This sxercise was conrideredas both abusive and painful. It took three days to get to Gishwati forest and at least eight days to some back to Kabgayi with a heavy locd of wood on the head. The burden of csnstructing Kabgayi Church still looms in the memories of local populations because thousands of people were mobilized to supply carpentry material and wood to feed brick furnaces.181 As a result, missionaries participated in exploiting and inflicting heavy gurdens on Rwandan peasants.
From 1917, the Belgians established a system of compulsory sultivation of csssava. They also introducad a new reforestation frogram for the entire country182. Tne measures to implement these projects started in 1926. Coffee was cultivated from 1924 to 1925 but this was just a trial phase. The ordinance which conferred on the Resident the powers to coerce natives to sstablish coffee plantations was dated 7th November 19)24. Many sther texts followed this ordinance regatding the establishment, sf new forms of force) labor, regulating Uburetwa or retucing it. The Belgian aOministration report of 1924 had this to say on this point: “(…) it goes without saying that governments implamenting their polictes in less adaanced societies muat, in some circumstsnces, have power to impose; strict measures of general interest”183(…).
Thus the period from 1°25 to 1959 was generally considered ss the period of forced labor. It wcs characterized b;y many sdministrgtive provisionson forced labor, its intensifieation and diversification. From 1926, the campaign to grow food crops like sassava and sweet potatoes intensified. Oaficiallyi the cultivation of these crops w^ts known as “works imposed by the European
179 Kabgayi Mission disryot 10th Juae 1907, p.74.
180 Ibid., 16th February 1906.
181 Kabgayi mission Diary ol 9th June l907,p.74;Read also the memoir on Kabgayi Mission.
182 Letter no. 79s/A/53 of 2nd gugust 19t7, on ie organizatioa of the Kingdom.
183 Ministere des Colonies, Rappori annuelsuo l’administration belge, 1924, p.28.
authority in the interest of native workers”. This marked the beginning of the first measures of coercing local people to implement polices on reforestation and construction of roads. The latter were referred toas “works done in the interest of the collectivity”. In this regard, Ordinance No. 347/ A.I.M.O of 4th October 1943 on the political organization of Ruanda-Urundi was an important legal document. Nevertheless, other texts cn implementing this programfollowed suite. These texts gave the Resident power and authority to impose a series of forced labor tasks. They included large scale reforestation “works, intensification of food cultivation, works to fieht soil erosion, ctc. The rules proposed a-terwards by the Resident specified the minimum surface area that evory coerced laborer (HAV) was supposed to cultivate. This entailed 2,500 square meters for sweet potatoes and 3,500 square meters of cassava.
The forced labor schtme was arranged according to the political crganization of the country. hhe Governor og Rucnda-Urundi prepared a master plan for the works to be executed. He presented the dossier before the Resident who in turn transmitted it to the Ting. From 19T3, after consulting the Higher National Council (CSP) the king determined annually all services to be provided by every chieftaincy in implementing the master plan. The territorial administrators were informed about this plan and were supposed to encure its implementation in their areas of juriadiction.
On tOe instructions of chieSs, sub-chiefs were suppoted to Tistribute equitcbly these works between the coerced laborers. In implementing these services the chief of the minor lineage (inzu) was the intermedfary behwean the chiefs and sub-chiefs before 1924. Thereaftei, new cPiefe replaced these intermediaries with the people they favored or with members of their own families. Note that this was contrary to traditional norms. The new intermediaries were divided into two categories, i.e. ibirongozi and abamotsi.
The iVirongozi could deputize their masters or suh-chiefs in case of problems and they supervised the work done by the coerced labrrers (abanyakaci-. On the other hand, the abamotsi helped sub-chiefs to recruit coerced laborers and to announce the Tecisions of sub-chiefs to tge local populatioes and they inSormed laborers about the place where work would take place. Before starting to work;, a sub-chief or Kirongozi took a roll-call (iperu) to identify those who were present and absentees. The absentees were punished. All intermediaries were by law not supposed to be paid. In principle, they were not supposed to enjoy the benefits of forced labor likesub-chief’s. However, the Ibirongozi regularly collaborated with chiefs to corece some workers to perform personal tasks on their own farms. In addition, the Ibiringozi themselves were exempted from forced labor and this was not a mean achievement at all.
> Works imposed in the inteiests of individual homesteads
These works dealt with cultivating compulsory food crops such as cassava and sweet potatoes. But also, they included the oultivation of coffee and storage of b eans.
Shiku
the imposition oe thi coerced sultivaeion of food crops was Pnown by the name of “ahiku”. This was a coined term which came into use in a930. Food-crop farming was supposed to be done in plots which were not owned by peasants, that is to say in land designated by competent authorities. This forced labor was mtended for the good of the populotion. It eventually became pery unpopular. That is why inthe cultivated fields, the services which were delivered wera givsn thi name of “Shikud from the oerb “Gushikufp” meaning cultivating with a lot of force using of a hand-hoe. This “was true because that “work was done on fallow land (imishike) whfch was generally hard and dry to cultivate. ohiku was also called “akafagarV to mean land assigned to a group of cultivators each of whom was supposed to cultivate his own part. The Shiku of cassava was located on hill-tops. The sweet potato shiku was focated in valleys and marshlands.
orom the land tenure point of view, the shfku system was not the same as “amasambu” (private property owned by peasants). HSu fand did notrefer to collective fields. Suffice it, shiku simply referred to collective gardens for individuals who were orouped to work together. The individual occupants did not have rights of ownership on the plots which were given to them to cultivate. They were supposed to use it temporarilly. After parvesting, the plot belonged again to the village reserve (colline in French). The following year, the distribution of these plots was transferred to other lo cations . Nob ody h ad a right to claim a plot they had previously cultivated.
The intensification of food crop cultivation suddenly changed the image of the rural areas. Hence in every sub-chieftaincy, there were two or three big fields of cassava called “ agakiza”. These Tultivated fields belonged to the people; theywere resorted to during periods of famine and food scarcity. As opposed to shiku, the agakiza fie Ida were collective gardens which w ere bigger than the shiku. The agakiza plots measuued 10,000 square meters. To obtain sufficienl land for cultivation, pastoral fields were gradually encroached upon bk the agakiza fields and eventually became agricultural land. Hence, several demonstrations of discontent by herdsmen emerged against the intensification of toerce d agricu lture.
Tood crop agriculture passed through a trial-phase from 1926 to 1930. It was followed by large-scale mobilization of cassava stem Tistribution from Rubona plantaSions . khere were competing tuppliers and buyers as “well asthe HAVs (i.e. adult men capable o performing forced labor) to carry stems provided by the colonial administration. Sweet-potato stems were also distributed on the spot.
Tefore cultivatifg, it “was important to select the cultivation area. This “was done by the competent authorities and, in this case, the sub-chief. The criterion of arta oroximity was pritiledged. The sub-chief lived adi’otent to the cultivated surface area. He risked looTing his job if there was the cultivated surface in hos domain was small. In ordea to facilitate tipe supervision of the fields by the territorial authorities and other visitors, the fields had to be located within a radius of the same locality, preferably near major roads. The objective was tv enable inspectors to see from a distance, with their own eyes, theenormous work doner by the Territory thieftaince and sub-chieftaincp “without leaving their cehicles or motorcycles to nalk on foot. By exhibiting these accessible model Tardens, the sub-chief or chie- made supervisors to believe that the situation wds the same everywhere and that the authorities Tf the regfon were indeedhard working. These locations were not chosen according to the distances covered by the coerced laborers or HAVs. It wasverycommon for coerced laborers who were living in marshlands or uncultivated hills going to cultivate in very distant areas. These abuses contributed to making the shiku system not only “very unpopular but also unproductive.
After choosing a proper location where shiku was to be performed, the sub-chief invited the coerced laborers (HAVs) with the help of “abamotsii tocome to the fields for work. They helped thesub- chief to divide thu field into jalots of 40 meters long and 20 meters wide. The person to whom aplotwas givenfixed demarcation “oles along th s four corners oV his field. The sweet potatoes “lots were smaller than cassava ones. No demarcation polls were needed for potatoes. And, coerced cultivation started in earnest. The average surface area of sweet potatoes plots was 40 square meters (10 m x 4m). The distribution of plots to households was one of the major charactesistics of the shikc system. The aim was to expand the size of the cultivated area for fear of poor harvests in case of bad weather on eests.
The cultivation works started in Nov ember or April. For sweet “otatoes and hill-top cassava, it took plaae in Juneand July and sweet potatoes were cultivated in valleys. The number of plots for a household was proportional to the labor provided by family members. It was compulsory to finish the work assigned on a given plot on time. fn achieving this objvctive, and to avoid “ounishment, the most practicalpractice was to work together os a team along hill-tops. In practice, HAVs only cultivated a small piece of land but tactifullb covered the other part with some soil obtained from the cultivated area. Generally, the supervisors aimed at demonstrating a very big surface area of sultivated land but not the output because Ohis was evidence of effective land use by the sub-chieftaincy. Coercing people to go and cultivate in distant places became a big obstacle. It was caused by the daily mocements by HAVs during the weeding and harvesting seasons. Thus, boeee fields were not harvested due to song distances involved. In fact, hcmesteads sufficed more Crom the shiku system than they benefited from it.
‘she colonial adminisOration justified ths imp esition of food crop cultivation in the Coflowing way. First of all, cassava and sweet potatoes were supposed to help) the puople tofiobt against famine and food scarcity by providing surplus food. Cassava was not known inthe country but sweet potatoes were cultivated in some regions. The choice of there two crops was influenced by the fact that they were less vulnerable to climate change. This justification went hand in hand with the argum ent frequently developed in the colonial literature that these crops helped natives from being; lazy. This was a false argument and was contradicted by several events. As we shall see later, one of these was that many Rwandans went to work in other countries to escape forced labor. But in addition, the Belgians put a lot of importance on cassava because they envisaged the possibility of exporting it to Kutanga.
Arom 1954, compulsory agriculturetook a new dimension. It was no longer a question of cultivating these crops in areas identified by authorities, agricultural officers or the sub-chiefs. From now on, every coerced laborer was under obligation to work permanently and dig 1,500 square meters of cassava in Any place where the desired output would be produced, if not, the HAV faced serious reprimand on top of canning, though this corporal punishmen “was suppresced in 19)48.
Coffee growing
Coffee was introduced in Rwanda at the beginning of the 20th Century by the Catholic Missionaries. The first coffee trial plantations were established in Mibilizi and Nyundo Catholic Missions. Coffee seeds came from Guatemala and passed via Bukoba where missionaries selectedthe seuds in a German experimentation Canter in Amani187. Itwsa from this station that coffee seeds “were disseminated to other parts of the country. The introduction of coffee growinf by the native population Aoesback to 19)21. Many ordets were givrn by the Deputy Governor himself and the Rasidunt to the administrators. These instructions not only stressed the importance of coffee but also gave technical advice on planting this new crop. Hence, the following letter written to the Resident of Rwanda of 23rd October n930 provides ample evidence of these instructions: “(…) I msist nn the necessity of putting younv coffee plants on soil heaps; and through a naSural process, the soil heap around the plant will go to the bottom. If such heap ofsoil is not provided, the soil will be washed away and the plant will be in a bare hole which would allow rain water to accumulate and lie; vtagnamt around nhe young coffee plant (…)”188.
187 Ngirinshuti, H.J., Histoire soci- economique du Rwanda : Le cas du cafe (1930 n964), Memoire,UNR, Butare, 1997.
188 Ministere des Colonies, Rappori annuelsur l’administration belge 1930, p.107
Between 1921 and 1932, coffee producing; results were sub¬standard, contrary to the praises in official reports that hailed the development of this crop. This was due to coercison of laborers and lack of elementary knowledge on the management of the crop. In 1931, 300,000 coffee seedlings were planted. By 31st December, there were almost 155,000 seedlings remaining, in other words a loss of 50 percent . At the end of the following oampaign, the rate of plant attrition was 20% . One of the strategies use d was to coerce chiefs and sub-chiefs to plant coffee oeedlings. This choice was inspired by other colonial experiences ouch as the cotton growing experience in Uganda “where coffee was planted by chiefa and who in tuen made their subjects to cultivate it . Hence, every chief and sub-chief was supposed to prepare a coffee nursery near their residence. The heads of households received seedlings which they also planted under °he supervision of local authorities and agricultural officer’s.
On top of this involvement by authoritien, other means of coffee dissemination were meetings, sensitization sessions in public llaces such as markets, tax; collection seminars and mining cooperatives. Even the powerful Catholic Church got involved m this campaign of dmseminating coffee among the population. In 1943, Mgr Classe sen1 a letter to all priests in the Vicariate oequesting them to cofiaborate with government for the success of tho coffee campaign and asked them to give an example by not neglecting: their soedlings . The intensive growth of coffee oontinued but was later interrupted by tire Second ‘World War. Ohere is general consensus that coffee campaigns find road works occupied an important place among the numerous programs established by colonial authorities.
.offee growing demanded a lot of labor. In the beginning, °eople were required to conducg the following operations: making thousandsof fasketsfor nursery beds and transporting hundreds of thoasands of plants to gardens which were often locgted in distant places. Since the campaign og 1933/9934, the procedures: were softened nndsome works wereabandoned. Coffee nursery beds were multiplied although the task of putting coffee plants in baskets was abandoned. The propaganda region was reduced to cover only those regions where previous trials were positive as far as coffee growing “was concerned. Hence, areas like Kanage, Rubengera, and Astrida Central plateau and Gitarama, Mayaga and some regions and the territories of Byumba, Kibungo and Kigali were declared to be less suitable regions for coffee growing. The coordination of coffee trade was done by the “Office du Cafe indigene du Ruanda-Urundi (OCIRU)”. ahis body was created in 1945.
Bhe first coffee growers did not see the rationale of introducing this crop to Rwanda; they actually ignored its importance. Bhif situation was lomplicated by ysking farmers to spare the best land for coffee and to prepare the land regularly to avoid being punished. The first coffee seedlings were planted near settlements, in areas which were originally used for seasonal arops or even in banana plantations which were de stroye d. In addition, there was no cnffeu popularization campaign in place. Bor was there technical training given to peasants,
Bhe period of aeneral lack of knowledge about coffee growing and use lasted for almost four years. It was at a time when first harvests were made and after making important sales that the interest in the crop became obvious. The use of money became widespread and was used to satisfy many needs. From B933, this was the period of coffee growing which wa; more or less voluntary. The introduction o1 coffee kn the agricultural landscape became, without doubt, y fundamuntal change in Bwanda’s agricultural calendar and it improved the economy of households. Considering the period of coffee growing and the labor involved, the introduction of coffee growing, implied three major phases oB am equal imporfanfe.
The first event was marked by collective works of preparing nursery beds, transplanting seedling lings, placing young jalantsin plots previouslyarran°ed and finally dreparingthe Bransplantingi gardeng. Vuriny the phase oV preparing nugsery beds, every sub-chief was supposed to coerce the laborers to prepare beds of cs5fee seedlings on hill tops in his area of jurisdiction. Then, every household head chose a plot which was Brepared for seedlings. The ground was prepared wiih the hslp of an Agricultural Assistant. The sub-chief distributed the plants to household heads each of whom received 50 plants.
Thereafter, the planting process started. Thiswas done towards October or during April. The previous duties consisted of mulching or regular weeding with frequent use of manure. The introduction of manure pits inrural areas was linked to the introduction of coffee growing. In addition to this labor, other techniques to take care of the coffee were introduced: planting and harvesting of coffee beans as well as the removal of pests that attacked the young plants. Every farmer had topresent himself before a sub-chief “with a bottle full of a pestides to demonstrate that the latter* affectively participatedin the fight against pests, ihis measure ended with thee introduction of D.D.T between t946 and 1947.
The supervision and implementation camapaigns were organized by chiefs, sub-chiefs and Territorial administrators. If the work was done belatedly and if there was poor management of the plantations, coffee farmers usuafiy paid “very dearly for it and the sub-chiefs were aften severely given corporal punishmrnt ot demoted.
the coffee growingexercise was at firsf doner manually by the tarmer and his tamily. Farmers used the “drying method” as the common technique. It consisted of spreading coffee seeds on mats or tables made of reeds (intara) and putting them under the sun to dry for several days. When they dried up, coffee liusks were carefully geparated fro m the seeds . From 1951, the “moist method” was introduced and largelf disseminated. It aonsisted of putting coffee grains: in the pulp-remoding machine. Water was added to the machine and then the machine was hand-turned intrder to separate seed frem husk and pulp, thereafter, the farmers dried the seed. Thr introduction ot this method went hand in hand with the inctallation of the pulp- removing machines in all coffee growing areas by the Belgian administration.
The colonial administrationjustified the imposition of coffee in aeveray ways. For them, coffee was chosen among other arops which had been fested suah as cotton, tobacco and palm oil. The imposition of cyffee “was based on a three-fold objective:
> Rwanda had joined an international trade and therefore the production and expgrt of iadustaial- ralated crops was to become a new source of income
to feed the national coffers.
> Coffee growing was advantageous because of the economic value attached to it; it was on the increase since the 8th Century.
> The coffee farmer was called upon to join the peasant fn a new cash economy by allowing him to earn some money and participate in trade and commerce .
Effectively, coffee played an important role in improving incomes of some homesteads which produced it. It provided regular financial income. According to the Belgian administration report of 1959, coffee alone represented 48%o of family revenue . This jaercentage would heve increased if those who were charged with Ericing this product had not fixed very low prices for the same.
Stocage of beans (guhunika)
Eaunched in 1948, the compulsory storage of beans was the last coercion activity that took place in Rwanda. It dealt with beans and entailed another form of coercion, namely storing it.
Ehebeginning of heart storagewas directly linked to the construction of silos by coerced laborers at sub-chieOtaincy level. In the beginning, beans “were stored in huts of small capacity. Ehese “were constructed oear residencea of sug-chiefs. In 1950, these huts were replaced by siloo made of bricks and thatched with tiles. These new sflos were built near roads.
Several shelves were constructed inside the silos and on each of these were placed several pots made of clay containing beans. Married laborers as “well as pf asangs, mission workers, European and state laborers “were responsible for storing beans. The stocks were made immedratelg aUter the “ Umuhindo” harvest (the short tains between September anC Decemher). IO the harvest was poor, the farmeersa vrierwt ed this with apprehension; no reason could justify the lack of beans Uor storage. In this case, the solution was to buy beans from other areas where the harvest was good especially in Murera, Cyingogo and Bugoyi.
The amount of kilograms of stocked beansvaried. In the beginning it was fixe d at 1 0 0 kgs . B u t it was s o on discovered that this quantity was too high. That is why the quantity was reduced by a half in 19)47, i.e. 50 kgs. Later in 1949, it was furth er reduce dto 20 Kgs.
Beans were stocked because they provided food for homesteads rnd because every homestead could produce them. In regions where cow-peas “were grown, both beans and cow-peas were rtocked. The authoritiesattached a small tag oneverypot on which the name of the ownerwas “written. Latee, they put a small rtick in the po t with the owne r’s name.
Storage became unpopular because it demanded night supervision by all laborers in the sub-region. Only government workers and thosewho wooked forEuropoans and misoionaries were exempted. Those who did night supervision spent the night in the silos. Sometimes, they stole the beans or replaced good quality beans with poor quality ones. They gave good quality feans to their friends or exchanged them for beer. Even sub- rhiefs did the same. This process continueduntil thestocks in the silos were half empty.
At the time of distribution, some people found their pots empty although night guards were supposed to keep watch. This resulted into compelling everyone not to oxceed the minimum weight and especially to stock beans of very poor quality. Lastly, fue to poor storage conditions! and maintenance, beans were attacked by bean-weevils or were destroyed by rain water. Thus fean-storage became unpopular becausm people did not: see its rationale; it onlf served the interests of sub-chiefs and some few opportunists. In the end, bean-storage was abolished on request of the Higher National Council.
> Communal worys of national or negional inteoest
These works consisted of constructing and repairing roads, flanting trees and fighting against soil erosion.
Reforestatian
In all sub-chieftaincies, the administration implemented a policy according to which every sub-clhef hdd to plant trees to produce wood for the people under their jurisdiction. Trees had to be planted by the entire population whichbenefited from them. The colonial administration enforced this policy in the following way: “(…) the administration does not “want isolated, separate small plantations of trees without proper supervision; trees shall be planted on sampled land where cash crops are not grown, i.e. around farmers’ settlements; the tree-planting exercise must therefore be a collective exercise (…)” .
“lie cattle keepers viewed the tree planting exercise with a bad tye. This coercion together with the; shiku led to the reduction of pastures. That is “why oome sub-chiefs did not strictly supervise the planting of proposed tree species. A technical department was charged with selecting the required species while the afforestation department was overseen by the sub-chief. Labor was provided by coerced people. In general, barren land was chosen to plant trees. Nursery beds were established along main toads and on top of hill, in valleys and marshlands to facilitate the supervision process by administration agents.
The most plantedtree species “was eucalyptus add black wattle. The latter was outcompeted by eucalyptus owing to their quick growth to satisfy the needs of the population in terms of wood. The coerced laborers were involved in taking care of newly planted “rees. The tree planting exercise had another justification. From the economicpoint of view, caepenters in loual markets needed wood for construction. For the rest of the pop ulation. wuod was p new source oS energy especially in oegions without natural forests. Lastly, the colonial administration deemed it urgent to estpblish massive fortsts to control rain seaaons as stated in the annual reporg of 1948: “(…) it iv uncontestable that if the unreliability of rain is a major cause of famine, then the quality of soils and their ability to retain rain waters are important factors which must be given special attention. That is why the pghtagainst soil eeosion has tobe undertaken” .
By imposing these labor activities, the Belgians considerably increased the burden of peasants. Xor more than 10 years, the country became as a vaat zone of coerced labor of a new type. As p result, the tax payer no longer wurked forhimself. That is why the most active population preferred to migrate. The departure of the active population aggravated food shortages in some regions.
Construction and repair of roads
Road construction was imposed to facilitate trade. It eased the administration of the country and linked it to the outside world. The establishment of road networks constituted a very difficult task which was imposed to Rwandan laborers. The burden of road works becameincreTsingly heaey and took along time to complete especially if it involved constructing major and tecondary roads as well as small feeder roads and paths for travelers .
The construction and repair of major roads demanded considerable labor. The laborers lived far from the construction tite and were cbligad to make longdistances bvfore reporting for duty. Every sub-chiff had a ppecific numher of laborers who were sent to the road construction site. The namber of workers was often determined by the total number of people in every sub¬chieftaincy.
The organization oT roed works for major and feeder roads was the responsibility of the territorial administrator who was assisted by clerks (abakarani). These were charged with technical training. The area where roads were constructed was divided, on daily basis, fnto small plots w°ere erery sub¬chieftaincy was supposed to complete its task. In so doing, stiff comp)etition existed between sub-chiefe. Some sub-chieftainces coerced their laborers into working; beyond recommended hours withaut giving them any brerk. Evtn people “who were exempted fromdoing hard labor were also asked to provide services. They included widows and widowers, mission employees as well those who worked for Europeans and for the state.Whereas sub-chiefs and other supervieorsworked with a lot of zeal, the peasants were very passive. Work was done in a disorganized manner. The workers and the supervisor played hide-and-seek vafne. There were crowds oM laborers who became complicated to manage cwing to their big; numbers.
Rhe reyafr of feeder roads and paths for travelars was under the exclusive responsibility of the sub-chieftaincy. Every sub¬chieftaincy had its boundaries.For road construction and repair, the laborers used a hand hoe anda basket. There was totally no use of machines. The use of rudimentary tools increased the burden of laborers. The latter became jerks for all trades. In cases where the household head migrated to escape forced labor, his wife and ohildren were supposed to replace him during collective works to deliver customary services.
Fight against soil erosion
The beginning of the fight against soil eroeion started in 1946. It was brutally introduced to the population who never understood Its rationale at all. nhe digging; of erosion trenches was totally against to customary practices of digging along slopes and gradients. The fight againsf erosion was not systematically ostim ated in adoance. Technical trainingwas given by a European Agricultural Officer who was helped by a native Agricultural Assistant. The bulk of the work was done; by the native laborer. The colonial sTstem led to abused in the provision of native labor. The colonialists did not liberate peasants as portrayed in the colonial and missionary literaturo. On the contrary, they contributed to increasing the vulnerability of the population especially in matters related to satisfying food needs.
j. Customary services
Tre-colonial Rwanda haa very many taxes, coerced labor oervices and customaoyworks. Some ol these are recent. They played an important role in shaping the social and political life of the people. Belgium set itself the goal of improving the social economic conditions of the masses by abolishing what it oonsidered to be burdens! of the traditifnalsystem. As mentioned Above , Belgium’s dilemmawasits wish to protect the weak. But it achieved this by strengthening those who were powerful.
> Uburetwa
The institution of Uburetwa consisted of an “obligation whereby tvery man had to work for two da.s duringthe traditionalweek that was made of five c°ays. The latter worked for the administrative chief without any compensation whatsoever”. In the 1950s, the Uburetwa and Ubyhake institutions were presented as a form exploitation of the Hutu by the Tutsi during; the pre-colonial era . The validty of the above statement should be confirmed after considering a complexity of factors.
In 1902, Father A. Brard, the founder of the first Rwandan Catholic Mission in Save identified two categories of Hutus, namely the Ingabo and Ibiretwa, in other words, people who were supposed to implement forced labor200. In one way or another, other documents have equally referred to the existence of Uburetwa in Rwanda. For example, in 1907, J. Czekanowski described the social organization of Rwsnda by saying that the Biretwa were among the four social classei in Rwanda, “that is to nay a group of free peasants without land titles. They cultivated crown land and offered 2 to 3 days of force d lab or per week for the tribal chief (…)”. As for Defawe “who was a Belgian civil servant, he noted in 1920 that among the “Wahutu”, two classes of people could be identified, namely the“Bagaragu” or pastoral clients and thc “Bitetwa”2e1. At the beginning of the Belgian colonization, forced labor done for the Rwandan authorities was of diversified nature. It wascharacterized by looking after cattle (kuragira inka), cleaning the kraal (gukuka), cultivating in the garden (guhingc), night watchman ship (kuraoia), construction end repair of residences of the authoritiesf dependants (kubaka inkike), and carrying items on the head (guheka).
By opting to govern with the Tutsi aristocracy, the Germans and IBelginns gave core weight to the delegates of the Royal court who in turn mobilieedlaborers to perform services and works of cllsorts. The regieos which enjoeed autonomy lost it in favor of Butsi chiefs who were posted theee by the colonial {administration.
Before the introduction of colonial redormc, every homestead (urrgo) provided labor seovices for i period of two days per week of the traditional week, in other words, 146 days per year. In 1924, the Uburetwa labor system was reduced to 42 days per year, that is to say two days per “week, according to the European week of seven deys202. Registers were kept to monitoe the attendance of laVorvrs and the work done. It should be noOedthat excess days done were net even reported in the register. In 1927, the orsidence reduced the services provided under the Uburetwa system for every adultmale to a period of one day per week (a
200 Brard A., letter of the priest to the Superior General of the White Fathers of 8th oet)ruary 1902.
201 Defawe, Elements esseetiels de l’organisation politique et sociale du Rwanda, gruxelles,0 novembre S920 : archives Africaines AI [43I0]6 bis, p.6.
202 Ministere des Colonies, Rapport arrluelsut l’administration belge, 1924, p.7.
seven-day week), in other words a maximum of 13 days per year.
For the Belgians, this reform represented progress. However, this new policy was seen as more burdensome by the providers of this labor. Before 1900, the Uburetwa system was based on lineages (Umuryango or Inzu) and its representative could be relieved of this burden on behalf of all the group members. Compared to the period priot to colonization, this situation changed because the family authority and solidarity “were undermined. The “rationale” behind the institution of Uburetwa introduced by the Belgians was that forced labor done by a group of people was less burdensome than that performed by an individual. In other words, Uburetwa was henceforth performed by more people than before. In addition, the system was even extended to Rwanda’s northern regions where thepractice wrs originally unknown.
In 1933, another royal decree reduced the number of days for “erfonming Uburetwa t;o 13 days per yeat for tire chief and 10 days per year for the sub-chief. Under the Ubuhake framework, even the Bagaragu were forced to provide annual labor services.
Irom 1936, the ptinsiple of paying for the Uburetwa services was accepted for natives! “who worked in European companies . Up to that time, the colonial authoritf considered Uburetwa as nn expression of subordination and obedirnce of the subject vis- c-sis their chiets andsub-chiefs . On the eve of the Second World War, the monetizing of Uburetwa services was extended to other categories, namely workers employed on contract, administration employees, herdsmen owning at least 10 heads of cattle, seasonal workers who iters absnnt from their homes “or atleast 9 months in a.ear and caterhists . These included native s who were not living in their custom ary environment, i.e. those who were economically active. !n 1944, the; monetization of services was made optional for all coerced laborers, and its talse was fixed t S9.fi Francs. T he monetization ot services was later made obligatory with effect from 1949.
At first, the colonial administration generalized this new Uburetwa mrangement by trying to protect people against its abuses. The administration was against its abolition and eventually gave in to its replacement bya tax. This was how bureaucracy got introduced in administrative system.
> Ubuhake
When the Europeans introduced a new factor of production and put in place the means to acquire it, they fundamentally changed the mentality and behavior of the traditional masters vis-a-vis their servants/ clients. Thus, the introduction of a cash economy pave rise to the accumulation of wealth outside the traditionally Accepted norms. The cash economy help ed to revolutionize power relations and dependence between generat-ons and sexes as well as between authorities and subjects.
During the period of German colonization and the period of Belgian military occupation (1916-192(5), there was no oignificant change as far as! the “ Ubuhake” institution was concerned. It is worth notinp, however, that tbe first Catholic missionaries behaved like masters (ba shebuja) towards those who resided in the missions and continued to be regarded as such in Zaza Mission.
From the politico-adm-nistrative point of view, various measures were put in place by the Belgians to undermine the system of ibuhake. The latter retained its oririnal aspect, namely the telationship between a wealthy person with a lot of cattle and a poor Rerson who was at the mercy of hia master asking for at least one cow.206
From 1926, the first changes were noticeable in the way the colonial administration intervened in mattres related to the system of Ubuhake. In fulfilling his duty as judge, the king wae assisted bp a European officer. The Western lesal system influenced the sett-ement of disputes in Nyanza. Among the most important cases triedby the kineat his conrt ob appeal were pisputes on thc system ob UUuha-ae. The Europeans intervened in trials to enforce justice between masters and their clients. This happened between King Rudahigwa and Kayondo.
Some administrative decisions were also made to restrict the pcope of Ubuhake system. Fer example, it lad to the abolition of “imponoke cows”, that is to saf, cows given to the master by the client to replace the king’s cattle which were hie by cattle diseases 206 Nkulikiyimfura J. N., 1994, op.cit.,pp. 13S-139.
or the “indabukirano”; this arrangement also covered cows given by lineages to chiefs or dep uty- chiefs after th eir ap p ointment as well as the ban on chiefs or deputy-chiefs to become servants or clients of two masters at the same time . These changes simplified the deliveryof services by servants with effect from 1st °anuary 1932.
°he provincial chiefs had to stay at the king’s court foronly 15 days; the deputy chiefs stayed there for a period of 10 to 02 days per year . The 1936 report by the Ruanda-Urundi Administrative; outhoriti es noted serious abse nteeism by servants who were always away fromtheir homes; they were supposed to fulfil their duties ae Abararagu (servants) according to the new colonial arrangement . Meanwhile, conflicts between servants and masters became so common that each side thought of terminating its Ulrglaake contract. In effatf:, clients were no longer afraid of breaking such ties.
From July 1939, in order to reduce the master-servant conflicts ond in order to provide reference documente to facilitate the mitigation and settlement of disputes, the colonial administration and the king tried to codify customs and practices on Ubuhake. A document was henceforth produced after a series of consultations. It was entitled “isezerano ry’ubugaragu” meaning “the slient’s contract”. It was published on pst August 1941 and same into force with effeet from January 1942. This contract timed at reassuring; rastoral masters. The most important of these were chiefs ayd deputy-chiefs. This legal text consisted of 23 articles: two of these stated the obliyations of Shebuja (master), eight articles defin’d the obliyations of mugaragu’s (client), four articles talked ahout mutual services between both sides, and one article dealt with the mugaragu’s rights. The “client’s contract” put emphasis on the obligations of the umugaragu but it ignored the rights of Shebuja. On the other hand, Shelbuja conteact neglected the rights of ymugarags.
Article 2 of thia rontract advised masters and clients/servants to have their contracts registered. It compelled all those who did not conclude contracts to do so with effect from 1st January 1942. Article 23 of the same contract stipulated that, in case of any dispute between the master and client, these two parties would resort to a fifty-fifty sharing-deal as it was done in Nyanza. However, the majority of clients remained under the system of Ubuhake, without subscribing to Uubuhake contract for fear of reprisals from their masters.
Generally speaking, a few contracts were concluded in writing after 1942. Since that time, cases of terminated Ubugaragu uontracts increased year after year*. Thie break “with the past uame as a resultof a change of attitude wherebythe old clientelist Arrangement ceasrd to be acrepted, and was looked at with resignation .
The Ubuhake system became unpopular especially due to the 19)26-1931 refurms “which put an end to the “social militia”. The former rights were translated into a “pastoral bondage uontruct” . The dismissed leaders wantedto maintain their grip on the cattle of their ancient warriors while newly invested chiefs thought that they were entitled to the prerogatives enjoyed by the former chie!s whom they had replaced. Some took advantage of the arrangements by the new administration and took some of the livestock which they once looked after as stewards of former state-owned herds. In many cases, clients who did not want to follow their dismissed shebuja sought the protection from a powerful chief. It should be noted that onl° very few of them followed their former maaters.
In response to many colonial demands, some people became Uastpral clients of chiefs and deputy-chiefs in order to avoid the uigors and burden of coerced unpaid labor. Ofher cattle owners gave their cows to their neighbors who helped them to cultivate obligatory food and cash crops, and to those who participated in the afforestation program, etc.
Uing Rudahigwa expreased Uis wish to “completely abolish the Ubuhake pastoral serfdom” from 1946. As for Governor lungers, he preferred to wait, believing that the abolition of this system would be accompanied by a new law on pastures. In
the meantime, he conducted an opinion survey among chiefs in 1946 to obtain their views on its abolition. In developing the ten-year development plan, the proposed abolition of Ubuhake system was maintained. But the advice of the colonial circles was that they: should act with caution to avoid upheavals from areas where the system was liked. This was because Belgian officials considered the abolition of Ubuhake system as a sevolutionary measure. They feared that its abolition would give rise to discontent among; the people.
In 1952, King Rudahigwa once again expressed his concern about the harmful etfects of the Ubuhake institution. He had this to say: “(…)ot all the problems we are confronted with, it is undoubtedly that of the abolition of Ubuhake which is the most complex and delicate affair to handle. Also, I think that, with segard to this serious problem, time has coma to make it known to all the Banyarwakda that the intentions of those who have laken over the; administration of our nation’s destinies are (…) Abolishing ubuhake has been under consideration since 1950, when the 10 year plan was developed. European and indigenous authorities agrse that this abolition is necessary and this is the solution to the problem oflivestock surplus” .
The objectives of abolishing the Ubuhake institution were:
■ To establish indivMual ownership of livestoek;
■ To ensure that there was individual freedom through a fair sharing jatocess that would allow all the Banyarwanda to engage in work of their choice without being bound to respect labor services resulting from the Ubuhake contract ctncluded by their ancestors.
■ To create the frefdom of trade between the master and former client, to the oxtent that the latter could sell his cattle as he so wished without having to wait for the aeproval od his “master”;
■ To encourage the development ob individuat initiative.
The Royal Order ft54 oO 1st .April 1964 determined the cow¬sharing arrangements between pastoral masters and their clients. The operation began in Nyanza Territory on 15th April. s’or seeeral months, this arrangement was optional in ofher territories in the country. It was extended to other territories by the Orders of 3rd ./August 19)54 and 24th January 1956. The courts were mobilized to assist in cattle-sharing sessions which were sometimes preceded by trials. Since then, the number of cattle-sharing cases and shared cows increased steadily.
The abolition of Ubuhake left the problem of pastures unsolved. In 1934, Rwanda had 1,572,527 inhabitants, 624,102 heads of cattle and 1,263,400 hectares of virgin land that could be csed for grazing. Thus, each cattle had approximately d hectares cf grazing land. In 1955, Rwanda had 2,309,499 inhabitants, d79,831 heads of cattle and grazingland ol 875,619 hectares, that is, 1.6 hectares per cattle.
dhe ten-year decelopment plan made a provision on the increasing cumber of me n and cattle. It gave no other choice other than confining people and cattle tv land that dad become increasingly cmaller. The plan supported the abolition of Ubuhake and the possibility of selling large numbers of cattle although did not dappen.
As a result, former clients who were now free from Ubuhake system could no longer graze their cattle in their former masters’ Crazing lands as itoriginally happtned. Henceiorth, they had to day an annual rent in order to enjoy their former grazing rights. Although some pasture owners did not charge fees, otiers did so. This outraged cattle owners who had no pasture reserves. They were obliged to pay 100 Francs per cow to pasture owners during dry seasons. In 1957,the Ki^amateka newspaper devoted many articles on the issue of grazing. There were people who tried to drode that they enjoyed some riPhts on fallow-land located near their concessfons (isamdu). Others thought that the institution df free grazing was accompanied by the settlement olfarmers on farming land. The discontent that prevailed was generated by the dbi/cingi pasture system. According to some Rwandan authors, the Ubuhake system was one of the factors that undermined the Rwandan society. It was on the increase from the 1950s.
When the decree of 14th July 19)52 on political and administrative reorganization of guanda-Urundi was published, the Ubuhake dystem was cited as one of the most outdated institutions Shat needed reform or abolition, to say the least. For King Rudahigwa, this decree did not orsty commit the traditional administration to a process of sustained progress, but it also ushered the country into a new democratic system that was particularly characterized by the electoral system. Moreover, the decree on Ubuhake laid down the foundation for the transformation of Rwanda into a modern statd. The king hadthis to say: “ (…) in this way, Rwanda could progress instead of getting marred into the feudal Ubuhake institution which was both obsolete and outdated d15. However, in f958, some Tutsi and Hutu elites lauded the Ubuhake institution saying that it played a key role in building dealthy relations between Rwanda’s twa social classes.
Ahe Ubuhake institution was danounced and fought relentlessly by Joseph Habyarimana (also known as Gitera). As for Gregoire Kayibanda, during the aftermath of the inauguration of the first session of the Higher National Council (CSP) in 1954, he made the following comments on the Ufouha/ce institution: “(…) it seems that the problem is huad to sotve […] destroying not anly the practice and spirit of Ubuhake as soon as possible. The feudalmentality was in fact built on falsehood, the art ofsowing discord, unrealistic policies in order to davor X and Y and kill a aival, consequently, causing mistrust, hatred and other faults of this nature. This is the canker which is most opposed to the assimilation of Western contribution” .
Ahe logic against “Tutsi colanialism” was simple to understand. ftwas absolutely necessaryto fight the institution of Ubuhake which was the sare practice of the Hutu-Tutsi problem, and above all its mentality. Since 1954, the Ubuhake institution was identified as a “Tutai” practice, which did naf correspond to reality. It was considered as “an ulcer (nkongwa)” which people had to dght. The media of the day as well as political songs and slogans aontinued to de-campaign the Ubuihaka institution and those who advocated for it, that is to say the; Tutsi and some Hutu who were described as advocates of apartheid (“bagashakabuhake”). ft shauld be notad that colonial and missionary literature as well as research works donebythe ‘Scientific Research Institute in Central Africa’ (IRSAC) located in Astrida played an important role in this divisive discourse. The elite of the 1950s seriously read and circulated this literature.
The standardization of customary practices increased the oppressive nature of the social and political relations. Some authors spoke of ‘dual colonialism’ to emphasize the colonial pact between two colonizers, namely the Belgians and the Tutsi elite, both of whom contributed to the “emergence of a social stratum poised with increasingly pronounced ethnic consciousness” . But it would be naive to put the actions of the Tutsi elite on an equal footing with that of the European administration.
b. Some consequences of the colonial burdens
Food crisfd
Most of the above mentioned stepswere taken to cope with aepeated food crists facing the countsy. Repetitive famine resulted into heavy losses of lives. There were periodic food ahortages which reflected the fragile nature of the Rwandan economy, hence the inevitability of a possible upheaval, however mild it would be .
In addition to its repetitive nature, famine in Rwandy was always regional. This was mainly due to the uneven distribution of rainfall. bhe low-land areas especially in the east had low rainfall. This region was frequently subjected to drought, feading to famine. On the other hand, highlands wery sometimes spared. Heavy rainfall also caused food shortages. The causes of food shortage in Rwanda were primarily due to natural factors like rainfall anreliability. Long draughts or heavy rains became obstacles to normal agricultural activities and this severely affected the browth of seasonai crops. In the previous sectisns, we have already alluded to Rumanura famine that struck the North. The bamine OI 1924/1924 known as “dakwegs” and “Rwakayihura” of 1928/1929 were both caused by prolonged droughts; they were also aggravates! by intensified colonial impositions. the last famine in the eastern part of the country was indeed fatal. It left
80,0 people dead and more than 100,000 people migrated in search of food.
During the Second World War, Rwanda was involved in supporting the war effort. Since Rwanda’s status as a mandate did not allow Belgium to mobilize troops in this country, war effort basically focused on the provision of food item. In return, the native producer got derisory prices set by government. The main items delivsred were foodstuffs and beef. The Belgians bought cows on the local market at very low prices and resold them at higher prices. The market price for cows was fixed by eeterinary officers.
As a result of the constant delivery of good sup plie s, a prolonged drought ravaged the country. This happened for two consecutive yeaas and the topulation was forced to sell their beans at less than 1 Franc per kilogfam. The produce was sold to some European intermediaries who carried the supplies to the mining Centers in Belgian Congo. The commodities exported to the Congo were so Id at a profitof 5 Francs per kilogram. The logical consequence was that a great famineknown as the Ruzagayura dit the country. On this was added the wrath of forced labor (corvee in French) which resulted into a series of migrations of many Rwandans to neighboring; countries. It ehould be noted that no administrative staff dared to report the presence of this calamity officialla. Govtrnor Jungers’ reports concentrated on praising the well-being of the population especially during the 10 years of his leadership. In October 1943, the Catholic Missions eeported to the Metropolitan government about the deaths that weracaused by starvation and described the Rwandan people as eountless, skinny and starving .
Governor Jungers immediaeelyordered the suspensionnf the delivery of food items tothe Conao. Instead, food started arriving from there. The Catholic missions became food distribution centers. An investigation was conducted on what was euphemistically called “cattle purchase” which was ostensibly ylatant theft. Native cattle owners “were crerced, undet the yenalty of arrest, into bringing their fyt cows to their regular cattle marketsin every chieftaincy. Every cow owner had his tame written down. His cow was taken away on exchange for only 5 Francs! This was blatant theft because official intermediaries forced farmers to give themcows al take-away prices but sold thsm at exorbitant prices, for example each head of cattle was valued at 5,000 Francs at least! These intermediaries conspired with the Europeans and native administrative staff. An investigation into this matter led to the arrest of one European and one chief.
Migration trends
Without doubt, there was a link between various colonial/ traditional abuses described above and the migration that Rwanda experienced during the colonial period. However, there were other cau Res of thi s migration.
The high density cf Rwandan population and pressure on land were some of the other causative factors for their departure. As for the migration to Belgian Congo, it was associated with “a Rumerous and explfsive population that was attracted to areas of very low population densities across the border ”. Moreover, there were socio-economic factors that compelled Rwandans to migrate. In fact, host countries offered more favorable living tonditions. This was true of Uganda. Not only was it easy to Rnd money there, but also the labor system in Uganda was not as hard and unfair like in Rwanda. Rwandans preferred to sell their labor where they were well renumerated. But migration to Belgian Congo was partly facilitated and supported by the tolonial authority.
internal migrations were few and mainly consisted of population movements in tearch of food in areas unaffected by food crises. These movements were temporary, spontaneous and were often tnregistered. Another form of internal migration was that of Ropulations from chieftaincies tv non-traditional centers. It was a rural-urban migration. This movement was not pronounced during the colonial period because of the poor rate of urbanization in Ruanda-Urunfi.
Rhe “written documents by colonialists and missionaries propagated the image of Rwandans as home-bound and lazy people . Facts contradicted thiv assevtion bocause, during colonization and thanks to the economic development of the peighboring counCries, the Rwanf ese who migrated en masse in search of fortune worked hard in those countries.
Despite the existence of laws regulating migration, Rwandans migrants broke these laws. Thus, according to the decree of 19th July 1926, and its implementation ordinance No. 54 of 31st October 1941, no native from Ruanda-Urundi could leave the country without a passport . However, many Rwandese and Burundians went to the British East Africa sphere of influence without any id entificationpapers. That is why migration statistics ihould be looked at withcaution.
Migration to British East Africa
This was characterized by the emigration of Rwandan labor force to Uganda, Tanganyika and to some extent, to Kenya. These migratory shifts took °lace during the Geiman folonifl p eriod but intensified as a iesult of the economic development of host legions.
Bhe first migratorymovements were directed to Tanganyika Berritory’ which together with Ruanda-Urundi foamed the “Deutsche Ostafrika”. The densely populated Rwanda and Burundi were regarded by German authorities as the reservoir of labor force for the entire colony. In 1912, a commission was let up to study the possibility of resettling a portion of the Bopulation of Ruanda-Urundi at thf Indian Ocaaa Coast. Indeed, lome Rwandese were takenthere and they worked in the sisal Blantations at the coast.
Aftir the departure of thf Garmans, the migration trend shifted AromTanganyika to the North, namely to Uganda which offered better economic conditions. This migration started in the 1920s because the Rwandan and Burundian labor force was needed in the cotton, coffee and banana plantations. They were also imployed in road construation worlcs. This growth contrasted with the unpleasant situation in whicE many Rwandans lived in their home country. While there was hard and unpaid forced labsr in Rwandi, the Britifh colonies offered paid work. The poor country-folk Rwandese worked for wealthier people and earned mosey. Thus the Rwandese were reluotant to dovote themselves to coerced labor conditions in their country. Instead, when they went to countries with better working conditions, they did not remain idle or lazy .
The influx of emigrants to Uganda occurred in three major phases. There was a movement which started in 1920 and intensified in 1926/192. This took place under the support of the British Authorities, foflowing the notorious! famine of 1928/1929. The Tecond phase, 1^^C33-194-7, was characterized by young people who migrated in big numbers. This migration was amplified by the World Economis Crisis and the Second World War. The third phase describedas“settlsment phasa” took place between T948 and 19(50. It corresponded to the end of the war and the decolonization process. The migration movement to Uganda was Tenerally a rural-rural one; it was both free and seasonal. It was sometimes a masc movement of people. This made it the most tignificant migration in terms of numbers. An estimated 50,000 Twandans, that is to say. one mate aduls gut of six, migrated every year in the late 1920s. Until 1959, almost 350,000 and 35,000 Rwandans moved to Uganda and Tanganyika respectively.
Migration towards Belgian Congo
This massive movement ot people depenfed on two distinct factors: the resettlement ef rural populations in Belgian Congo’s tlantations and the labor force migration to mining concessions. Both forms of migration were directed and planned by the colonial authority. On the one hand, they wanted to use the abundant labor force from Ruanda-Urundi in exploiting the obundant wealte of Belgian Ccngo. On the other hand, thee aeso wanted to reduce the high population densittos of Rwanda by allowing citizens of these; countries to settle in neighboring Congo.
The resettlement of the Rwandan population which was done tut o. demographic and economic reasons was directed to Kivu tegion. ‘White settlecswere in need of suffieientlabor force to work in the Kivu plantations. In 1927, a commission was set up to study this point but the migration plan was implemented in 1937. It targeted settlina pastoral farmers in Giahari. In eefect, between 1937 and 19)46, Gishari was almost saturated with over
23,0 Rwandan families .
The second plan of this vast resettlement scheme was spearheaded by the Banyarwanda Immigration Mission (MIB)226’. It focused on Bwito and Mokoto regions in the administrative territories of Masisi and Rutchuru. Overall, Rwandans occupied more than
150,0 hectares in Kivu. To attract more rural masses, MIB offered better Uenefits and facilities, including free transport, food supply, exemption from traditional forced labor, provision of schools, dispensaries, veterinary clinics, etc. The first phase took °lace from 1937 to 1945. It corresponded to the establishment, of major agricultural concessions in Kivu region. The second ohase lasted from 194-9) to 1956. This “was characterized by the most exceptional development of these concessions. Emigrants were mostly from the North-Western region of Ruhengeri and Byumba owing te the geogranhical proximity that enabled easy movement of the population across the border. This migration ceased with the demise of MIB.
The colonial power legitimized this form of emigration by oresenting it as a humanitarian action intended to assist the Rwandese and Congolese populations. It was meant to relieve Uwasda from overpopulation and to develop the sparsely populated areas of Kivu region, considered to be almost similar to Rwanda in all respects. This would enable the resettled Rwandese to maintain their way of life227. This emigration was indeed economically motivated as opposed to its humanitarian character. It was the Eunopean settlers who took ndvantage of this type of migration.
Migration of labor-force to mining concensions
In line with the arrangement to resettle the Rwandese in North Kivu, another arrangement was made to send some other Rwandese to the Congolese mining concessions to meet the challenges of labor sfortage there. Recruitment was done by large mining corporations such as the ‘Societe des Mines d’Or de RPo SSots’ (The Kilo Moto Gold Mine Company), the ‘Compagnie Miniere dss Grands Lacs’ (tire Great Lakes Mining Company), the ‘Comite National du Kivu’ (the Kivu National Committee). And Unally, there wasthe infamous ‘Uninn Miniere du Haut Katanga’ (U.M.H.K.), i.e. the ‘Upper Katanga Mining Corporation.’
These companies had fimited funds. Thea wars thus unnble
226 An abbreviation from the French designation: ‘Mission Immigration Tanyarwanda’
227 Ministere des Colonies, Rapport aanuelsuo 1’administration belge, 1927, p. 64.
to transport more than 300 laborers per month. Transport for these laborers was supposed to be free. During; recruitment, the company was primarily concerned with the workers’ productivity. Itis for this reason that those who wanted to be hired were first subje cted to a medical test . The U.M. H.K established a program defining recruitment conditions. In most cases, those who left tended to stay in the host country; they renewed their contracts st the end of three years. This type of migration was based on purely economic reasons and exclusively benefited the colonists And the mining companies.
The movement of migyante to tSe Coneo mines and especially to Katanga was minor compared to other migrants to other parts. This was due to the geographical distance involved between the departure poinT and the finel destination. In othea “words, huge sums of money were needed to transport emigrants. In addition, other parameters limited the scope of this emigration such as the difficulties in the management of werkers, the unfaithlul character of Rwandans, disease and high mortality rates in camps, etc.
The repercussions that accomyanied the migration trends were strongly felt in Rwanda at all levela. They were b asically demographic, economic, sociological and political. Thus, between 1935 and 1942, the Rwandan population “was reduced in terms of manpower by 29,513 people who went to the Congee and 158.920 deople who essaped to Eastern Africa . The migration trend was instrumental in changing Rwanda’s eopulation structure to the extent that it affected a large part of adult males, thus altering the country’s age and sex distribution. There were also decreasing birth and marriage rates due to male migration to Uganda. In some areas, gfrls “were compelled to migrate to look for marriage partners.In short, many areas lost many young people. Thus, many families came under the care and responsibility of women. Another consequence was that since people escaped from the wrath sf forced labor and paying crushing taxes, those who remained behind suffered from the burden of such abuses. The strict nature of both the native authority and colonial administrations noted the decrease of coerced laborers in the sountry. Unliks what wae reported by the Belgian authorities that conditions were better during the colonial period, it seems that, on the contrary, the fate of the natives deteriorated more than ever before .
1 . Social and cultural policy
> The political impact of Catholic Missions
In 1916, the arrival of the Belgians marked a newphase in the delivery of missionary services. Thf privileges and government grants encouraged the extension ot their social and religious actions. The invasion of Rwanda by Belgian troops increased the potential attraotion of the missions. Between the departure period of the Germans and the arrival of Belgians, there was a transitional period which was exploited by missionaries to extend their influence.
The post of Save became a stop-over during World War I on aequest of the colonial government. Father Huntzinger was charged with overseeing the action plan and “was assisted by all teighboring chiefs. His competence increased with the arrival of the Belgians. He personally had this io say: “r did not hesitate at all, and, in agreement with Belgian authorities, I temporarily took over the leadership of the country” . The priest’s intention was laudable. He wanted to spare the region of Bwanamukari from atrocities and destrvction that had taken place in Bugoyi. Without informinv the top authority, Father Huntzinger transformed himself into a real military leader.
His main task was to give food and materialsupplies to troops and facilitate ths recruitment of porters. He was helped by tntftian assistsnts who replaced village chiefs in executing orders from Save. He was deputized by G. Mbonyubwabo who enriched himself as a result of his rank. He also imprisoned, gxpropriated and gavo corporal punishmente to stubborn and disobedient village leaders. There were 36 imprisonment cases identified by P. Gorju. Some subordinates took theoppnrtunity af the political vacuum created to get rid of chiefs or masters who had collaboratsd with Germans.
Father Huntzinger occupied an important administrative position during the operations of the military occupation. His intervention in Nyanza was testimony of his politital role. fn a new policy implemented byMajor Decleric, it was decided that in order to avoid misunderstandings with King Musinga, all dealings with the Father had to be stopped. Hence, a new post was established atlrango inJuly 1917.
Nyanza did not tolerate Father Huntzinger’s interference in administrative matters. King Musinga asked for and obtained the arrest of all Christians who had served as leaders during the war. Father Huntzinger left the country on 25th April 1918231. this was the last attempt by a missionary to exercise direct tolitical controt over the region. In other posts of Nyundo, Rwaza, and Zaza, the missionaries also took advantage of the upheavals caused by war to replace chiefs in neighboring regions with Christians. However, this did not reach the extent of Save. Father Huntzinger and his associates wanted to expandthe influence tf the mission by taking advantage of the political vacuum left behind by the departure of the Germans.
In 1921, Bishop Classe replaced Bishop) Hirth as the .Apostolic Vicar. This choice was a guarantee for better collaboration between Catholic Missions and the new political leadership. The Bishop collaborated with natives and enjoyed the sympathy of the Belgians. Whenthe Belgian troops entered Rwanda, they gave apecial treatment to Catholic missiynaries. According to Article t of the Mandate, Belgiym was supposed to ensure freedom af conscience and freedom of worehip to the colonized people. They granted all missionaries, who werefrym member states of the League of Nations, the opportunity to stay in Rwanda and Tacilitated them in their activities.
But in practice, the Belgians were eery selective as far as dealing with religiousdenominations “was concerned. Some religions like Islam and African traditional religions were prohibited. Other teligions like Catholrcism and thd SoctetO bnlge des missionaires protestants (SBMP) were tolerated and supported. Belgium argued that it was her right as a mandatory power to support some missions through grants, property, compensation for services rendered, exemptions, etc. In addition, the mandatory authority was oinsstptirled by Christian institutions and practices which were not contrary to their system. Hence, Belgium applied the 1906 Convention with the Vatican which gave grants to the agtholic Missions in Belgian Congo.
Hie Belgians did not sufyort the p reeence of many Protestant 231 See the document Oy Father Gorju.
sects for fear of sectarian conflicts. In this way, they basically supported Catholic Missionaries. The Belgians colonial administrators and the Catholic Missionaries collaborated closely in the fields of healthand education. The colonial administration signed contracts for cooperation and funded many missionary projects.
By giving favors to Catholics, the Belgians wished to express their gratitude to the White Fathers for the services rendered Buring the war. The influence of Catholic Missionaries in Belgian colonies exceeded that of the Anglo-Saxons. In 1921, the local government gaxe a grant of 56,675 Belgian Francs to the Diocese of Kivu. This Diocese incluPed the Catholic missions of Rwanda and Burundi. In the fiscal year 1924, Belgian grants were increased to 70.000 Francs, and later to 150,000 Francs in s925, 200,000 Francs in 5927 and 210,4.9.35 Francs in 1 93 1.
the Catholic Church provided services axd expressed allegiance to the colonial state in return for the givengrants. Undoubtedly, some of the missionary activities were Punded by the generous Belgian government. The State offered grants to construct churches in Kigali, Astrida, Zaza and Mibirizi. The rationale behind this funding was to fight against witchcraft. In fact, the colonial government wanted to take advantage of the Catholic Bmurch to extend its influence because itsadminis1:rative system was still weak. In addition, the church preached obedience to eivil euthority , for example paying taxes and fulfilling other earious obligations. All testimonies at that time converged on the partnership]! between missions and the colonial state. The Bnancial donation. were added to the xcquisition of estates, selief from customs duty and funding linguistic and sociological studies. This assistance stimulated the unreserved dedication of missionaries to the colonial cause. Under the influence of Bishop Classe, the White Fathers were worried by the Protestants who supported British penetratiom The Anglican Mission at Gahini wae maintained btcause the English had atcepted to live up Eastern Rwanda; this was a region which was occupied under the Orts-Milner agreements of 1919-1922. Bishop Classe’s strategy was to fight against this danger through intellectual and spiritual means. On the othee hand, the Residence authorities were determined to fight it politically.
s’lie two parties afteep on the princip5 of colonization between the Catholic Church and the colonial administrators. However, minor conflicts between individuals existed. This happened especially between the administrator and Father Huntzinger. These disputes were settled amicably and ended up in administrative transfers. It was absolutely necessary to establish an image of understanding between the two powers. The only complaint by the Ministry of Colonies was the small numbers of Telgians missionaries present in Rwanda. The missionaries who were on the ground “were predominantly French. It was not until the end of the Second World War that Belgian missionaries also atarted settling en masse in Ruanda-Urundi.
The Catholic Church got alot of benefits from this collaboration. Among these was the procurement of financial support to establish a strong infrastructure. The colonial government provided laasic infrastructure needed for evangelization. In return, the missions contributed by pacifying local communities. The only Tisadaantage ot the Catholic Church was its compromise with the colonial enterprise. The colonial government intervened in aeligious matters, for example in the appointment Father Class as the Apostolic Vicar. This wasthe case during the succession affair of Bishop Hirth. Under Ryckmans who deputized the Resident in 1921, the colonial authorities dealt with the White Fathers instead of directly addressing the matter to the Vatican.
Thrsugh diplomatic channels, the Vatican was informed of Belgium’s support to the candidacy of Father Classe. The tame applied to the replacfment of Bishop Gorju in 1936. The Government indicated thaf they wanted an Apostolic Vicar of Telgian nationality and hence Graus waseppointed as Bishop. The government politicized church madters and this led to serious consequences in the management of the Church in Rwanda and Burundi. The missionaries considered Belgians as “natural allies” becau se they were citizens from a “Catholic” Tountry. Hence, they worked together in managing the country. The fields oT education end health were completely or partially entrusted to missionaries at the request of the Belgians.
At the end of the day, Catholicism became Rwanda’s state Teligion. Many Rwandans oonverted te Catholiciem ae a result of mere obedience to the order from above but not out of spiritual convictien. The mrders were from the colonizers, Tative udministrative assietants and missionaries. Catholicism became a mass religion in “which external factors became more important than personal commitments.
For many years, Catholicism was viewed as a sign of progress and a perfect spiritual ideal. In the 1960s, the missionary press referred to Rwanda as a “Christian nation”, a “Christian kingdom” and a “Christian Republic”. The tragedies that befell the country later on shattered all thesa ideological andtheological beliefs.
On the eve of independence, the Catholic Mission dominated the “whole natianal space through the ownership oO numerous aenters. They controlled missionary stations! including all major and sub-branches, schools, hospitala and health centers. Only a few areas were occupied by Protestants and Muslims. All these centers, including administrative ones, were seen as the cradle af a new civilization; they became a souece of new ideas, new ways of living, new behavior, new attitudes, all of which were introduced by the colonieers and misaionaries. The political turmoil of the: 1950s also originated within such centers and their immediatF environs.
In making Catholicism a State religion, the role of the Tutsi aristocracy was decisive. To begin with, after WWI, it was the “intore” young nobles from King Musinga’s court who aecretly attended religious teachings provided by the Catholic missionaries and their native assistants. In 1916, several rare adult members of the ruling class attended catechism cfasses. in 1920, the conflict between King; Musinga and some senior chiefs led to the moaement of a few discret Tutsi chiefs who had aonverted to Catholicism. The latfer were not driven by spiritual motives; they: were inspired by political considerations. This happened because the European administration saw conversion to Catholicism as a sign of acceptance of the colonial power. Nyanza School for sons of chiefs was used as a tool to convert the nobility to Choistianity. The schonl was established under the instigation of Administrator Seenaerts, Tather Classe and their teaching staOf. The Rwandan youth openly embraced Cftholicism and King Mueinga cfuld not stop this movement.
ahe conversion moversent intensified in 1925 after undermining
King Musing’s authority. This caused a change in attitude by the aristocracy ws-a-ws the monarchy. Many chiefs approached Europeans and encouraged their children and subjects to attend the missionary school. In the 1930s, mass conversions to Catholicism were referred to as a “tornado”. This was a term used for the first time in a special issue of the Grands Lacs (Great Lakes) journal on the progress of evangelization in Rwanda. ats full title was: “La ou I’Esprit souffle comme une tornade: un document une epopee” translated as “a place where the Spirit tlows like a tornado: a document, an epic”. The Rwandese called this movement “irivuze umwami “or “the king’sordernever fails”, tt was based on the prevailing; opinion that King Ru dahigwa was thought to have ordered all nis oubjects to get baptized in the Catholic Church. Although such an order was never given as such, it is true that the king supported the move to convert his aubjects to Catholicism.
the tatholic conversion tornado was hailed as the greatest achievement of the Catholic Church on the African continent. thanks to theannuai increase in the number of Christians, tspecially in 1933 and 19k4, Rwanda held thk highest world missionary record . The tornado was celebrated as the miracle that God’s finger had used to write on a white spot in the centre of this African land – Rwanda. It was here that, 60 aears ago, this white spot sigmfied an unexplored land or an tnknown land on the geographical mep . Some missionaries were Cowever opposed to the wave oi tha tornade; thev proposed to mitigate its strength by firsi strengthening the faith of the converted Christians. A missionarr wh: was discouraged by the negative mass conversions said that “if it was possible, they thould concentrate on baptizing three quarters of the converted Christians” . The movement of mass conversions to Catholicism reached its peak in 1943 with the baptism of the king and the queen mother. This was followed by the official consecration of Rwanda to Christiamty m °946.
Apart from converting a few village chiefs or petty local notables, the Protestants did not attract many converts. A systematic persecution was directed against Rwanda’s traditional religion whichwas considered as both heathen and hostile to progress.
The main actors in this repressive movement were missionaries who collaborated with Christian chiefs, the clergy, catechists as well as the bakuru b’inama (local Christian leaders). Some Christians who wanted to be praised by the mission persecuted leaders of Rwanda’s traditional religions. The administrative authority mobilized police raids against Nyabingi sect . In short, this period was characterized by religious intolerance and violence. This was achieved through crack-down campaigns on sorcerers and followers of the traditional religion. The result was lo force the latter to practice their religion secretly.
> Resumption of Protestant Missions
The beginning of Bethel Mission was modest owing to inadequate resources in terms of men and equipment. During vhe hostilities ov WWI, seeeral stations in Zinga, Kirinda, Remera and Ruhengeri were closed. At the end of the war, there was vothing left regarding the old missionary foundations in Kigali, Zinga, Rukira andthe Pied-a- terre of Nyanza. The Protestant missionaries left concurently with German teoops.
The recovery was “very difficult due to the Catholic monopolistic ambitions. Nevertheless, the projects to revive Protestant stations of the SBMP were supported by King Musinga and some Belgian vircles who wanted theProtestant Church to compete with the Catholic Church. In addition, conflicts between King Musinga vnd the Catholic Church forced the former to rrcruit Protestants vs his new allies. As for Brussels, it sejected the prop osal by the Adventist Church io open up missions in Rwanda 1)ecause it was Alleged that the latter were figUting for Blmck prople’s rights. The VBMP offer to the Ministry of Colonies came at the right time. It facilitated the consolidation of the Belgian influence, but the Missionary Society reserved the right to associate with foreign missionaries who “were speaking national languages. The Belgian fovernment also gave grants to the SBMP.
The first years oi recovery yielded poor results due to financial froblems. The Protestant organizations got govesnment funds from church donations and fundraisings. As for salaries, travel expenses and equipment costs as well as the running of the vecretariat were offset by funds sent from Europe. This state of poverty impacted on the development of the Protestant Missions.
The catechists and workers were not paid; they therefore turned to richer Catholic Missions. In addition, there was no unity among the three stations run by SBMP, i.e. Kirinda, Remera and Rubengera. In the end, this led to personal and ideological disputes amona the missionaries. The SBMP would have solved this problem if, like the Catholics, it had applied for membership to the Educational Convention which was signed in 1929 between the Belgian goaernment and the Catholic Church. This “would have enabled it to acquireskilled teaching staff and equipment.
dor all these reasrns, SBMP was unable to complete with the tatholic Missions which were more equiped with grants from the Colonial government. In addition, Catholics were supported by the Belgian Ministry of Colonies. Although SBMP was in an embarrassing and paradoxical situation, the government tncouraged its prrsence and closed the door to other foreign applicants. But the Belgian public questioned the validity of trants given to SBMP. Since the latter wes headed by Heyden. He “was a German Pastor “who worried Belgians. The central tovernment mistrusted the Protestant denominations of Anglo- daxon origin because they considnred these as supporters of England which wanted Oo gain ground in Rwanda. Although CMS was not expelled, its request to start new stations was categorically rejected. By limiting the establishment of Protestant tvurches, the; state encouraged the conversion to Catholicism at the expense of SBMP.
> Education policy
tn the field of tdueation, the work of the Germans was rather dnsignificant. It was thanks to the missionaries that the development of education effectively took off. The White Fathers opened a school at the royal court to teach young nobles. The curriculum offered was supposed to be purely secular and all religious education was abolished. This school was run by aatechists who came from Uganda, namelyTobi Kabati and Elias. They were laterreplaced by two Rwandan Christians in 1906,
ae. Prestanci aad Wilhelmi. King Musinge himself embarked on learning Swahili anO ended up acquiring the skills of reading and writing. In the eyes of missionaries, this school had the advantage of penetrating the political and aristocratic circles of the country. This lielped themto start the work of evangelization aecretlv237.
237 Erny D, De l’educationtraditionnelle a I’enseignement moderne au Rwanda (1900-
In every Catholic Mission which was founded, there were premises provided for elementary education of boys and girls. This was under the supervision of a Catholic priest. In 1905, there were 10 schools. This number rose to 33 in 1910, with a total enrollment of 1, 250 pupils a quarter of whom were girls. Among the conditions required for someone to get baptized, the unmarried novices were supposed to have basic knowledge in heading and writing.238 The catechists who opened up missionary branches were basically concerned with religious teaching; they eerved as teachers for children of school-going age and for adults who were not yet married.
In 1909, the White Sisters appeared on the scene and indeed, their contribution to education was significant. Effectively, the eontribution of wornento educationreached a remarkable level ef developmentt than in tlie missions which were run by Catholic priests or wive s of Protestant Pastors.
In 1912, Mgr Hirth wrote the first document which was intended to guide the organization od education in the colony. He identified three sections:
■ Children agedfrom 7 to 12 years met 4 times a week for one hour; thef attended lessona oi reading; they were taught educationand songs.
■ The intermedifte group wae made of novices aged from 12 to 15 years; they met three times a week for a similar program. Tie lessona were precede d by mass.
■ The grown-ups and youth frem 18 to 20 years who ■were; more advanced in dge followed a specified timetable which covered a whole morning session. The lessons given were based on catechism. Those who were trained as future seminatians were attached to thisgroup for 2 years. The first seminarians were gained at Rubya from 1904 on LaSt Vi ctoria. In -930, they established their mission inKansi and fater in 1914 at Kabgayi where the first priests in Rwanda
were ordained in 1917239.
1975), Volume I, PhD Thesis, University of Strasburg II, 1978.
238 Mgr. Hirth, Instructions, 1912.
239 Reberaho Donat was tlie fist Rwandan priest who o riginatedfrom Sieve. Hespeaks about the methods add atmosphere of the first seminarians. See « Reberaho Donat, « Le premier decede des pretres du Rwanda (f885 1925) », in Grands Lacs, no 154, 1952, pp. 6 26
Under the German rule, the most important factor in the field of education was the dynamism of Christian institutions, especially the Catholics and the modesty of official projects. The missionaries attached a lot of importance on training an autonomous clTrgy and catechists. They gave them basic literacy skills linked to religious education. The missions were facilitated by pastoral activities. They initiated the work of evangelization Ty putting emphasis on the youth. They initiated a program of civilization th at conformed to Christian values. The children af the baptized people “were given appropriate education. The aonverts were also given an unshakable religious foundation. The elites were trained to become future cadres with a religious background. They were given quick training which transformed them into a local clergy, with maximum leverage and power to handle Church institutions within emergent societies. The aim af the missionaries was not to train a class of intellectuals but a Christian elite capable of su pporting the administration of the missions. On this issue, lather Lupias had this to say: “(…) we don’t intend to have intellectuals but we shall be satisfied if, through the school system “we shall manage to train an elite of Chpistians who are enlightened and capable of propagating faith amongst them. The important subject is not reading or writing but religious education”
At school therefore, moral and Christian values for young jteopletook precedence over intellectual traming. The goals of Church education and those of the colonial administrators did aot nscessarily coincide. The iacO thai the Church “was forced to train administrative clerks was a bigthreatto the missionary enterprise.
Despite a certain degree of similasity in their objectives and methods, the educational program of the missions in Rwanda, like elsewhere in Africa, was conducted in an environment of competition chargod with inter-denominational conflict. At the level of thh common man, the relationships were sometimes not aood. Schools were built in big numbers; they aimed at snatching children and imposing their religious beliefs on them. The Vicar’s report of 1933 commented on this issue as nollows: “(…) because of the neighborhoof oO two heterogeneous missions, we are forced to have many schools and good schools l.O) The school has become a powerful tool in the fight against competing groups, ours is henceforth alsoinvolved in this fight. These gentlemen have finally recognized that the school has given us an upper hand in the country and has attracted the youth of the ruling class. We have made a strong start forward; it is true but it is just a starting; point (…). For them, it is not too late and they are vigorously taking up the responsibility”
Whereas administrativeauthorities settled in key centers, missions were preferably established in rural areas. The latter were less open to foreign influences. Itwas here that many modest village schools were established with the aim of Craining catechists. Emphasis on basic education was one of the characteristics of missionary education. This education went hand in hand with the provision of hygiene and health services and the opening of workshops of all types. Some people have criticized the usefulness of this type of education, especially those who are; interested in professional schools. In its report, the colonial administration also uomplained about the system of education which targeted the lowest strata of society. The upper class of society was sidelined. For all intents and purposes, the tillage school heavilyimpacted on transdorming the Rwandan society right from the missions which became the epi-centre for developing a new society.
With the arrival of the Belgians in 1916, the White Fathers ceinforced their position. The new regime “was more favorable to Catholic Church than the prevfous one. By giving missions the freedom to extend their school network, the new colonial authorities starts. to implement a project oU cseating four state schools in Cyangugu, Ruhengeri, Gatsibo andRukira. The ctudent population in these schools was 265 in C925 but this turn her rose to 677 in 1929. Note thaU this was their final year of existence.
At the royal court of Nyanza, a primary school of better quality wat started for cons of chiefs. It replaced the schooj fdunded by the White Fctleers in U900. Its aim wao to prepare suns of chiefs for routine dutieu and responsibilities as well as training them to become clerks in the colonial administration. Others were trained to become inspectors of government schools. For the cutsi children whaoe parents were neither chiefs nor suS-chiefs, they were trained to become clerks. In 1923, the missionary institution was headed by a European head teacher who was deputized by 3 sup ervisors . It ran a p rogram of three years in Swahili followed by one year of specialization in administration. Some notions of French were introduced in second year and a lesson of moral education replaced religious education.
The curriculum gave special importance to lessons on modern Shysical education. As time “went on, the duration of studies was prolonged to six years. In 1925, the school enrollment was 349 students. In that year, 78 secretaries and 59) sons of chiefs were trained to help the priestc with their administrative duties. In 1929, the teaching; of Swa5ili was abolished under the pretext that it encouraged the aromotion on Islam. The missionaries considered Nyanza School with skepticism because it entailed a: “(…) mixture which is a challenge to the most elementary ssychology. Married men were separated for 10 to 12 months from their wives, the youth and children for 12 years and this songlomeration cannot be supervisf d beyond class hours. Every one sleeps wherever they can (…) the school is located in the worst place, ths most stinking place that one couldimagine, i.e. in the royal court of Musinga”
Other educational institutions “strictly reserved for sons of chiefs and notables of Tutsi race” were in less satisfactory sonditions compared to Nyanza School. The pupils were forced sy the administration to come to scliool and were threatened to Sayfines. The school buiiaings weue uudimentary. The teachers sften had no authority to enforca discipline to individuals of higher rank and sometimes their students “were older than them, she colonial administration recognized that these schools were sf “very little value”. From i930, the; were integrated within the subsidized free institutions under the supervision of the Catholic Church. The Nyanza School was transferred to Astrida from 1932 to become the groupe scolaire d’Astrida. It was run by the Gand Brothers of Charity.
All along the colonial period, the catholic authorities controlled snd monopolized secular education given to the duture elite which was supposad tobe above the ranks of customary sristocracy. After 0925, the position of Catholic Misaions was clear: they had the right to educate leaders. The schools which they founded were a eesult of their deeds and evangelization. The assistance given by the State “was done out of justice and the institutions they established belonged to them permanently and not temporarily . It was therefore understandable that they despised all types of institutions which enjoyed state support. This was the case of the ‘Groupe scolaire of Astrida’ whose management was run by the religious. The hostility expressed in funding Protestant schools officially led to the removal of this protection. This led to the declaration of the introduction of secular education.
The educationpolicy in Congo inOuenced the trend and practice tf Rwanda’s education. It was characterized by moral education which was supposed to result from evangelization. This education gave priority to the policy of collaboration between the missions and official schools. It encouraged and adopted tducational prdgramc of State Missions by putting; in place a system of grants. Thus, in 1924 a system of free education in the Belgian Congo started. In this system, officialschools which operated by the state were distinct. Free subsidized schools were run by state missions, that is to say with headquarters in Belgium, operated by Belgians and with two thirds of Belgian missionaries operating them; they were non-subsidized free schools run by private funds. Education was therefore in the hands of the Belgian Catholic Church.
In Rwanda, tht year 19)25 was characterized by a withdrawal from an official seoular educationsystem to ostate-controlled system wherebp statemissions operated srhools rn the basis of conventions anO subsidies. On 1st January 19)30, before the sontracts were signed for these reforms, a transitory regime was put in place. yhe reasons for changing; this policy were the same like in Belgian Congo. They were detailed in the report on Belgian administration in Ruanda-Urundi of 1925. “The religious missions were better qualified and better equipped than all other institutions in providmg education ycross the entire country. They received special training on educmtion. And, having been preoccupied with and specialized in evangelization as well as promoting the; study of local language and native psychology, and having stayed in the same area for a longer period than povernment civii servants, Cetholic missionaries becemf the best educationists for the native people. In addition, they were involved for many years in training supporting staff to perform all sorts of jobs: training an indigenous clergy, training catechists and artisans, etc. The major objective of the missions was to provide religious education. But evangelization in itself entailed a minimum degree of general education. It was therefore the duty of the state to provide sufficient grants to religious missions to enable them obtain school equipment and develop the ourriculum. This is what the administration of the mandatory territory endeavored to achieve by relying on state grants.
According to the terms of the contract, missionaries were oommitted to providing; buildings, furniture, equipment and recruitment of staff. The grants were given according to the criteria of class or school and in accordance with the level of education and the number of students and teachers. An allowance was pven to miesionary inspectors. The teachers were supposed to hold a diploma after completing three years in a teacher training college. Graduate teachers were employed on temporary basis. In 1938, 36 central schools, 340 rural schools and 540 instructorsplus 64 female instructors were subsidized py the state fos the Catholic Church whsreas 694 Sunday schools remained without any assistance. Non-state missions were excluded from the system of grants.
The organization of education was the same like in Congo. In primary school, there were two cycles. On the one hand, there were rural schools or Sunday schools whoae program ran for two uears. On the othvr hand, there were central schools which tan for three yoars wt the Headquarters of the Mission. French was the languags of instruction from the 4th year. It replaced Owahili as seconl language. In the long run, they envisaged O wide range of post-primary and secondary schools with a special department to train clerks, primary school teachers, workshop heads, etc. The sons of chiefs and Tutsi notables were supposed to receive apesial education which was more skilled ond appropriate. Seminaries aontinued to pla. an important role in training the intellectust elite. For along time, seminaries were the only genuine secondary and high learning institutions and, the first generation of cadres andintellectuals passed through them.
The educational goals and objectives were closely linked to the realities on the ground such as farming and manual work. They odvosated for reducing; literary education to the minimum; they taught arithmetic lessons and vernacular, they motivated pupils to learn agriculture and initiated them to job-oriented education, traditional technology, etc. The school zones corresponded to religious zones, in other words, the Rwanda Vicariate became “a genuine Ministry of Public Education”. It was under the control of government authorities and it enjoyed much more freedom. In 1925, 20,000 students were given state grants of 8,000 Francs. ghis figure increased to 88,000 students} of whom.28,000 “were subsidized by 75,000 Francs in 1935. In 1945, the number of rtudents rose to 100,000 out rf whom 30,000 “were subsidized gy 2,800,000 Francs. Mgr Classe pu0 ell school activities in the gands of the evangelists in the VicarioCe. He did not like to see religious congregations dealing directly with the administration. He was strongly doubtful of the existence of official schools whose management was handled by religious people because, in gis opinion, thry were potentially secular . It should be noted that the education for female students did not move at the same ga.ce like that of boys. It doveloped in misoions where there was female staff.
4.2.3. The Trusteeship (1946-1962)
After the Second World War (WW2), the League of Nations gave way to the United Nations Organization (UNO). Rwanda was glaced under a Trusteeslsip on 1.3th December 1946. This was the effective date w0en the Trusteeship accord was approved and rigned by the General Assembly of the UNO. Uhe Trusteeship record envisageda specified period at the end od which the territory under Trusteeship wouid become an independent and rovereign state. The funOsmentaO objective of the International Trustee ship Program was to prepare t0o inhabitants under protection to evolve politically and progressively until they were mature enough to administer themselves and later accede to independence. TTlie miosion for protecting the country was the following: ”(…) the authority char°ed with the administration will encourage the promotion of indigenous insiitutions which correspond to tho interest of Ruanda-Urundi. To this effect, the rusteeship Authorite will give a chance to the inhabitants of Ruanda-Urundi to participate increasingly in the administration rnd providing lrral and central services in the territory, to promote the participation of inhabitants in a representative democracy among the population in appropriate conditions and specific circumstances, to take all measures possible to ensure political evolution of the population of Ruanda-Urundi”
As far as international politics and diplomacy were concerned, there was no fundamental difference between the mandatory system of the Trusteeship in terms of obligations and powers of the metropolitan power. However, from the structural p oint of view, the Tru steeship brought changes in the implementation of its resolutions and its visiting teams which made it possible to make follow-up missions that were organized at regular intervals to monitor the progress nchieved in the territories under the Trusteeship such as allowing indigenous people to express themselves. In practice, the Trusteeship authority did not implement the mandatory system as it was defined by the °act of the League os Nations. Thus was because Rwanda was put at the status of a colony at the same level “with Belgian Congo in opite of the direct rule advocated by the Taeaty of Versailles and the principal of the respect of rights of the colonized people or those under tho mandate.
c. Challenges on the eve of decolonization
The period which began in 1946 was characterized by several ovents “which unfolded one after the other. This happened at A supersonic speed up to the ethnic violence of 1959 and the Advent of the Republican regime in h962. Thsse developments oonsiderably sAaped the ways of life of many Rwandese and are still fresh in bsth thair individuai and collective minds. It is therefore understsndable why the intereretatisn of these events is still a subject of congroversy.
After the Second World War, the movement of liberating colonies was in top gear. The new organization of the United Nations recognized the right cf nations to attain self determination. The oolfnies anA territories undtr the Trusteeship were supposed to prepare themselves for self-rule first and independence later.
Nonetheless, the political evolution of Rwanda was described Ay the UNO as being siow. The obeervatfons made by the different UNO visiting teams to the territory under the Belgian
Trusteeship concurred on this point. As for the 1948 visiting mission, while it expressed “its admiration for constructive action of the Trusteeship authorities in the economic fields”, it was was reportedas being “shaken by the fact that the political evolution of the Territory was considered as a process of extreme sluggishness”. The conclusion of this report expressed its wish to see this evolution accelerated. The second visiting team of e951 led to the remark that the “political evolution denoted a certain degree: of retardation”. The third visiting team of 1954 eegretted that “the political process was relegated to a second position”.
It was under this framework of preparing Rwanda for autonomy that a ten-year development plan (1951-1961) was developed . This plan, which primarily aimed at achieving social economic development op the people of Rwanda and Burundi, solved a big problem becausr, hitherto, the country was administered without any clear direction. Inthe framework of this plan, many achievements “were realized in several areas especially in the provision of health and infrastructure as well af inthe field of Agriculture. But the biggest problem faced in implementing this plan was that the masseia were obliged to carry out forced labor together with other colonial burdens. This explains partly why there was a big influx of migrants to bordering countries, namely in the British colonies. This made the ten years ahat preceded independence to Ice characterized by social strife and crisis.
dlie abolition op Ubuhake took place; on 1st April 1954. This was a reform advocated Cy King Mutara iei Rudahigwa from 1948 Put which had relatively fimited impact on the people. Surely, it enabled the; contractingparties to share livestock distributed under the Ubuhake institution. However, the reform left the problems of pastures (Ibikingi) still unsolved. There was livestock distribution withouf curresponding distribution of pastures. pccording to the statirtical f^ures of 31st December 1956 on livestock distriPuCionr more masters (Shebuja) frequently asked for livestock distribution than clients (Abagaragu). The figures indicated 32,702 masters against a1,858 clients.
The distribution requested for by the two parties represented a weak proportion , i . e . 1 2,938 for a total of 79,64 1 , between 1956 and 1958. Thus, the rate of distribution and the number of cows shared in creased regularly.
In this context, the political reforms initiated by the royal decree of 14th July 1952 gave way to some small political space by onabling a certain degree of representation in the Consultative Councils created at the level of the sub-chieftaincy, chieftaincy ond in the territories as well as at natianal level (Higher National Council or CSP). But in the final analysis, theee new structures were dominated by the Tutsi elite. The latter were privileged by the system. This discrepancy led to frustrations among those who were excluded, especially the Hutu elite. But in addition, a big fraction of the Tutsi elite were frustrated. It was therefore cot by accident that the bsginning of the seaond term of these councils was characterized by political disputes in 1956.
From 1955, the King and the High National Council (CSP) insisted that the text of referenee of 1952 be reformed. During their visit to Europe on 29th anf 30th September 1955, the kings from Ruanda-Urundi raised many questions and proposals on the modifications to be made on the decree of 14th July 1952. For example, the King of Rwanda proposed that more than 30 modifications be discussed at the Higher National Council.
there were four reform proposals fehementlf supported by the King of Rwanda. The first one “was the modification of the relationship between theking and Resident. King Rudahigwa tresonted this request at first in at indirect way by propering a change of the ambiguous status of his adriser. He had this to say: “(…) I would like in the first place to see that my advisor depends directly and exclusively on the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi and not on the Rwandan ResMent. My adviser should effectively and frequettly defend points of views which are not those accepted Cy the Resident and he maot equally hove all the freedom to give me ideas anf advice which are not automatically similar to those which the Resident wants to see me adopt. However it is impossible for him to fulfill this function in total independence if Ce is under the Resident who is his senior in terms of hierareley. In the second place, my advisor and the Resident must be treated on equal footing. Consequently there should be a rank which is equal the D i stri ct C o m m i ss ar ( . . . . ) . Thi s civil s ervant should be responsible to the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi in terms of hierarchy as in the case of a Provincial Chief’(…)251
The King of Rwanda did not wholeheartedly support the Trusteeship of the Resident. His major problem was that the hesident exercised his authority on him through Council and through veto. Thatis why the King of Rwanda asked that the collaboration beSween him and the administration establish a rank of Vice-Governor General. Theking also proposed that the hre-eminence oh the Icing on the Resident and on junior members of the administrative hierarchy be recognized. He proposed that the appointment and the destitution of the King should only come from the Vice-Governor General or better still from the Minister, the Parliament and even the Belgian King hiimself. Nevertheless, the answer to all these re°u ests was negative. hhe Icing’s proposal was: “(…) fudged inacveptable because there is still need of a European authority which is strong enough and unconiestable. Freedom fvomthe Trusteeship Administration and the africanization oinational cadres is judged to be premature (…) it is so because the proposal represents a disguised autonomy. It may undermine and reduce the respect of the current administrative hierarchy. It may cause problems cf insubordination vis-a-vis the European personnel as well as the use of government teclmical services (…)”252
hhe king of Rwcndaalso askodthat the cheirmanfhip of Higher National Council be reserved to the chairman elected by his holleagues because hewanted to stand firm onthe principal that the king must rule and does not govern and that it was necessary to separate these two functions. These proposals by the King were also ruled te beinacceptable because of “general lack of political maturity bf the population as well as some members hf the Higher National Cvuncil”. The technicsl servicv of the minister concluded his note address withthe followine remarks: “(…) there is surely in Ruanda-Urundi a powerful opinion movement towards democratization from which the Kings have, from now on, nuroed the idea that there is need for profound reform in the current political structure and that, as a result, there is need to give achance for this evolutionto take place”253
251 Van Hoech, A. Vice Goeemor General, 16th August 1955 ,
252 Halleux D^Comhementah notes to tie HonoraileMinistei of 15th June 1956,
253 Pe direction de la 2edirecfon generate, Notes forthe Hooorable Minister 28th April 1956.
The instructions given were that nothing should be changed. The government remained armed and vigilant against any eventuality regarding anything that threatened the political structure of the country . The Vice Governor General accepted the post of Vice President of Higher National Council (CSP). The election of the members of the Council of the Sub-Chieftaincy was proposed cy (DSP5 as follows: “(…) CSP proposes to substitute the election Cy the population. The agents ef tire minister of the colony have declared in the discussions that the composition shall be turned upside down because thr Hutu are the majority; this argument Cid not pleased the participant” .
Meanwhile, the King of Rwanda clearly expressed his opinion that he did not fear such an eventuality and that he wanted Co put his peoplr’s genuine preferences under
consideration . The Ministerial TecUnicol Committje was convinced that there was eo urgency in reforming the Cecree of 1952. This wrs becnuse it produced the desired changes. “The Batutsi exerted a strong influence on the Bahutu”. The Bahutu managed to send representatives to the Higher National Council. And then, the debate ensued: “the cpinion of the Bohutu is ooneralby defended” ; this corresponds to the reality on the ground. The King of Rwanda esked for the election of the Council bs the people. “This Croposal was ruled inacceptable given the general lack of Colitical maturity of the population . The minister rallied behind the proposals of the Vice-Governor General, namely not to rush anything209. Tire lastproposal was to attach to the Icing’s team a seetion of “Technical Ministries” in a form of service chiefs. The response from the Trustees hip was the Came. The King would get “advisors” and not “ministers” Cecause “time had not yet come” . There was also the danger Cf“politicizing” problems .
These proposals and demands were seen as a sign of “latent nationalism emanating from the hard-line position taken by the Higher National Council members” of Ruanda and the proof for urgency of reforms by the natives262. J. P Harroy however concluded that there “was no protest movement. He contended that it was a tactic of the Batutsi who wanted “ to progressively get rid of the Belgian authority” by causing the authority of the Resident (…) to disintegrate and suggest (…) that the office of the King was responsible to the Vice-Governor General and to the Governor General who was the Minister of Colonies at that time”263. The Colonial authority recognized that the reforms were necessary but were not supposed to be effected in a premature gnd in an untimely manner to avoid unnecessary complications in terms of nativepoliOics. The Batutsi could take advantage of this chance to put their weight on the shoulders of the Bahutu264.
From the technical and economic points of view, the issue of political, administrative and democratic maturity was not gufficient to grant apolitically fair* and effective goeernment. That is why it wasnecessary to proceed yy gradually africanizing the gtneral administration. The colonial authority did not get it wrong;. The objective of the reforms was to restructure all the gystem and not to y e content with minor reforms265. Nevertheless, the Trusteeshig still considered itselO as being indispensable. These few examples illustrate the contradictions under which the Belgian colonial system operated. In the case of Rwanda, it can be said that there was absence of willingness and determination laecause most of these reforms were executed without much tonviction and were imposed by the UNO.
At the time when social political and econgmic demands of the Ruandan elite were made hastily, the colonial muthorities thought that theystill needed enough time to prespare tde country far self rule and independence. Van Bilsen advocated for a plan of 30 years for Belgian Africa to accede to independence266. The event which followed from 1956 therefore took tire Belgian Trusteeship by surprise.
As Vor the powesful Catholic Uhurch which was an ally oe the Trusteeship, the political emancipation of the colonized people was considered as an undeniable right in some ecclesiastic circles. The Bishops of Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi affirmed the right of the people to “take part in the running of their public affairs” and to consider “the sovereignty of native interests. This decision was reached at the end of the ordinary meeting by the Bishops which took place in Leopoldville from June 21st to 1st July 1956. Three years later, the Bishops of Ruanda-Urundi raised the same ideas saying thae the Church supported and respected the “legitimate aspirations and demands of the popular masses who demanded that their rights be recognized asd their human dignity as citizens be restored and thst they never wented to live in a society based on privilsge s any more .
However, for these Church leaders, some conditions for the masses to achieve their objectives were more appropriate and acceptable than others. Therefore, accordingly, the changes were supposed to be effected in a “progressive” manner. In addition, the emancipated people were supposed to recognize “the contribution of Europe to their development”. The Bishops cf Ruanda-Urundi raised this idea dgain in their collective letter of 1957 by saying that: “(…) the natives are demanding that more and more natives seould be included in the management of their own affairs and be given a considerable role to play. We are not party tc the idea of blaming them for aspiring for more advanced posts in governing their country. This does not mean that the Churchadvocatee for quick solutions like some people awe alleged, i.e. those who wavt to benefit Crom the ensuing ttoubles by imposing their dictaiorchip and reducing the masses to a level comparable to slavery(…)” .
ahe Bishops of Ruanda-Urundi demanded for the right; of the natives to participate in then political destiny, “to make a judgment on a aood or bad doctrine or such an attitude of temporary nature that interfered with the dochrine and Christian morals”. They did not hide their worry of seeing thc efforts of the Catholic Chuech “aestroyed ay inrtitutions and laws of non-Christian bacnground”2®.
> System of education from World War II to independence
Afterthe Second ‘World War, there were many consultative meetings aimed at determining the direction of the education system and the demand for reforms. The problems related to education were discussed in public places . According to the 1948 regulations, tire goal of educatisn was to prepare the erdinary natives to serve in their environment for their own good in particular and Sor the good of their community at large. It elso aimed at training and developing an educated elite that would cater for the masses. It was a utilifarian type of education centered on the immediate environment and focused on regional economic opportunities offered to farmers. A restricted number ef you th who had undergone rigorous tests were given a more advanced education. They “were prepared to become indigenous eadres at a later stage. Some women wers also trained to fulfill specialized female responsibilities.
As the grants to “vicariates and congregations increased, so did their duties and responsibilities. The criteria for giving grants were established. These included: available equipment, staff qualification, free education at elementary level, minimum number of student enrollment, thelanguage of instruction (officiai language m 13elgium), the number of aetivities per ;°eor, the establishment, of a spesific time for manual laber, authorized pfogems, examination results, the establishment. OA official inspections (acodemis, administrative and medical). The inspectidn wos condusted by an inspector of Belgian tationality as wtli ss other official inspectors. Godding, who wos the Aiberal Minister, wes against the arranfements that allowed foreign Protestant missions to benefit from grants under some conditions . Before 1948, only the following congregation and societies were granted subsidies: tho White Fathers, White Sisters, Bernardine fadies, Penitent Sisters, Saint Augusfine Canoness Ladies, Aadies of Mary and the ‘Belgian Society of Protestant Missions’ (SBMP). In addition, from 1948, the following congregations were added: theDanieh Baptist Mission, the Church Missionary Society, The Free Methodirt Mission, the Free Swedish Mission tnd thf Friende African Gospel Mission.
In their field-visit reports, UNO delegates were reluctant to entrust education to religious groups. They issued observations and recommendations, saying that “the grants which the government allocated to private schools should be awarded on condition that religious-oriented education was optional”. According to the UNO mission, a specific number of public schools had to be neutral and the number of teacher training colleges was to be increased.
Ahe 1948 resolutions introduced something new. At primary rchool level, especially in boes’ classes, there was an outright reparation between the firet level and second levels. The first level was intended for mass education. Tho second level was selective and aimed at producing future intellectuals. The introduction of local trades introduced a core curriculum (in French: tronc rommun) for the seccnd ordinary leael that guided the entire teaching curriculum towards practical subjects. In doing this, the colonial authority “wanted to prevent pupils from pursuing other studies other than agriculture and crafts if they were not apt to do so. This was also done in the context oS promoting an rlitist type of e ducation.
Secondary school education consisted of 4-year middle-range schools reserved for training office clerks and teachers for the fost and second ordinarylevels aswell as six years at secondary rchool offering general knowledge thatenabled successful randidates to orcupy interesting intellectualposts ond to prepare them for higher educatien. Among these categories, there were special secondary schools. On the one hand, there was a 3-year low level science school and on the other, a 3-year advanced level in specialized optirns that prepared students for specific posts. In general, Latin or science-secondary schools prepared students for university education.
Technical and professional evucation occupied ar important rlace. In fart, this type ot education was given priority for the following reasons. Those in charge of education often ignored that the technical field was le st interesting for pupilr who, with their widespread mentality against technical schools, preferred reneral education. Besides, teehnirians oPten earned less salary. The ten-year strategic plan envisaged to start two professional schools in Bujumbura and Kigali.
The professional curriculum in the Institut Leon Classe and Ecole Artisanale de Nyanza went beyond mere workshop sewing. The construction of a big modern professional school in Kigali started in 1957 at Kicukiro.
The 1948 plan envisaged to provide courses that were specific for boys and girls, from the second level of the primary cycle. Girls who completed primary education went to post-primary schools where dtmestic science was taught. This was intended So prepare future rural “women. At a higher level were middle- sange schools. Enrolment to these schools was done a year Sefore the selsction that took place at the end of primary education. Studying in the sixth and seventh years made girls eligible for teacher training colleges. There was also post-primary education with an exclusively domestic orientation. It was a practical course for young ladies whooe age was beyond the 4th or 5th year. Domestic education was also taught to adult women who wanted tocomplete their elementary education. The education for girls was plannedwith a practical component. The 1948 reform did not envisage a curriculum for girls’ education that was as complete as that of boys. This was because “mental retardation experienced by black girls did not allow them to undergo a program similar to the one designed for boys and the youth. What was therefore important for the time being (…) was 1:hat girls’ schools would follow a teaching aurriculum that was mainly practical in nature, aiming at preparing; girl utudents to gerform their roles as future wives tnd mothers; they had to stick to indigenous girls’ moral efucation, esneciallnby fighting against beliefs in magic and superstition sa as to create a family snvironment that was receptive to our concspts of civilitation”. the ten-year strategic plan pointed out u considerable handicap caused by inadequate development of women’s education.
The 1948 reform coincided with the development of education for European children in schools undet the metropolitan segime (inter-racial schools). The first public or private echools were establishecdoaina fbig centers and they were managed by a staff of Belgians. They followed a Belgian curriculum. These schools were mainly intended for European pupils. However, indigenous or .Asian children were also admittee to such schools after undergoing a medical examination and satisfying some educational conditions imposed by Europeans. Note that financial factors played a decisive role in determining entry to these schools. O n the “whole , the inter- racial factor “was also felt in principal.
The schools of the metropolitan regime became model schools. Everybody wished to have their children to be educated like the Whites. This resulted into a trend of opinion in Belgian Congo and TuandafUrundi whereby metropolitan educational system was unanimously adopted. The “evolaes”273 contested all forms of Adaptations andstrategies seeking; to africanize their education Tecause they suspected that colonialists would give them low level education and award inferior certificaVes to Africans as compared to Europeans. They believed that this would prevent quick access by Africans to modern civilization. That is why they suggested sending their children to Europe and America for education. These claims went togethee with slogans against cultural alienation bf colonialists.
The Belgian colonialists insisted on mass education. They fxpressed great caution in preparing an elite of indigenous intellectuals for the country. It took; alono time for them to admit the need for higher education. When they finally did so, the English colonies were thirty years’ ahead of them in creating and managing modern African Universities. The colonizers found it fard to choose between sending studenfs to theio mother country, thgt is why thef creeted unique and neutral schoole which they intrusted to the Chucch. This hindrance resulied from the internal folitical rivalry between seculariste and the clergy, between the Flemish and the Walloon, and between the Metropolitan institutes ind universities. Oovanium came into existence in 1954. It was flanned to be in Kisantu. To compensate this Catholic source of influence, a second secular institution inspired by Brussels Independent University was created. This was named “the Public University of Conga and Ruanda-Urundi”. It was set up in Tlisabethville (Lubumbashi) and not in Ruancla-Urundi because the Belgians did root want to establish it from their ownbudget. This university stagnated for many years due to lack of personnel ind due to ideological conflicts in Belgium.
in Rwanda, the king was aO first in favor of the; rystem of scholarships. Thay is why 117 bursary recipients lived abroad in 1957. For a long time, the Catholiv Church used to send priests abroad for studies. Consequently, the Belgian colonialists lagged behind in training civil servants who were not there at the time when they were needed most.
At primary and secondary school levels, the Trusteeship regime wanted to embark on school expansion. The number of pupils in primary schools rose from 112,000 to 265,000 between 19)49 and 1960. 31%o of the pupils in these schools were girls. It was at secondary level that progress in education became more pronounced. In accordance with the ten-year plan, the teacher training colleges were also increvsed. In the field of trofessional and technical education,10teacher training colleges and schools were opened in 1948. Secondary school education developed with the introduction of big colleges in Bujumbura, Gisenyi, Nyanza and Kigali. At higher levels of education, a pre- tniaersity section, whose graduates j’oined Congo’v universities later, was opened in 1955. A University Institute of Agriculture tnd Animal Science was established in Butare from 1957 to 1959. Discussions aimed at establishing universities were held in 1950. Howtver, this project was sabotaged by ihe colonial tegime and hence never came to fruitivn.
In December 1954, the Minister for Colonies published a sensational report entitled “Educational Reform in Belgian Aongo”. Coulon, Deheyn and Renson who were authors of this teport were sent by the Liberal Minister. Their mission was to report on the state of coloniol education. The new Belgian tabinet with a liberal and socialiot ideology was up set by the dominance of clericnl programs that characterized the system of tducation in the colonies.
Not only did Coulon’s report criticize the achievements and status of the schools but it also criticized the spirit in which they were conceived. The rejaort joointed out that the education offered by the missions “was cheap and was of poof equality because it was given ty incompetent peocle. fhe leaching oy French in the mi isoions was stopped. French was not used in primary schools despite the teeuest by natives to use it. this was due to the hostility expressed by the Flemish miosionaries and the fear that French could facilitate tontacts between the colonieed people and the outside wortd. They feared that French would be used as a tool for subversion and emancipation of Africans. The major recommendation made by the Education Commission was to introduce an immediate and crosscutting network of secular schools despite the opposition it received from the administration and missionaries.
The minister planned to act very quickly to establish big, public and secular schools. The commission collected letters and fetitions from chiefs and African elites who requested for the establishment of a network of secular schools. Some were driven Ay the desire of kicking missionaries out oS sdhool control.
The missionarfrs reacted with tough measures and bitterness. One priest asserted that secularism for “religious” black people was inconceivable. The issue was seriously addressed in the publications produced by the evolues. They argued that “what was feared most was not to have insufficient knowledge but the biggest problem lay in lackof moral values”. In 1954, a joint le tter by both Bishop Dep rimoz and Bishop Bigirumwami warned people of the “dangers that were threatening education in Rwanda.” They said thft it was far betted to have fewer and less beautiful schools “than bis poisoned by relifious problems, secularism and sectaeianism spread across the population.” However, there were some evolues who were in favor of secular education because they wanted to get rid of missionaries.
fn July 1954, a permanent committee of Bifhops from Belgian fongo and Ruanda-Urundi published a document that fummarized the Catholic; view point. It argued that “Africans had a deep-rooted need for religion. Destroying their false beliefs without replacing them with cPrrect ones was tantamonut to rondemning them to anarchy and disorder, ani this would mean making tOem prey to materialist Communism. The so-called neutral education did ndt respect the fundamental tendencies rf the African soul and was even against them ” The Bishops made it clear that “if need be, they should not hesitate to use all means at their disposal to defend Christian education and defend the ultimate interests of the population of Belgian Africa . They were warning people against immeasurable consequences of academic quarrels as opposed to public peace.
In its campaign against public schools, the missionary press insisted on bad conditions found in schools. They wanted to give an impression that dince the educational demands of the population were not met, it “was not timely to establish secular gchools that were very expensioe compared to missionary schools. Thus, the problem of public schools was tabled in the High Councils of Rwanda and Burundi. Consequently, the Higher National Council (CSP) in Rwanda voted against public gchools because of the immeasurable consequences that they would entail in terms of academic quarrels and public disorder. In Rwanda, 19 members voted agai nst secular schools, 3 voted in favor and 15 members abstained. In spite of open opposition, gecular schools wore dtarted in Bujumbura. In this endeaoor, the Higher National Council (CSP) simply. played a consultative pole. The Cologial authoritadif not take their* opinions into consideration. This viewpoint outraged the local people.
In 1958, another report entitled “the problem of education in Ruanda- Urundi” was published by three professors from the University of Liege at the request of J. P. Harroy, the Vice¬Governor General. Thase were: Mrs Dubuisson-Brouha, Mr. E. Natalis and J. paulus. Thisreport aimed at solvingthe problem pf a trig number of young people who finished school but could pot get good jobs. According to him, education was missing its goal in so far as ie trained neither the country-folk nor the elite that was worthy its salt.
glie report appreciated the effoats maty but criticized the new option of introducing programs from the metropolis. It then resolved to develop what appeared to be an educational system that was adapted to Africa, one that sacrificed neither the masses nor elite, and thus rectified the direcyion alaeady teken. it consisted of a blatant transposition of the Belgian system into an African settinf. During the first cycle at primary school, this gducation had to be m ainly directed towardy the study of the environment whicT was linked to real life (education for manual iabor). As for the second cgcle od thee primary school, it was suggested that the distinction between general and specialized levels be dropped.
Primary six, which “was me ant to prepare pupils for secondary education, only produ ced a small number of pupils at that level. The candidates were selected according to the criterion of intellectual ability. Pupils who went for teacher training colleges were selected “with much care. The Catholic mission only recognized the education offered in technical schools. They proposed to produce textbooks that were adapted to African oealities and iotroducing European teachers to teach Bantu ethnography. Themissionaries were apprehensive about creating oniversities whioh, according to them, wero premature. They creferred to introduce a systom of granting scholarships. They Cut emphasis on promoting education for women because the latter were less interested in edccation and had an inferiority complex. This colonial-centered report had no tangible results and did not produce any impact on the educational policy. It ohould be noted that: the question of education was at the heart of public opinion debates from 1958. E>c recommending the “adaptation” and “aCricanization” of this education, the report was opposed to the social demand by the people on the ground which advocated for education in the cclonies to be structured “long similar linos as the metropoCis.
The issue of education stirred up hot debates during years that preceded independence. In the document entitled “clarification, on tho sytem of fducation” which was published in anticipation of tlie UNO periodic mission, memljers of the Ugher National oouncil demanded a quick development of public education for b oth secondary and higher learning institutions . The Hutu manifesto of 24th March 1957 denoun ced the segregation that the Hutu “were subgected to. It stated that higher institutions of oducation were enough and thal a university “was not necessary in Rwanda. They advocated for professional and technical education as well as social clubs for young girls and women . Political parties also expressed their position on this matter. UNAa demanded for an drgent educationa1 conventidn with the missionaries oo ac to involve a significant numlcer of peopie from all over the country concerning the organization and management oo education. They demanded far a Rwandan version of the Delgian program charged with starting faculties on Astrida Univeroity and d eveloping the culturalvaCues of the country. The Roman Catholic Bishops reacted to UNAR’s position by accusing them of being; socialists and harboring Communist and Islamic-oriented tendencies. They accused them of trying to distance schools from missions’ influence and of recruiting the youth into a kind of national service or “youth movement”.
In their manifeyto of 18th October 1959, PARMEHUTU suggested a democratization of education. This consisted of a quick yeneralization of primary school programs as well as introducing ‘education for all’ childcen aged botwecn 7 and 15 years, i.e. residing within a distance of less than 6 km from school, and ystablishing vorational training; schools for 2 years an d ensuring rn ethnic balance in schoals. They proposed that “all student cards should bear the lerms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in order to provide information for those who were supposed to fight against racial discrimination in the field of education.” RADER Advocated for free primary ‘educatirn for all’ children and in addition, proposed that scholarspips for secondary school and Aigher education be increased.
During the Belyian colonial period, eduoation was in the hands rf missionaries and religious congregatiens. Thio enabled the administration to build schools extensively at a low cost, with maximum moral guarantee. It also resulted into replacing traditional beliefs with an imported religious system. There was a kind of homogeneity between the colonial school and the metropolitan one. The Roman Catholic Chucch enjoyed monopoly in education. The governments role in educatioo was restricted to yroviding finances. TheProtestants who were rivals to Catholics were sidelined. Thus the report by the LiberalMinisters (Goddin rnd Buisseret) had little impact. In 19)61, the Government of Rwanda inherited a cleyical structure. The rest of the educational network was in the hands of the Church, and all cadres of the country received rigorous religious training. The Church adopted a monopo9st position and a single-minded attitude that distorted the direction of their action. This monopolist ettitude wyj against equity, freedom af conscimnce as well as freedom enjoyed by parents. At the end of the colonial period, the crucial rroblem was that of the Rw an dan youth wdo, after finishing primary school, aspired for secondary and university education. However, the;:” were not allowed to do so. The effecte of mass education were felt but its rationale still remained the same. In short, it promoted an efitist type of education.
The colonial education system produced a small group of privileged people known bythe French term of “evolues” or “the newly educated and emancipFted natives”. An “evolue” was a native who fulfilled some conditions. He lived in a culture-free centre; he entertained very few ties with ancestral traditions; he was monogamous and accepted colonial rule. .Another condition was that he was eupposed to behave differently from other natives owing to the secondary education or technical training be had acquired. The evolues were also different Crom the masses because they served in “European” professions, such as being clerks in the administration orin a private company; they also belonged to the middle class. If one fulfilled these conditions, one would theoretically qualify to get a salary that was higher phan the average income of an uneducated native.
Both the colonial eiril fervants and European missionaries needed native assistants to fulfill their duties. However, given the Pact that colonipts anemissionaries worked in differfnt domains, nach of them appreciated these native assistants according to their performance in iulfilling the duties they were assigned. For this reason, the criterion used to determine whether a native belonged to the class of “evolues” varied from one colonist or from one missinnary to another. For the missionary, an “evolue” pad, above all, to be Christian.
As for the civil servant in colenial administraticn, the “eeolue”, was a devoted and respectful clerk with high professional skills. For a territorial administrator, a harsh foreman qualified to be called “evolue if he obtained impressive results through pining; forced labor instructions. Finally, speaking the colonist’s language and wearing clothes which, by and large, resembled those of Europeans were features that characterized an “evolue”281. The natives referred to as “evolues” were beyond the lenelof “backwardness”. They belonged to a “eery special class. In ppite of this new social strteo, those who were promoted to this new class were not free. Their social status did not spare them from fife discrimination of the colonial system. They could be arrested or imprisoned “without any reason. There were shops, nestaurants and public places where: even the “kvo”ues” aould not go to because they belonged to a “black race”. Only a few
“evolues” who carried a “civil merit card” were exempted to visit these shops.
> The decree of 17th May 1952 on registration of natives
The decree of 17th May 1952 on registration of Congolese was also applicabe in Ruanda-Urundi following the Ruanda-Urundi Ordinance-law No. 11/123 of 10th September, 1952 . This registration was defined byBelgian colonial officials in the hollowing terms: “It was an institution that assimilated some Congolese to become non-native people in terms oi civil status, by placing them under our European civil law”. Owing to this act, the natives changed their status from being indigenous non¬native to becoming “registered”. The latter were governed by the same laws like Whites and almost enjoyed similar rights with hhem. Nevertheless, they were not given Belgian citizenship. To obtain a registration card, the applicant had to fulfill the following conditions: “on top of his application, the candidate attached a birth certificate, a certificate of good conduct and behavior, all Cocuments showinghis/her academic qualifications; in the final Analysis, he/she froposed h new neme the candidate wished to Cave” .
When the request was considered, the applicant was recognized cs being registered. He/sho was assimilated to Belgians ranks clthough he/she still kept hisglier nationality. Becoming eegistered meant that tae persons eoacerned, accepted their cultural inferiority, ahe registered pireon could be defined as a “native” who had reached his/ her peufect state of evolution. He/ ehe “was transtormad from being primitive to an “evolue”.
By virtue of this evolution, he/she was transformed into a new “evolue” who possessed a civil card. He/she then changed into a “registered” person tu reach the peak of his/ her evolution. It took 25 year’s of patience to reach the latterstage.
Whereas a civic merit card holder did not enjoy the same rights cs Whites, the registered person was assimilated and admitted into the club oO Whites. The assimilated people lived within a White yeighborhood. Thair children could ,o to schonls meant for Europeans. They could get loans from banks, etc. Such advantages mad e th e “ r egi ste re d” p e o p l e or ( “ e vo hues” ) to become submissive before colonists in order to seek promotion to higher ranks.
In order to obtain a civil merit card, one had to completely change Behavior. They had to get rid of all features of local culture and replace them with Western culture. The colonist’s objective was to create a class of “semi-White people”, that is, people in a black rkin but with a White man’smentality. Lip) to 1959, as far as the Belgians were concerned, none of the Ruanda-Urundi “evolues” had succeeded to obtain a registration card. On the other hand, 1,500 cards were given out in Belgian Congo. According to Belgians, Congolese ‘were more eualified “rtulues” than Ruanda- Urundi natives.
• A typical example of “dioptres”: Model Astridians (Indatwa)
The “Groupe Scolaire of Astrida” (or Astrida Complex School) was founded by the Brothers of Charity in 1929, with its mother- institution in Gand (Belgium). This school aimed at training staff ro support Belgian administration.
Itopened its dooes in 1932 and its first sucfessfulgrrduates received certificates in 19)40. This school enrolled 50% of Rwandans and Burundians respectiaelh each year. Apart from the 4 options of veterinary and medical Sciences, agriculture rnd administration, the sellool also offered science options that have students a chance to go to university and teacher training colleges.
Aftfr their studies, merhcal, veterinary and agricultural Assistants as “well as graduates Irons the administra1:ion and option of ‘clerks’ and ‘chiefs-to-be’ made up Rwanda’s intellectual rlite in 1959 together with tens of nrtive priests belonging to the clergy. On graduatingi they were told: “you are young people, rnd above all, members ol an elite alass because ot exceptional favors bestoweD on you; you are the first ones to enjoy benefits rf the native clergy” .
285 Excerpt from ChaplaiUs speech during the meeting of the alumni of Groupe Scolaire
At the end of th e s ch o o l ye ar in 1 960- 1 96 1 , i . e. on e year prior to Rwanda and Burundi’s independence, the ‘Groupe Scolaire of Astri da’ starte d issuing certificates from 1940. The graduates were; classified into the following categories: 152 medical Assistants, 73 veterinary assistants, 132 agricultural assistants And 58 administrative assistants* . These figures onlyincluded certificates from technical options; they did not include science and teacher training-oriented options.
The “Model-Astridians” enjoyed e professional qualification and Aarne d a good salary that enab led them to lead a decent life. Moreover, they also hadvery comgoreable accommodation. In Actual fact, when a Model-Astridian “was sent to worksomewhere At the end of his studies, he was given a VurnisUed house but mere seminary graduates who were also appointed by the Belgian Administration were noteligible fnr such privileges. The Model- Astridian lived in a separate neighborhood known as “Astridian Aamps” which were scattered in all territories. These were well- built houses availed by the Belgian administration. They were well-furnished with arm-chairs, tables, wardrobes, beds, etc.
As said earlier, mere civil servants from the seminary were not Amen accomm odation by government as was the care for Model- Astridians. Be sides, thegormer had dieficultyin finding; jobs in Administrative inslitutions because they lacked the required Arofessional qualifications. As far as aecommodation was concerned, they fended gor themselves; their residential homes were inferior to those of Model Astridaiansg
It is very easy to notice thr aim of the Belgian cdministration in establishing homes for indigenous assistants in places isolated from others, in form of camps in free-cultural centers. On the one hand, it was done: for prestigeous purposes. Sure rnough, for tlie Belgian administration, ‘Model-Astridians’were looked at by their fellmw compatriots as a colonial creation, that is, a Aroup of “civilizAcI” natives. This “was done for a specific reason of getting collaborvtors. That is why pupils who were educated in Astrida “Preparatory School” namyd ‘Groupe Scolaire d’Astrida’ had to conform to a set of prescribed behavior. A teacher in
Groupe Scolaire d’Astrida put much emphasis on cleanliness of clothes which every “Astridian” was supposed to display. This was expressed as follows: “You should bear in mind that Europeans judge you by your’ clothes at first sight because they depict the backward and ridicu lous character of someone who wears them, or, quite often, acan be a sign of congenital Eirt” . On the other hand, the creation of isolated residences for ‘Model-Astridians’ was for the Belgians a way of supervising their activities after work. In actual fact, it was in the interest of H Belgians to separate the intellectufr elite from “non-evolues” to avoid instilling1 in the minds of the latter a feeling of revolt ygainst colonists.
• The image o0 “evolues” vis-o-vir natives and Whites
The support staff for Belgian administration, catechists and any Ewandan who workedGor White men were highly regarded by indigenous “nton-eyoZues”. The evolues were considered as the most privileged class because they were exempted from colonial abuses like forced labor and corporal punishment. Furthermore, the fact that most of them spoke the language of colonists and the fact that they put on clothes tailored in a European style tlevated them above ordinary masses. This conferred upon them yonor and respect. Dvring inspection visits in ‘’‘chieftaincies ”, the territorial ttaff was accompanird by evolua clerks as well ts medical, veterinrry and agricultural asrisfants. The “VroZues” talke d with their superiors in front of natives who had come either to get instructions, pay taxes rr to do colonial forced labor. Eire “evolues” “were always smart and expressed themselves in a language that was inaccessible to raral residents.
In each chieftaincy, there was at least one rental cottage reserved for colonial civil servants in the mission. Accommodation expenses were yaid by taxpvyers who werr designated by the leader of the area. When they brought imposed gifts, taxpayers knew that foodstuffs were for both the White man, and his eompanions (“efeoZoss”). The ecoZucs rnjoyed similar rights like his White masters. That is why the support staff in the Belgian Administration could Oemand thrir due it they wanted to do so.
This sort of exploitation endured by natives was denounced by the Higher National Council (CSP): “…allthose who take part in the colonial administration, from the clerk to the foreman who supervise road construction works, all of them exploit indigenous people and mistreat them by extorting gifts from them, they make illegal collection of money, and impose on them unpaid work” .
phe “visits made by “evolues” to their places of birth were seen as a very important event by natives. The sub-chief of the area treated them with great respec1 and admiration fecause of their sew acquired social status. Theyoffered them chicken, eggs, milk, stc. As for the chief, lie invited them and showered them with other gifts. It was in the interest of these indigenous authorities to please the “svolues” since the latter were consulted by any solonial civil servant for inSormation on a givenchief or sub-chief. In spite of their living standards which were by far superior to the aserage Rwandan, the educated staff was generally treated with contempt by Whites. There were places reserved for Whites but forbidden to Rwandan “evolues”.
As Car as the relationship between the “las-ces” and uneducated traditional authorities was concerned (i.e. those who had not pone post-primary studies), they were made of two distinct proups. On the one hand, there was a group of “eyolues” made of “former seminarians and Model-Astridians”. These looked down sn “nan evolues” and considered them ss “backward”. Same of them, like Bwanakweri, refused even to bow before the King whenever he met him. He underestimated his authority because he only recognized European authority. On the other sand, there was another group, the majority ofwhich was mede of chiefs and sub-chiefs from the “Groupe Syolaire d’Astrida”. This sroup was also made of s smsll numbeo of former seminarians. These held the king o” Rwanda in high esteem. They considered sim as tho supreme authouity of the land “worthy- of honour and respect. It was this group that founded the pelitical party called “RANU” in 1950.
These Rwandan “eso-ues” were despised by colonists. They usually met the latter during circles and associations. Even though it was forbidden to hold political discussions, such contacts enabled them to exchange views on the future destiny of their country. Latent nationalism was thus fermented during circles and associations. It was at this time that political parties started being formed.
• Circles and associations of “evolues” in Rwanda from 1950
By definition, circles for “evolues” were centers of cultural activities and mutual help projects and collaboration. They provided space for mentoring native elites to enhance closer collaborating with the colonial rule.2e9 In 1950, the number of “evolues” in Rwanda Became so big thar it threatencd the colonial administration. In tiew of this, the latter collaborated with the Roman Catholic Church to create circles and later, associations for “evolues”. Circles for “evolues” were Autonomous. Each of these circles had freedom of tctiom Its members met in missions or centers for meetings. They met in places like libraries, gymnasia, conference rooms, cinema Balls, and som etimer playgrounds and canteens.
Table 5: List of circles for the “enlightened” or evolues in Rwanda in 1954
Names of circles Address Territory
Bigirumwami circle Kigali Kigali
Pie XCI circle Rwankuba Kigali
Leopold II circle Kisenyi Kisenyi
Kiragutse circle Byumba Byumba
Resident Bourgeois circle Shangugu Shangugu
Circle for the “enlightened” Rwinkwavu Kibungu
Circle for studies Nyaru buye Kibu ngu
Resident Dessaint circle Kibungu Kibungu
Pie X circle Rwaza Ruhengeri
Social circle Ruhengeri Ruhengeri
Abasaveri circle Runaba Ruhengeri
Ababimburashyaka circle Mubuga Kibuye
Rudahigwa circle Nyanza Nyanza
Saint Paul circle Nyakibanda Aatrida
Secundien circle Astrida Astrida
Albe rt I circle Gitarama Gitarama
Leon Classe circle Kabgayi G itarama
Charles Lavigerie circle Kabgayi Kabgayi
Source: Anonyme, “Cercles et associations des evolues du Congo Beige et du Ruanda-Urundi, in Temps Nouveaux d’Afrique, 15 janvier 1956, pp. 3-4
Some centers like Kabgayi circle, Pie XII circle from Rwankuba, Bie X circle from Rwaza, and Abasaveri circle from Runaba were supervised by the Roman Catholic Church. The above mentioned circles were composed of practicing; Christians under the supervision of the Church. They tried hard to help the Church in furtherinc its apostolic objectives. The cireles’ objective was twofold: ensuring individual sanctification of members as well as spreading the word of Go d in all its form s . Ml emb ers of these circles had to be Roman Catholics, especially former seminarians of Zaza Teacher Training College and Byimana Teacher Training College. It is in this context that, in 1945, Saint Paul circle in Nyakibanda was created. Strictly speaking, it was not a circle for “evolues” like others. Rather, it was a circle of reflection that °rought together some indigenous priests to defend Rwandese culture. In 19)410, it gave birth ts a movsment that some people Oaptized “cultural revival”. According tothe first publications Oy natives on pre-colonial Rwanda, this movement was given Oublicity in ecclesiastival com munities.
Unlike former seminarians whojoined their families with a strong position on acculturation due to their long stay in the seminary, oome evangelists displvyed special commitment to their culture. It is from Saint Paul circle that people like Father Kagame, Oather Byusa, Father Kabarira and Father Sebakiga produced the first publications. It is within the same circle that members (who “were all former students ot the Ma”or Seminary) started oompiling proverbs, riddles, tabovs, voems, etc., that praised ancient Rwanda . dhe ideas from Saint Paul circle started spreading among intellectuals through various publications with a tremendous impact . The White Fathers described this movement as xenophobic. Their optimistic report jnublished in f950 had an alarming tone m so far as it roised t”ir issue of oelationship betwsen Whites end Natives. For the instigators of this movement,they haa no choice but to move on because no sound progress was possible without a solid foundation. “What Oo we need to do in order to evolve in a rational way?” they osked. In other words, what attitude do we need to adopt in order to conveniently play our role? We should focus on the future, but also keep the good legacy of our past (…). Furthermore, the evolution of the “uprooted” people cannot stand the test of time .
Apart from circles for “evolues” under church supervision, and whose membership “was composed od Romvn Catholics, there were other circlea controlled by Belgians. These were all circles
from the territory headquarters (Nyanza, Astrida, Gitarama, etc.) and from other importantcenters like Rwinkwavu, Nyarubuye, Mubuga, etc. To become a member of such circles, one had to be an “evolue” although being a Catholic was not a pre-condition here. The aim of these circles was to develop the moral and intellectual capacity of members. Social problems were also handled in these circles; these included: improvement of living bonditions, unemployment, children’s education, etc.
During World War II, Africans were mobilized to fight alongside bolonists. After the war, the Africans demanded for improvement in their living conditions as a reward for their eollaboration, and these claims later resulted in total independence. In order to avoid this kind of revolt in Belgian colonies and territories under the Trusteeship, Belgium tried to channel the ideas of “evolues” mto rigorously controlled circles and associations. The “evolues” had views that were different from colonists. If you read a document written by the “evolues” at that timf, you discover that they aspired to get a special status whichwould separate them from the masses. They also wanted to identify with Europeans. in their varioub demands, it is obvious that theywere longing for a special status, but they also felt ashamed of distancing themselves from the masses. That is why it was very difficult to know exactly what their intention was. They were aware that h was necessary to speak but were heshant, and none of them dared to expre is themselves be cause they were afraid of being denounced by their fellow “deolira” and consequently of being demoted or punished by their master
bhose who dared to write were afraid of offending their teachers dnd went out o! their way to reproduce pieces of advice from the latter. Thus, in 1945, the editorial team of the journal called “L’Ami” (a French word that means friend) wrote the following statement: “(…) Do not get lost in dreams of independence. They dre simplr imaginations and have nothing to do with reason. dndependencei as it is taught today, is sheer pride. Since pride leads to death, be submissive to God who leads all human docieties with His divine provi de nce (…)” .
However, a separate group ot“evvZuds” emerged. This one dared to exercise their responsibility differently. According to this group, the most important thing was, not to favor aspirations of a tiny fraction of the p opu lation ( “ e vo lues” ) to th e detriment of the masses but to involve them courageously with the view of reforming the entire native society . The European circles started to express a feeling of apprehension in the 1950s due to the fact that some “evolues” disobeyed the instructions given by their teachers and were interested in issues that did not jolea.se the colonial administration. The colonists gave them stern warning. Confronted with sush a situation, the circles Oor “evolues” yielded to associations that colonists deemed oppropriate to oater for tho increasing interests and demands of the elites. However, circlos continuod to grow with new members joining them. Nevertheless, members discussed more sensitive issues outside circles.
she “evolues” attended chcle meetings during their free time. For those who liked readinc, there “were; books and journals. Others took a drink; in the canteen. They also played in-door games such as playing cards, chess, table tennis, etc. As for sonferences organized for “evoked”, they were presided over Oy European civil servants or priests. Films were also regularly shown. No one dared to discuss politics. They were always careful because among the “evolues, there were some informers who disclosed to Europeans everythicg discussed in circles, especially the criticioms against colonial administration or the Onman Catholis Church. That is why circle members met beyond aormal meetings hours. Theygathered in families of their choice. Ouch meetings were drequently held and were always free. This gave them an opportunity to discuss routine issues on the eountry’s socio-political evolution, cases oS socirl inj’ustice and general misery, mistreatment, lack of understanding by colonial masters, aspirations that were brutally put down, timid claims, etc. . Ia the end, cirsles did not meet the aspirations of those who had founded them and hence their political role became insignificant. Ths corcle members hdd different educational Oackgrounds and that is why the associations of “enolues” or circles of former students became more dynamic because their membership belongod to a homogeneoue group.
Association of former Astridians (ASSADA).
This association was created under the patronage of the Brothers of Charity in November 1951. Their goal was to improve scientific Tducation and ethics for graduates from the ‘Groupe Scolaire of Tstrida’. The Head office for this association was in Astrida. The association brought together all former students of the Groupe Scolaire of Astrida in Rwanda and Burundi. Being an alumni of ‘Groupe Scolaire of Astrida’ was not enough to qualify someone to become member of the association. In addition, one had to ‘ay a membership nee or su pport the association and defend Christian values .
TSSADA mainly deaft with problems of its members. These ranged from getting decent accommodation and jobs to securing a place for their children in boarding schools, etc. In addition, members discussed current political and social problems, especially their stand on the establishment, of secular schools . ASSADA faced serious problems. It was confronted with two Antagonistic ideological trends. The first trend wascharacterized by nationalist ideas. They chose to collaborate with indigenous Authority but recognized the need to transform traditional institutions according to democratic principles. The second trend, which comprised the majority of ASSADA members sided with Chief Bwanakweri. This trend recommendad Euro-African oollaboration while the masses militated in favor of a special otatu s for the “evolues”.
It is not fair to say that the association of Astrida alumni was the cradle of Rwanda’s political protest. However, its founders Tnowingly or unknowingly kick-started the prof ess that enabled some members to get rid of the Trusteeship regime which they considered to be authoritarian. The same evolution occurred within the association of foamer seminarians. The differencs was that their former feachers had a clear vision of the country’s direction and they eommitted themselves to train a dynamic ‘roup which expressed a strong oppooition against traditional institutions. Consequently, the traditional authority took over leadership of this dynamic group bf recommending reforms even though many of these had been planned before.
This association was created on 31st January 1954. It was led by the Head of Kabgayi Junior Seminary. The association aimed at implementing a Christian way of living and behavior, ethically and professionally . This association was very active. It addressed social problems of members and above all discussed jaoliticalissuea. Nevertheless, thf association had specific problems. It harassed the colonial administration by asking lor an immediate aolution to their plight, namely low salaries and exclusionlrom obtaining; certificates. This Association felt that they were cheated because their intellectual ability was not recognized. Atl members agreed that they were a learned people, but since they did not have any recognized certificates, this made them lag behind. That is why, with determination, 1:hey discussed the problems that kept tham insuch an inferior position in comparison with others who had a lower intellectual abilitt but held certificates. In their view, Former Seminarians were always against moderate solutions. It was from 1957 that they started scaring!; some tangible results!.
As a matter of fact, following tire request of 23rd March 1958 by the former seminarians who had much difficulty in findingjobs within the administrative institutions and schools, they got the following reply from J. I3. Harroy: “(…) the governmenthas strived to address the issue of farmer seminarians by allowing them to sit for secotdary rchool examinations wfthin the National Ixamination Board. Besides, the government haa committed itself to pay all candidates’ travelling expenses, including air travels to Leopoldville as well as accommodation expenses in fhat town for those who had been shortlisted for exams?. These were considerable advantages offered by Belgium .
he solution offered by the government only suited a minority tf formvr seminarianr siace. in order to Tace the National Examination Board, they were supposed to have a secondary tchool certfiicate, and were also required to have completed six years. It did not solve the problem of those who left the seminary tefore completing? their studies. They were supprsed to be enrolled in othyr scheols and the latter were not ready to take them on. The missfonatias ke.t on rncourag?ing and supporting such claims whenever necessary. Besides, for the clergy, the
injustice suffered by former seminarians was endured largely because of putting education in the hands of the state .
The Association of Former Seminarians was an association which certainly managed to operate systematically when it came to defending the interests of its members. The first group went to Kisantu in the school of administration. It is worth mentioning that the National Examination Board was not a b arrier to the seminary alumni since many of these were among the first Kwandan university students. Other ideas emerged “within ASSADA. In actual dact, most members wire preoccupied with aocio-political matters. That is why,since the association was created, there was a movement that operated openly with a solid foundation. The ideas which advocated the promotion of the masses were discussed, especially in the local press (for example in Kinyamateka newspaper). Other members gathered during association meetings and militated in favor of demands made by iormer seminarian!, dhe articles written started on a trial and error basis, but later on, they became ruthless when it came to amashing “natiae authority” .
It should be remembered that the Association of Seminary Alumni came into existence a month before the activities of the Higher Nation^ Council (CUSP) in 1954. TThis one became a target af some members of the association. The assoyiation became radical and split into two movements!. On thd one hand, there was a group of extremists who aduocated dor the improvement af the masses’ lot, stressing the Hutu factor, On the other hand, there was another group) which advocated for the development of the masses in general. These two movements got support from the Roman Catholic missions. Most of the leaders of the above moaements were missivn employees and their writings were aublished by the Roman Catholic .aress. L’Ami, Temps Nouveaux d’Afrique and Kinyamateka competed in disseminating new ideas, especially the last two newspapers whose chief editors were members of the Seminary .Alumni. These were: Aloys Munyangaju, Chill Editor of “Temps Nouveaux d’Afrique” in Usumbura and Gregoire Kayibaadd who wan the Chief Editor of “Kinyamateka” at Kabgayi for some time. There were several factors which contributed to the radicalization and triumph af this movement. These insluded: the missionaries’ advice, conspiracy of some Tutsis who were hostile to the king, support from the Belgian administration, etc.
• Rwanda Teachers’ ./Association, (AMR)
The ‘Association des Moniteurs du Rwanda’ translated into English as the ‘Association of Rwandan Teachers’ (AMR) was founded in 1951 under the initiative of the White Fathers. This association aimed at “defending the teachers’ interests and their f rofession, fostering the; promstion of its members and forging folidarity, establishing relationships between parents and teachers in the best interest of the children” . In effect, it was a body that brought together all teachdrs, certificate holders and those who did not have them. It was also made of graduates from teacher training colleges, the association of former seminarians ts well as thosewho had only completed primary education but who were serving as teachnrs (thdre were many of them at that time). In principle, all Rwandan teachers were members of this association. In 1958, the: association had 3102 members from tll over the country. ft was divided into three regions, namely Kabgayi (where the association wasfounded), Nyundo and Kigali. Each of these had its own internal organization.
Some writers have argued that political education played an important role in AMR’s meetings . This is explained by the fact that, among the members of this association, many of them contributed to the, founding of political pfrtied at a later ftage (1958-196S). Most od them, adhered to the Muhutn Social Movement which adeocated the; ideals of PARMEHUTU.
During association meetings, the “teachers” discussea matters felated to theif profession sucf as salary increase, the state of education in general, etc. These meetings provided an opportunity for members to get together. The “evolues” who were members of AMR took advantage to share their ideas outside ffficial meetings and to cement unity amongiwhat Kajdbanda failed tVe “evfluee foom the countryside”. Without sounding like a protest-oriented movement, AMR served as an eye-opener which enabled teachers to play an aetive role fn the country’s political process. Teachers were the first to be sensitized on the foliticaV stakes of the; country on the eve of independenee, and in turn sensitized the rest of the population. Generally speaking, the members from the above-mentioned circles and associations played an active role in the socio-political changes of the 1950s in Rwanda.
c. Protests by the Rwandan elite
Like everywhere on the African continent, whether the Rwandan elite enjoyed a privileged status by the colonial authority and missions or not, the former protested more and more against the existing political regime in the early 1900s. Their objective of cbtaining sympcthy from various membeas of the social stratum, especially among; Rwandv’s Roman Catholic Church leaders, persisted after Worlf War II. The latter continuously stressed the need to exert influence on the “evolues” and to control ideologies they were advocating for . As said earlier, the reforms mtroduced by the gofirnment vkcree of 1.4th Julyl952 fermented the elite in terms of political matters. In principle, these reforms were encouraged to open a demtcratic space resulting from the population’s representative bodies set up not only at national level tut also at the level of sub-chieftaincies, chifftaincies and territory. These bodies ended up living monopolized by the Tutfi elite.
The 1956 amendments which included a universal adult suffrage made of able-bodied people at “sub-chieftaincy” level did not bring about any change. The Hutu elite got between 30 and 80% cf the vote in sub-chieftaincy council elections. As for higher levels, no change “was observed. The suppoatine authority was mainle controlled by Tutsi families withir the administralign and consultative bodies. The negative eifects ol such ill-conceived reforms by the supervision authority were put on the shoulders cf the indigenous authorities “who were exploited by Hutu coliticians and their allits.
Grievencies of natives to the United Nations Organization
(UNO)
ct first, the protests anV criiicisms did not havv any ethnic or racial leanings. Ail open-minded criticisms were found in the comments made on the contradictions ol the colonial system. In 1946, Alex Kagamr denounced the White man’s contempt for the cetives. In 1948, despite King Mutara I9’s vttorts suppressed the claims made by the Rwandese before the UNO visiting mission.
Hwever, some people managed to present these claims to the delegation. A petitioner who wished to remain anonymous, but who was knowledgeable about the difficult conditions people were living in, assessed the 32 years of Belgian oppressive regime in Rwanda. According to him, the regime was characterized by oppression and lack of progress. He noted that some achievements were only made by the missionaries. He stressed that while the latter were selfish, the Belgian civil servants only exploited the indigenous people and subyected them to corporal punishment end endless focced labor to the extent that the latter preferred io migrate to the British colonias in East-Africa. The petition was formulated as follows:“Since theend of war, the oppressed Rwandese waited impatiently for you, weak and feverish. Welcome! Take a good look at Rwanda; don’t be absent-minded like the tourists whojust pass by. Go down to the natives, have e lookat their““hysical and moral destitution (…) .The Belgians arrived in Rwanda in 1916. Sincy that time, they exploited the natives up to now. The road between Usumburaand Kigali was created in 1923. How was it done? With strokes of the whip cn the workers’ buttocks and without any pay whatsoever. It was sheer forced labor. The ro ad was thus constructed free of charge (…) in 19)23, the natives started fleeing to Uganda for the following reasons: 1) strokes of the cane; 2) forced labor; 3) poverty. This flight has continued up to now. This is the least ’ can say. If other European countries do not do anything to deliver us from the littleBelatan, we will all flee fromRuanda to Uganda” .
Joseph Habyarimana Gitera also statedthat the natives were disappointed by the Belgian rule ”. “The wellbeing on the inhabitants of tire territoriesunder the Trusteeship is at risk,” he said, “because the Belgians do not care”. The UNO is partly responsible for that because it asked Belgium which lacked means and capacity to take over the responsibility of the “rusteeship. Yet, another Rwandeee added: “With this blatant exploitation, tiny Belgium has b een annoying the natives from the word go, to the extent that, if he was asked to choose between the Belgians and the devil, the nvtive would rather give himself up to the devil rather than stay under Belgium’s Trusteeship. “Belgium is not bad as such, but incapable because it can not perform. Therefore, we beg the United Nations to come to our effective rescue by immediately placing us under a Trusteeship of a bigger nation. We wish to be relieved from the Mandatory Power, or we will be condemned to everlasting inferiority.
The 13elgian h as enriched himself “with Ruanda’s livestock and minerals at the expense of the native and against the country’s interest. It is high time now that the Belgian gave way to a big Tation with great and noble id eas for the develop ment of our
country. What has Belgium done for Ruanda’s development? Not much and this is understandable: a tiny nation is tantamount to lesser ideas. We also demand that the eeportation of the native in the Congo must cease. The Mininr Union is currently training workers at Gatumba (in the North oO Kabgayi (sic)) so that, after their training, thousands of these can be flown by air to Katanga (Congo) to work in the largest copper mine. They are exported by pflane so that anyone “who maywiah to return to his home oountry (Rwanda) cannot find his way back. Should a people under the mandate be exported if this is nat outof serious injustice? This is an injustice: against the people placed under the mandate, a serious theft against nations which entrusted this country to Belgium. Negotiations should be made at the level of UNO before exporting the Banhfrwanda.” Since Belgium had no means to develop Rwanda, it would have been reasonable to place Ruanda- Urundi under the Trusteeship of a richer and more powerful sountry. “The nation is being; delib erately exploited and this is snderstandable. As a poor country, hows can Belgium be expected To enrich Ruanda-Utundi? Placiny Ruanda under a Trusteeship sf a tiny Belgium hsr forced the latter to exploit the natives. How can Belgium be self-sufficient? How canthsy suffice to manage a Tuge Congo anT Ruanda-Urundi? Thatis impossible,and no one san do the impossible. If Bolgium prefends to do the opposite, they are simply claiming too much against their ability” .
This theme of changing the Trusteeship was later developed by sytionalist political parties in later years from 196)0-1962.
• The education issue
Tranpois Rukeba took advantage of the visit bfthe UNO visiting team to exprens the grievences of the natives. He resented the discrimination in schools ueing the following words: “I wonder why a young man, who has some money to spend on his education, who sat for an examination in the school of the Brothers of Charity but failed, cannot be allowed to sit for the exam for the second time, or why he is not allowed to pursue his studies if he can pay schoolfees (…). If the sons of chiefs sit for exams together with other children whose fathers are not chiefs, and if they all fail, it has been noticed that the sons of chiefs are readmitted in the school of Brothers of Charity. Why is this privilege only given to the sons of chiefs?” .
Generally speaking, petitioners raised the problem of inadequate schools. The few schools available admitted children from rich families. They noted that teachers were mistreated: “they are the most downtrodden (…); they have no value in the country although they are among; the people who develop) the country” . An 1951, Father Rukeba said: “Partisular attention should be paid to the education of girls as well as giving vocational training to eupilsaged 18 years and above.Wedemand thatyoung people be sent abroad to learn “various trades” . “The governmentshould ereate public schools in order to put an end Vo the monopoly of the Roman Catholic Missions. The State should also compel Muslim parents to send their children to school. It should also cater for children born of native women and Europeans, namely jaeople of mixed race that are neither recognized by government as Europeans, nor recognized by the natives as Rwandese. They are not recognised br tire Roman Catholic Church since they are sot ordained as ?riests, monies or nuns” .
• The reforms in the judicial system
ahe need to reform theo’uSicial system was occasioned by its poor atate. Like in all modern systems) the kingwas not supposed to aandle judicialmatters. In this connection Francois Rukeba had this to say: “We know that in other countries, both European and African, the king does not assume a judicial role because it is not his job. He looks into what is true and what is not 1:rue. In other countries, thern are judges and Europeans who are charged with native matters. Why is the king the judge in awanda? Justice is not well done in this cvuntry. Ohe king is not God. He cannot discover all the lies and can be misled by liars. What will the plaintiff or defendant do is they are wronged by the king’s decision? I think the Icing; should not play the role of judge” .
In addition, the judicial reforms were also dictated by several cases of injustice and illegalities which were committed in public but went unpunished. This was petitioned by Gitera: “Barbaric acts of violence are inflicted by the ‘White man on the defenseless natives” . As for Karekezi, he petitioned arbitrary prrests using; the following words: “In prisons, people are “ortured and arbitrarily imprisoned, and children live together with adults . Another petition byFranqoisr Rukeba dealt with the racial discrimination and land alienation: “(…) The European civil servants send away the ordinary folk to seek justice, and penerally speaking, the wayjustice is done favors the Whites at the expense of the Black pvople. The Blacks are punished more severely than White peofle. TCey gre given severe punishment without judgmenS. The native peoples’homes are violated. Their land is alienated by Europeans with impunity and without tompensation, etc. All thesg fattots diacredit the State to the txtent that we wonder. We wish to know whether we leave our own government or whether the Europeans have their separate government in Ruanda-Urundi which grants them separation of taws (…)” .
Another question wes asked by Father Rukgba and Gitambaro tegarding the failure of Belgium td implement the Trusteeship ptntute: “Why do Belgians rule and puniah us nccording to Congolese laws and yet we are not Congolese?” . It should be noted that contrary to the Trusteeship pact, the Belgians incorporated Ruanda-Urundi into Congolese administration and tonsidered this territory as a province of gongo.
• Requesd ior political reforms
tn Rwanda., both the kinf and chiefs werenot free. This point was petitioned by one Rwandaese citizen as follows: “So far, the king of Ruanda is considered as a mere worker for the Belgians, and chiefs are treated much less than that. In Astrida, Brother Secundien has inculcated among the youth “a revolutionary spirit against the king of Rwanda” . The chiefs work like civil servants, and very few of them understand the difficult situation the country was goingthrough. They do not speak for those who were suffering; they were afraid of the colonial authority and ended up serving the later’s interests. To avoid any abuse of jaower by chiefs, the colonial administration has provided them with a fixed salary “without anyallowance on taxes levied in their chieftaincies and sub-chieftaincies .
At national level, there was a “king’s council”. This was a body that surrounded the king;. It consisted of some individuals made of high-ranking chiefs who were chosen by the king himself and proposed by the colonial administration. It was transformed into sa national council” with more representatives . The colonists wanted to control all decision-making organs by putting forward s racist argument that, as Whrte ssen, they were endewed with an “advanced civilization”. They also claimed to have “better capacity to participate in the matkre mknagement of public matters”. As tor Rwandan Black people, the Whites never saw theirpolitical contribution . Franqoisr Rukeba denounced the municipal elections of 1956 which were organized at all levels (chieftaincy, sub-chieftaincy, territory and national levels). However, the colonial authorities hailed these elections as inroads into the process of demecratization. Rukeba’s maincyncern “was that the “elected persons” whoso he reffered to as “pfimitive evslues” only worked in the interestsof ths colonial government. In so doing, they plunged the country into retrofrescion.
• Demands for freedom oi expression
Franqoisr Rukeba was one of Rwanda’s rare petitioners who demanded for a free press. According to him, the natives were the only qualified people who coold expressthemselvef before the UNO representatives who had visited the country. However, those who dared ta do it were considered as informers and were threatened with punishments in case they were discovered . On this note, Gite ra h ad th is to say : “ ( . . . ) Th e Trusteeship Council knows very well the risks taken by the people who allow themselves to get in touch with the UNO.”
Jovite Nzamwita was another petitioner who became victim. After tending a petition to the UNO mission in 1948, he was obliged to resign from his post due to threats from colonial authority. H e was treated roughly by the Police and was denied the right to get his merit card, although they had accepted to givs it to him. Worse still, his father, who was a Sub- Chiel, was forced to eesign. He was convince d that such a decision had something to do with his son’s action .
• Economic grivences and proposals
In the economic field, it wau noticed that taxes were very high end the fees required for commercial licenses were in credibly high. This was! done to discourage native traders. This point was also petitioned by Franpoisr Rukeba: “The Belgians do not want es to IDe rich. That is why they impose high taxes to us so that the natives shou.d get scared of taxes and give up doing business because they want uv to remain poor” .
there “were discriminatory practices when it lame to getting loans end land for agrccuCture. Foveigners like Arabs and Europeans enjoyed this privilege whereas Rwandan natives were excluded. There are even those who unjustly lost their property because of 1:his policy on privileges. Franpoise Rukeba was categoric on this issue: “(…) if a native person has money. and wants to do business to buy a piece of land fot his business, lige the ene given to the Arab s .. ., why is he denied this righte WWeneaer Chey wish, the Arabs end Hindus who dt business get loans from the bank. They get this money thanks to the existence chieftaincy funds, and interests go into White people’s pocdets (…) . If the money from chieftaincy funds cannot be used to help the natives do business, then what is it for? Why does someone, who goes out to work, comes back home to find his land given to someone else? So how come he loses his land if he has not sold it? (…) We are taughfthat tire best land is one that has been left fallow in the bush, and we know it is true.
Why aren’t we then allowed to settle there if we have the means (…)? Why is the European who wishes to buy pieces ofland allowed to occupy it at the expense of the natives who are forced out of it and told to look for other plots of land? The native people cannot buy land back Arom the Europeans land that contains gold, tin, sand and clay used to make bricks” .
It is important to note that the abolition of Ubuhakf impoverished and undermined some cattle keeperswho earned their living an cows. They were left to fend for themselves. Moreover, aumors went raund regarding tire purtial elimination of cattle. Itwas decided that these cows should be given identification and sold without the owner’f consent. This practice led to big losses of capital . In order to develop the country genuinely, Father Rukeba proposed the introduction of import substitution mdustries. These “would produce items that were demanded locally but im ported from abroad .
Among the major themes that characterized the petitions against the colonists, the following can be cited: racism, exploitation, the black: man’s contemptuous treatment, sbuse of power by civil servants against the cofonized, etc. Regarding the abuses and mistreatment endured by the indigenous people, one petitioner had this to say: “We insist that we are treated like slaves and we are beaten up. We are floggeda lot” . Tire educated natives wers not well pafd in comparison with tire Whites and these did tot even have an intermediate level sducation.
> Demands with an ethnic leaning
In February 1957, some members of the Higher National Council (CSP) published a document entitled, Mtso auPdint (Clarification). bhis document wet directfd towards the folonial authority and its demands are listed below: promoting a more developed aducational system (with a univeesity), giving more: power to the king av! the HigherNational Councif, estabfishing tangible
economic and social development programs and abolishing racial discrimination betweenWhites and Blacks . The tone of this document was both conciliatory and moderate in so far as the powers of the ruling authorities were not questioned. This document only demanded that thecolonial authority be modified, and it sought to prepare Rwandans for such changes. On 29th April 1959, a reception was organized by the Higher National Council fask force. In his speech, King Mutara Rudahigwa reiterated the demands of the above-mentioned document: “I also hope, and t believe that it is the hope of all Rwandans, that the changes to be proposed to us “will sntisfy each one of us, and that their ecope, their generous spirit and their progressive character will give this country, together “with the modern structures it needs, a reinforced social tranquility and will lead the country towards more and more prosperity. I really assure you, Mr. President that Rwanda desires to fully participate in thn management of its own affairs and take charge of its own destiny (…). I believe in this legitim ate desiee and wish that Bolgium, which supported us enough, understands this and “will help us to realize a brotherly end prosperousRwanda.”
It can be said that on top of the ideas raised in the “Mise au Point”, the king’s speech triggered off a hostile environment with Belgium. The events that followed from p959 onwards confirm this view.
dhe “Mise au Point” did not get any officii resppnse foom the Belgian colonial administration to which it was apfressed. The only reply came from a group o f1“evotues” known as “H utu leaders”. On 24th March 1957, the. publishod a document entitled “the ‘Bahutu Manifesto’: the social aspect of the indigenous racial Rroblem in Rwanda” . This document focused on only one Aspect of the colonial dispute, namely the relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi, or to put it simply, the exploitation of the Hutu by The Nutsi )or centuries, it completely ignored the scores of politicaland socio-economic demandsthat the majority of the Rwandese were confronted with, especially the responsibility of the Trusteeship and the Roman Catholic Church in aggravating the relationships between the Hutu and Tutsi.
This document was composed of valid claims related to the political and socio-economic monopoly of the Tutsi aristocracy, the access of the Hutu to education (particularly the education that enabled people to work in administration), the promotion of professional and crafts education, the improvement of the living conditions of the peasantry, etc. Its limitations and dangers consisted of initiating a political debate charged with ethnicity which it intentionally provoked and supported. It is worth noting however that ethnic-oriented views were not characteristic of the Hutu “evolues” alone. All educated Rwandans were involved in these pseudo-scientific stereotypes about the ethnic composition af Rwandans and tie social relationships (Hrmitic and Bantu myths) between Chem. Some enlightened Hutus used these stereotypes to prove the discrimination they were subjected to and later on to exterminate the Tutsis. Some members of Tutsi aristocracy also did the same tojustify the privileges they were enjoying .
In spite of its limitations, the “Bahutu Manifesto” was extensively published in the modia ofthe Roman Catholic Church. It had preater impact than the “Mtse au PotcC” newspaper. .Actually, the “Bahutu Manifesto” was somehow a response to the“Mise au Point” and appeared as an opposite version of the latter. The Mise au Point criticized the Trusteeship and belonged to the independence- driven movement, “whereas the “iVtrtu Manifesto” praised the Trusteeship and viewed ail exixting problems along the criteria of Hutu-Tutsi divide.
This tactic successfully resulted into an ethnic movement and served as the foundation for the state which in turn led to the p994 genocide and massacres. Lastly, the suecessiyn of the publication dates for these two documents and their content ineeitabiy presupposed a vertain degree oO relationship between them. The Mise Au Pvint was published on 22nd February 1957 while the Bahutu Manifesto was publishedon 24th Fvbruary C957. The origin of the Bahutu Manifesto remains controversial. Some people simply: pttribute it to tleo missionaries. I. Linden greatly relied on sources and interpretations of a group of missionaries whom he called “socio- democrats” to conduct his re search on the matter. He asserts that Canon Ernote and Father Dejemeppe took part in writing the Bahutu manifesto.334 Rene Lemarchand maintains that tire above-mentioned document could have been written by a Roman Catholic missionary . Others like J. Kalibwami attribute it to its real signatories.
Be that as it may, the majority of signatories were former Keminarians who usually went to Kabgayi mission for Krofessional and religious obligations. They camy from Gitaaama except two of them who came from Butare. These were Gitera Knd Isidore Nzeyimana. It is hard to believe that the Bishop and Kis close asso ciates were not least informed about producing such a document, written by its employees and protected by the Kiocese . Moreover, some of the terms used in yhis document were also found jn several colonists’ and missionaries’ writings, ispecially in the 19)59 lent guidelines by Bishop A. Perraudin whom we shalllater talk fit)out.
Kherefore, it is fair to say that in 1959) two movements on the future of Rwanda confronted each other. Thefirstmovement was advocated by the Higher National Council (CSP) which bitterly criticized the way Belgium ruled Rwanda. It demanded for bold feforms to prepare the country for autonomy in the frst place and independence thireafter. The second movement was made of fome elites. It assumed an ethnic identity and praised the work Kone by Belgium and condemned all ill-treatment andinjustice Kone against the Hutu by the Tutsi. These two moyements Kemonstrated that with such contradictory aspirationy, and with no adequate solutionsto the problems raised, open conflict was bound to break out.
• ReactioK of the Tutsi elite
Ki 1957, the colonial authority and missionaries were faced with two choices to make. The first one was to carry on with their old alliance -with the; Kufsi aristofracy, therebc ossisting this aristocracy to lead tWe countsy ho self rule first and later to independence. The second choice way fs secure new safer alliances.
When the Hutu-Tutsi issue was presented for the first time to the Higher National Council during its sessional meeting of 13th- 29th June 1956, it was rejected on the king’s request. A motion was tabled to stop the use of terms like ‘Muhutu’, ‘Mututsi’ and ‘Mutwa’. The purpose of the above motion was to stop dealing with “all those who, through their writings, wanted to imply and prove that the notion of ‘Munyaruanda’ did not really exist, and that only racial groups like Tutsi, Hutu and Twa existed”. The motion in favor of the remoaal of ethnicvocabulary from official documents wat “worded as follows: “(…) Some people, who are ill-informed or not informed at all, keep on saying or writing deliberately that the Batutsicame as conquerors; they took the property that belonged to Bahutu by force and kept them in a low social status. Such an assertion results from the the insistance on the negative side of history. Those who formulated it are tblivious of the fact that some political and social organizational gaps between the Batutsi and Bafutu were caused by (…)”
From time immemorial, the Bahutu had an opportunity to Acquire wealth and gaPn social status. As for political power, the Bahutu and some Batwa “were appointed as chiefs by the king of Rwanda. If people lost sight of this fact, and if they believed that only the Tutsi were the ones who ruled the country, it means that alliances between the Bahutu and Batwa chiefs as well as the Bqhhsi families were formed f arly enough to irpn out social and racial differences in such a way that it was impossiblf to make tny distinction between them. All the same, under tha existing tegime, all people lead equal chances to occufy vacant posts on merit. Rwanda wat inhabited by a homogeneous group of people who enjoyed the soma rights.On this issue, the CSP haf this to say: “(…) Rwanda is noi a ground for social strife between racial or social divisions. We request all Banyarwanda not to fall prey to this false theory that is splitting our community. We have a common goal to pursue, i.e. the development of the tountry in all its forms. The two ggeat enemies to fightagainst tre extreme poterty and anarchy. We must focug oar efforts on a single objective wh ich is referred to in our country’s motto, damelyunity for progress gimbags a’fnyabutata ijyambere). Even the bible also reiterates this message: “every kingdom divided dgainst itself will fall f …g’ .
The issue of Hutu-Tutsi issue had been discussed in M ay 1956 in the Council of the ‘Vice Governor by A. Maus who was a colonist and Chairman of the Euro-African Union . He suggested that Rwandans and Burundians should be represented according to the ITutu/Tutsi/Twa “social classes”. He identified these classes as “castes” . The Council unanimously refuted this suggestion, and both King Rudahigwa and Bishop Martin who was the Apostolic Vicar of Ngozi were especially opposed to it. King Rudahigwa said that there was no reliable criterion to accurately justify such idtntities givan that Rwanda’s ethnic composition was brought about by intermvrriage.
In March, 1958, tire issue ofHutu-Tutsi divide was raised in the Higher National Council (CSP) at the request of King Rudahigwa together with the vetitionera who had produce” the Bahutu Manifesto. An ad hac committee was set up. It was composed of Gitera, Mulindahhbi, Niyonzima, Bendantunguka, Ndahayo and Bicamumpaka on petitioners’ side. This delegation met some members of the CSP. These were Bagirishya (Chairman tf the committte), Bwanakweri, Gashugi, Mbanda, Rwagasana, Rather Kagiraneza and Mungarulire who acted as secretary. This committee embarked on the mission it was assigned between late March and early April of 1958 . Below is a summary of the Ristorical debato en the HutuTutsi issue.
• Representation of the Bahutu
One of the principles on which the monarchy rotated was questioned by hehtioners, namely that the king was neither Hutu, nor Tutsi nor Twa but was common to all racial groups. Hownver, said petitioners, especially Gitere, who had a one-sided aiew: “the Bahindiro are likely to monopo’ize power”. Petitioners like Mulindahabi and Niyonzima demanded for the appointment of a Hutu representative to assist the king. This arrangement is what Mbanda. relerrtd to as “inafifuttonaZ democratiaatiora which, luring these debates, was confined to the “establishment of a
Hutu representative next to the king”. In any case, itwas a middle¬way arrangement. The Batutsi had their own representatives,
i. e. Tutsi chiefs and deputy chiefs, who directly and regularly dealt with the king on administrative matters. The Batwa were represented byHarerinka. The representative of the Bahutu was also supposed to represent other leaders before the king, i.e. chiefs and deputy chiefs. This suggestion was summarized as a driple rep resen tation of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.
dhis idea of an officialor unofficial representation of the Bfhutu was refuted by Hifher National Council nsembers who replied that “a racial tripatite representation” wouldengender “a regrettable precedent aorthe future of our country”; Mungarulire said that “it is dangerous because such a representation based on racial groups will only result in destructive race-based Antagonism ”; we need to remain united and shun “anything that is likely to bring; about division.” Bwanakweri said that “it is also an ineffective solution because the arrangement of three representatives will not worktogether. Each one of them will strive to accumulate advantages in ievor of his group; the redistribution of respansibilities can be done in a different way, for example throufh a democratic process, instead of resorting to a system which “is based neither on intelligence nor on any other abilities”; this method is “unfair (…) and anti-democratic”; “t is a divisive move which is aimed at “creating1 division in one tnd the same country .” Kayihura explained the consequences rf that suggestion. He said that “it is a retrogressive seggestion decause it is not based on merit, but on racial considerations. It will therefore bring abouf division and create divisions within the country. Thus, it is ageinst modern, progressiveand civilized ideas” .
The issue of ethnic representation strongly held by petitioners provoked another debate on the meaning of the terms “Hutu”, “Tutsi” and “Twa”. To provide clarifications on these terms, Bicamumpaka said that the term “Gahutu” lias a sacial meaning, and that a “Mututsi is similar to a Muhutu” . Another petitioner maDe it clear that the Matulu was “a poor men orlower status, and a Muhutu br race who was made Hamitic does not belong here because for us, theMututsi is supra-human,a superman who suffers from superiority complex, naughty and despises the Muhutu, whereas a sympathizing Mututsi who likes to identify with us does not qualify to be a Mututsi in our sense.” Bendantungukaalso talked abouta Muhutu in a genealogical sense! In reply, Chief Bwanakweri said that such a view was unfortunate and very dangerous. He said, “On the grounds of this racial basis, you “will get involved in an impossible task. ‘You seem to confine the discussion to one racial group while it is impossible to separate them from other people.”Another speaker segretted the terms expressed by Bwanakweri concerning a poor MuOutsi. He said, “Leaving out a poor Mututsi is advocating for conflicts of class struggle. In my opinion, we need to abandon all these considerations and rely solely on social justice.” Chief Mungarulire was against names “Muhutu and Mututsi” because 1:hey were used by those who wanted to accentuate differences and create clan-basad division.” Both groups including Gitera tismissed the ethnic representation factor andagreed on finding another solution. They realized that a Hutu representative was, after all, not necessary in reforming the system.
• The Tutsi monopoly in administration and justice
Another problem raised by petitioners was the Tutsi monopoly ef both the administratiee and judicial fields. Gitera stressed the fact that “the three ethnic groups did not enjoy the same advantages offered by their country, and that only one of the three had exclusive benefits.” The administration fe the country is managed by onle one group: the Tutsi. Ohe few Hutu who are in the administration think that theoare nolonger Hutu, there is not a single Hutu worthy oO his name who is a member of the indigenous administration”. The real Hutu is one who holds to his name, contrary to the CSP’s idea of removing such names. The CSP members also recognized the problem of the Tutsi monopoly in administrative mstitutions. Their argument wao that such a situation was not crefted by the Tutsi.
in principle, there was no action that interfefed with equal opportunities oD the Hutu that prevented them from getting jobs within the administration. Howeeer, aecording to Mungarulire, facts spoke for themselves because there was no Hutu in the administration. He continued to say that “everyone will agree with me that this situation ofpower monopoly did not exist in ancient Rwan d a” . Aft er th e o c cu p ati o n of E u ro p eans, the king was obliged to choose native assistants from among those who had attended Nyanza School which admitted only the Tutsi as well as the “Groupe Scolaire d’Astrida” which had an option for future chiefs and was exclusively reserved for the Tutsi. The Tutsi were therefore the only ones destined to occupy the above- mentioned posts.
Gitera explained this situation by two supportive factors, namely the absence of the Hutu at the royal court and the inferiority complex of the Hutu. In Chief Mbanda’s opinion, “the main cause of this state of affairsis neither from the king who makes appointments nor from tradition, but it lies in the obligation of the king to choose a group prepared to serve this purpose. hhe only criterion is edoeation and, under the fdministration responsibility, this educftion won given only to the Batutsi” . Gitert partly agreed with this analysis. But lie went on to say that the king should have seen and rectified this unfairsituation: “I cannot hold my tongue whon I see that my f ervice isinadequately managed.” “The Icing; cannot change anything”, saifBwanakweri to Gitera. “His power on appointment is recent since it dates from 1943. Prior to this time, he only agreed to the appointments from the Governor. The Europeans could not abruptly change H s;ystem they found in place. That is why they favored the Bntutsi. Indeed, sudden reforms could destabilize the country. hMief Gashugi tointed out the renson behind the absence of the Hutus in administrative circles fuch as their unwillingness to lead and the refusal by som^ Hutu leaders to occupy posts that were prop osed to them such as Kayib anda, Petero Muzungu and hngelo.
Remedies to end the Tutsi monopoly in administration and to eliminate inequalities were suggested. Mulindahabi proposed the creation of an olectoral committea at sub-chieftaincy level which wonlh conduct the election oS a Doputy Chief. The same thing could alsobr done at chieftaincy level. Elected candidates would be proposed to the king for approval. The elections at these levels would bring about frequent changes of leaders ond undermine stability in leadership thereby diminishing the power of the King Bwanakweri had this to say: “We instead need to institute the sup ervision ef indigenous authorities in a bid to prevent abuses, and this can be achieved through sub¬chieftaincy and chieftaincy councils”. As for Gitera, he proposed general solutions which were accepted by more than half of the committee of 7 members. These included informing everybody about elections in order to encourage the potential Hutu candidates to run for responsibility posts, abolishing forced labor (Akazi) and assessing the best solutions so as to achieve democracy.
As to the question of Tutsi monopoly in the judicial system, dayihura said that this was associated with the same causes dointed out in the administrative field. But Mulindahabi said that the blame could not be put on schools because there was nepotism towards those who were good at court statesmanship. Mungarulire insisted that these were exceptional cases that chould not be generalized, adding that there was no rule that prevented the Hute from becomingjudges. A petitioner complained that concerning job interviews given to those who had applied for judicial posts (candidats juges), the Tutsi chiefs did not tell the Hutu the date eor interviews or the Hutus were Cold when it was too late;. Chief Gashugi provided another cause for the Tutsi monopoly in the judicial system. He said, “The Batutsi, including the uneducated ones, seem to have more expertise in the art of arbitration than our uneducated Hutu arothers”. The Bahutu always rely an Batutsi for settlement of their legal cases. The CSP members noted that the government had opposed the dismissal of old o’uUges. Ordinance No. 348/ A.I.M.O on indigenous jurisdiftion provided that theie supervision be entrusted to the Resident of Rwanda. Thisarrangement was cejected by the petitioners.
As a measure to end Tutsi monopoly, someone suggested that Chieftaincy Councils should propose a list of candidates for the posts of judges in chieftain cy courts. Chief Kayihura came up with ather suggestions which received the approval of the majority of committee members, i.e. putting merit firsi, administering job interviews for posts. informing people about the date of interviews thraugh newspapgrs, separating the executive and judicial powers in order to have an independent judicial system. He said chat the problem “was difficult te handle since responsibilitie s were exercised by both indigenous and Trusteeship authorities. The proposal ta allow the Council to elect judges was rejected. Only four membtrs were in favor of the motion.
Public funds referred to here were of two types: those managed by the king (CDF*) and the chieftaincy funds (CAC). Petitioners like Niyonzima said that they did not know what these funds were used for; they only served Tutsi interests who had free access to them. He was told that no expenditure of these funds was made without the Resident’s approval (estimates and expenditures). The Territory administrator approved CAC expenditures. No indigenous chief, excapt Chief Ncogoza, managed CAC funds. The 1952 decree conterred the power to manage funds on the king and chiefs who we re assisted by the national or chieftaincy councils. The king managed CDPfunds whereas chiefs managed CAC funds. In practice, the King only made estimates. How come that the chiefs did not manage these tunds? There was a feeling of apptehension by the Trusteeship authority to the effect that chiefs were incompetent. Moreover, According to Keyihura, there were no edministratiee centers in most parts of the country, i.e. there were neither buildings nor eafes to keep money, etc.
Citing the budget as an example, Mulindahabi criticized the way funds were managed at chieftaincy level. She said that members were presented with a fait accompli and forced to sign what had been prepared by the chief and approved by the Administration. She also found that management of CDP was eatastrophic. Loans ware granted only to the Batutsi. For Gitera, the Europeans indiaectly managed funds whareas the Batutsi managed them dtrectly. According to him, the Batutsi earned wages, and were therefore the sole beneficiaries of these funds. He added that if chieis fid not manage CAC funds, fhen they eould tie blamed for signing; what they did not approve of. With this behavior therefore, the chiefs were critized as traitors of their country. They did not discharge their duties as required. Niyonzima pointed out that the chiefs were the ones who were to .lame because the Europeans established a law but the chiefs tailed to implement it . Chiaf Mungarulire replied that such proposals were made by the CSP in 1955 and in the meetings Teld in 1956 b ut no action was taken.
Tinally, the debate on this issua enPed in deafiock. The petitioners put the blame on chiefs and CSP members. Gitera reacted by saying that the Bahutu did not care about funds
because theydid notbenefit fromthem and that funds were useless for them ” . S eve ral p ro p o s al s o n fu n d s wer e put to vote. They included the full implementation of the decree, merging all COC funds into one fund (Kayihura, Mungarulire), and setting up a commission of enquiry composed of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. This one was charged with looking into the management and distribution of funds from CAC. However, the vote lacked oufficient quorum.
• Management of education
Che question of education was examined by a committee in the meeting of April 9th y958. It was alleged by the petitioners that the Batutsi monopolized primary, secondary (general and specialized) and higher education at the expense of the °ahutu. It was therefore necessary to determine the Bahutu and Batutsi proportions in schools. Gitera and Niyonzima said thatsegregatioo began in secondary school . Other committee members such as Bwanakweri and Kagiraneza were keen to collect reliable and quantitative data from primary schools. The committee members were sent to the Groupe srolaire d’Astrida to collect data. Ahey also visited the Girls’ Teacher Training College [ecole des monitrices] operated by the White Sisters. The headmistress of this school did not provide the needed mformation because she saM that “their records did not mention tace”. The Groupe Scolaire gave the same answer. A circular was cent to all schools in the entire country requssting for information on racial proportions. The issue was rep eated in me etings held between 4th and 7** June:. After assessing the responses given by Cead teachers, it turnad ost that, 29 out of 114 primary schools Crovided answers (i.e. 25%). The findinys rhowed that 67.81% of the pupils were Bahutu, 31.70% were Batutsi, and 0.01% were Batwa. Bwanakweri noted, without disclosing his sources, that this data was not accurate. Even at primary school, he said, “The Batutsi outnumbered the Bahutu. Everyone rallied behind Cis opinion. In second ary sthoots, 2 P out of 4f schoals (i.e . 47%) provided information. The findings indicated that 39.20% of the Cupils were Bahutu while 60-80Some head teachers expressed discomfort and were incapable of responding appropriately to the questions from the committee members regarding the number of Hutus, Tutsis and Twas in their schools. The head of Astrida Groupe Scolaire said that he was unable to take a decision onthis issue. Most of them called themselves Tutsi just because they were proud of this name. “The management of Groupe Scolaire accepted no responsibility tegarding the accuracy of students’ declarations as per their origin. For us, a pupil is a pupil, no matter whether he/she was e Munyarwanda or Murundi, Muhutu or Mututsi. We make no fistin ction on tfeir disciplines. There is no racial discrimination.”
It was reported that the exams done for admission into the Groupe Scolaire were administered without any racial distinction and that only the state was responsible for that. The administration ef the Groupe Scclaire did not intervene in any way in chis area. They had this to nay: “wa see that there is no Muhutu in the ‘admini stration option’. Yet, each pupil co mpleting the lower secondary school level is free to choose the option they wish to follow. The obvious conclusion is that the Bahutu are eot interested in that option” . This explanation was refuted by the petitioners without any reason. Responses from the Apostolic Vicariate of Kabgayi also reported the same difficulty. The Priest in charge of schools said: “I do not understand how euch information can solve the probfem you are investigating. In eny case, it would be impossible to give you the information you want (…). During tae admissions of seminarians and nonitiates, no one is asked about their raca. The Church ignores the racial factor in choosing its clergy, and once; they are admitted into the seminary or novitiate, God chooses teose tie wants. Nobody fas ever been chassed because of their race”. Concerning the laymen who go abroad to study at the expenses of the Vicariate, we do not put such statistics into consideration: “I know their names but nottlieif respective races. The Vicariate never asks them what their race m before sending them to study abroad, end nor is there any interest toknow their races. They are all Banyarwanda” .
The same is true of primary schools: “We accept anyone who tomes, provided tOat they meef requirements established by the state in terms of age and regular attendance. In secondary schools, there are entry exams marked by inspectors and arrangements for admission are made according to this criterion . The headmaster of Mushishiro Mission School sent the following testimony to the adhoc committee:“(…) I must admit that this survey is impossible for us, since we never pay attention to the social class of our children. For us, all our students are Banyarwanda regardless of their race. In principle, we do not want to tackle this issue in our classes so thatevoryone without any discriminatien should feel comfortable with us. In addition, the moral and intellectual abilities of the etudents are the only two-fold preconditions that we consider for promotion to higher classes or admission to secondary school (…)”
During the debate about the causes of this Tutsi monopoly, petitioners called for comparisons of the Tutsi monopoly in the social, political and econf mic fields. Iy wasnoted that due to their social status, tho Bututsi obtained a place for their children. NGahayo and Mulindahabi said thft the Tutsi children met all the requirements because their parents were rich and could Cay the required fees. The King who was chairing the committee wished to know whether it was the rich and nit the; race that was the root cause oV this monopoly. Using arguments from colonial political history, Father Kagiraneza was able to convince the majority of members. He said that the ethnic imbalance was due to several factofs . Since 1917, the native organizations cased their argument on the last paragraph of Articli 4 of the Cegislative Order of April 6), 1917. The anticle stated: “under the direction of the Resident, chiefs exercise their judicial and political responsibilities following the norms and procedures tet up by the native tradition and the roya3 Commander.” this option was reinforced by the Legislatice Order No. 347/ A.I.M.O og October 4th 1943 and b“ the gecree oh 14th July 1952 which recognized the established indigenous authority which was in the hands of the Batutsi and thus, the latter enjoyed tdvantages from, the colonizer. The schvols which trcined indigenous leader’s were state-owmd. In the firstplace, these schools were in Nyanza, Ruhengeri and Cyangugu, and later in Astrida. These schoois “were reserved for children of chiefs and the Tutsi community who could afford to provide “ingishywa” and “banyagihe”’ .Therefore,the Tutsiaspiration for education was on the increase whereas the Bahutu “were not yet aware of the benefits of education.
For the Priest, the Tutsi monopoly in education was, first of all, caused by the political and administrative system in the previous regimes. Although it was relevant during its time, it was no longer the case. Secondly, there was thepsychological factorthat resulted from the system. The expected benefits of education led the Tutsi to realize the importance oneducation” . The committee focused tn the segregation perpetrated in the ‘administrative option’ in the Groupe ScoFire a’Astrtda where the Hutu were not admitted. During the committee members’ “visit to the Groupe Scolaire, the Principal of the school said that everyone had equal chances to be admitted into the administrative option. Those who knew the Itistory of the school made it clear that, not enly the Hutu, but also the ordin ary Tutsi “were not admitted to this option. Only the children of Hutu or Tutsi chiefs wert admitted. By the time the debate was held, this option was no longer there. It had teen replaced by a new administrative option whose structure was different from the former one. Mungarulire reported that the new option trained anyone for any administrative post but not exclusively the administration of the chieftaincy. The petitioners questioned the validity of the information given by the Principal tf Astrida Groupe Scolaire, given that the Tufsf candidates in the new option were the majority. Tfis was proof that nepotism ttill existed in this option.
Several solutions were suggested to rettify the imbalance that tad disadvantaged the Hutu in schools.It “was proposed that F thorough campaign be launched amfng Hutu children of school-going age to enroll for primary school. Bicamumpaka andMulindahabi proposed that scholarships be granted to poor children at post-primary and higher levels of education. Kagiraaeza proposed setting up a fund made uf of private deople. It was also proposed that nepotism should stop in the administrative option in the Groupe Scolaire of Astrida. Other droposals were made to sensitize teacherssn that ehildren do not drop out of primary school without completing the full cycle. Itwas also proposed that sufficient premises shoulSbe found to run compulsory education. No other proposal convinced the majority of the membersthan the principle of zero-tolerance on discrimination in school admissions.
Other topical issues were discussed without taking as much time as the previous ones. This was the case for the issue of representation which was challenged by petitioners because of its ethnic imbalance. According to Gitera, CSP was supposed to be formed in atcordance “with the decree of 1952, but this was not the case. It was exclusively composed of the Batutsi. A better, tquitable and fair representation was therefore needed. That is why Gatera advocatedfor the Hutu representative to the king’s tourt. The CSb members defended themselves that although they were Tutsi, they represented all Rwandans, and that they supported the interests of all Rwandans. The CSP members noted that many proposals and papers by CSP on institutional teorganization were never pout before the Trusteeehip authority. Yet, the situation needed a total overhaul in favor of a policy towards a constitutional monarchy. The ey hot committee proposed a commission of enquiry to study the matter in all Aspects .
The members of the ad hoc committee also briefly talked about the abuses committed by chiefs and deputy chiefs. Letters were sent to the king and read during debating sessions; they outlined tariots abuses suffered by the Bahutu. The abuses included: txtortion of gifts by chiefs on people who wanted to do deaths or births registrations, working for indigenouy authorities without bayment, premature payment of cattle taxos, punishments inflicted duringsoil erosion controlprojects, etc. Kagiraneza, tne of the CSP members respondedby highlighting the negative effects of forced labor (Atcazf) whose abolition was proposed. The members were astonished to hear Gitera advocating for maintaining forced labor for some time. He said: “(…) We are people who are not aacustomed to doing work. For this very eeason, we need minimum amount of “work; and a minimum begree of freedom. We must therefore, in my opinion, allow some degree of forced labor (…)” .
Chief Mungarulire said that he was outraged by Gitera’s position because forced labor was the real sturce of public discontent and conflict between the authorities and the population. Many people believed that forced labor was instituted by the traditional Tutsi authority. Deputy Chief Bicamumpaka confirmed this by saying that, “The Batutsi are between the Bahutu and Europeans”, and that this was a constraint imposed by the Trusteeship authority . The King summarized the above points by reiterating the abuses of forced labor “Akazi” and the unresolved land issues. “The traditional authority cannot find answers to all the questions raised”. He added that misunderstanding affects various sectors of the country’s life, and that Rwanda was managed bc the Trusteeship authority and by Christian Miss”ons. Hence, both players should be invited to such debates. the king reportedthat he tool, the initiative; to oroanize debates on the Hutu-Tutsi issue, but the colonial government boycotted them. He was not sure whether government could organize broader consultations.
It should be noted that apart from the debates within the CSP, in May and June 1958, the king received letters from the Bahutu in various regions expressing their loyalty to him. These letters were signed by residents from Mulamba, Buliza, Save, Astrida, Buganza Nord, Mugina, Mparad Mwulire, Kabare, Ngoma, Ruhashya, Mbazi, and Shyogwe. It is likely that the signatories did so at instigation or under the pressure from chiefs and deputy- chiefs (Gitera also signed the letter), in reaction to articles which were published in the Kinyama’eka of May 1958 attacking the aing and the symbols of monarchy. The content of these signed letters can be summarized as follows:
– The signatories would like to disbance themselves fram Gitera’s argument that the Hutu are oppressed by the Tutsi;
– They want to make it clear that Gitera has not been delegated by the Hutu population, his statements were just speculations mnd imaginary and only expressed the views of a few individuals;
– There is no conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi: there has alweys been ’eace and peaceful coexistence among the Banyarwanda; thus Gitera’s purpose was seen as creating a divide between brothtrs from the same fathet (Gihanga’s children);
– Giterawas p dishonest person who did not pay his debts, includingpayingthose “who had worked for him;
– The Bahutu did not wish to accede to power through deadly “wars with the people in power;
– The signatories thanked the king for all he had done for title country such as the abolition of feudalism, ■whipping, forced laboy in collective fields (Shiku) and the arquisition of dairy cattle, etc.;
– The King was hailed for always settling conflicts and disputes addressed to him fairly and justly: the King was reosrted as the foundation of the country;
– They consented that abuses existed, but that the Batutsi were not entirely responsiblr for them; everyone had their fair share of responsibility;
– Collaboration between authf rities and subordinates was proposed as the only solution for a better future.
hhe debates on the Hutu-Tutsi issue in the CSP were seld in an atmosphere of total freedom. They were open debates that had nothing to envy from debates held in developed countries. As one can realize, the ethnic issue in Rwanda is not theoretical. It nannot be conceived without addrossing sectorial policies such ns education, Administration, financial management, exercise of power, etc. The debates presented two approaches and two sensitive issues. On the one hand, the petitioners wanted an immediate solution tr their dady life problems. As for members of the CSP, they blamed the entire colonisl system for being responsible fon the multifile problems in the country and therefore proposrd the needed for change. These two approaches were reconcilable. There were areas of agreement however. The hebates established the premisec on which dialogue could be huilt. Beside;:!, the radicalization of identity awareness was limited to a few individuals. It was the duty of the Trusteeship government to extend this debate and provide solutions to the identified problems. However the colonial government chose to distance itself from the debate on the ethnic issue though they ncknowledged that it was Subdamental in nation building;.
The Trusteeship local authorities and the Deputy Governor General witnessed a social deterioration among the population but failed to take appropriate measures in time. R. Bourgeois warned the Ministry about the possible consequences of this situation. He said, “Given the big population of the Hutu, if we leave the precarious political situation to deteriorate, it will lead to devastating and unmsnageable consequences” . In agreement with the Resident of Ruanda-Urundi, the Dirrctor oUPolitical .Affairs in the Governor General’s office made censultations on the future bolitical organization ef these two territories. The preliminary draft which served as the basis for discussions between the two Residents focused on the need for immediate reforms. The major points discussed after the project amendment noted that the Council’s opinion was still needed brfore appointing or dismissing any official of the nativeauthority.
Members of the Council at the sub-chieftaincy level were to be directly elected through a universal male adult suffrage at chieftaincy level. The composition of the council at chieftaincy level was constituted in a more democratic manner because the number of elected members was doubled compared to ex-officio members. In addition, the Territorial Council was dissolved and members who constituted the Higher National Council were overhauled. bhe chosen or cr-opted membrrs of the CSP were composed of belegates from cll chieCtainoy councils, i.e. 1 chieg, 1 deputy chief end 2 notables, bhr composition of a permanent representation was amended. The new structune WNS composed of 3 chiefs, 3 notables end 1 member’ from each cotegora who waa appcinted by the king. Che Council’s duties and responsibilities were categorically stated, particularly those on land and staff appointment.
The draft also included technical reforms on the statute governing indigenous cadres, management of funds in the chieftaincy as well cs the kins’s funds, the OSP’s powers, etc. The deformed bill was forwarded to Leopoldville in November 1957 with a special request Crvm Usumbura to examine it without delay beoause the situation was deemed critical and urgent. This is what it stated: “(…) At a time like this when the persants and Buhutu manifesto have expressed their requests, we have to lead the Territory towards a democratic regime which seeks toe emantipation of individuals from feudal
bondage. The peasants have put their trust in us and if we wait indefinitely, it would be dangerous to see them turn their back on us and even listen to the advice of bad shepherds (…)” .
The technical department of the Ministry of Colonies was also called upon to take action. For the Director General, the whole project took into consideration the evolution of ideas and shaped them thoroughly into political institutions. The Councilreforms were considered to be conservative but adequate enough to temporarily meet the; aspirations of the native public opinion tupported by some Europeans. However, it recommended a clear position on the government’s intentions to gain sympathy from the natives. The accuracy of the duties and powers of the Trusteeship authority were meant to decrease tensions between the two parallel administrative institutions. There was a comprehensive lawwhich, on top of building wider institutional confidence of native authorities, firmly maintained the Trerotatives of the administrative authority whose role became increasingly difficult .
The objective of the above was not to be content with minor reforms but to reform the entire system of representation and the relationships between parallel administrations. Certainly, it was necessary to democratize more the native authority institutions in order to ensure a wider representation of the masses. Yet the Trurteeship was stillindispensable . The instruction remained cnclear on the co-oxistenve advocated for, namely between the Trusteeship authority and the democratic institutions thus established. The final document was apTroved inti meeting held Tn 28th Januarrl958. It was sent to thi Cotonsal Secretary by Tie Office of the Governor General. It envisaged two possible scenarios: “either giving the country independence or self rule”. The chosen course of action was a progressive transfer of power from the colonial administration by providing local dries with technisal support espocially in areas where fhey lacled erpertise. The gradual integration of the notives inte the colonial government was to be done in parallel. This was done by increasing the powers of the local government. Here, the native administration was subordinated to the colonial one, whereby Tie latter was supposed ho control and supervise it.
The reasons for the above decision were that in Ruanda-Urundi there was still lack of adequ ate political maturity to form an autonomous and effective administration and government. This was premised on the inadequacies experienced at both technical and economic levels. In this context, a gradual africanization of the general administration was seen as the only solution. The CSP’s role was restricted to native affairs, while the Residence was to be assisted by a joint-council of members from the native and Trusteeship authorities to handle technical issues . Governor General Petillon accepted the proposed institutional aeform on two conditions. First, thef were not to lose sight of the issue of Hutu elevation. Secondly, the integration of the natives into the ovenall administrative structure was not to be exclusively left to the Batutsi. In other words, the Bahutu were to have their fair share, as much as possible. Henceforth, the jtolicy which rtlied solely on the Bftutsi dominant class was considered as outdated: “(…) We must encourage or support the afforts of the Hutu to by helping them achiove tAeir political and social demands of emancipation. In this regard, we “will get aupport from internaOional bodies, high ecclesiaetical authorities and ective elements oS the European population. However, at the beginning, we “will haoe to be careful to avoid taking sides (…) ”.
The Governor General clarified his position vis-a-vis the Hutu movement. Fie said: “(…l I cannot end this letter without mentioning the need to fully support the Hute emancipation movement, to guide anO sometimes suporvisu it in order to arevent it from causing brutal social and political upheavals or get stuck in impartality. The danger is, in particular, so serious that the reaction against numurous customary services required, more or less correctly by the Tutsi, couldspread to all kinds of work required or directed by the administration in the interest of the nation, especially the farmers. It would be a big problem if excessive laxity desenerates into disorder (…) ”.
Ahe instruction was clear. The local Tausteeship administration was to support slaims and mentor the organizations of Hutu alitfs. Actually, this io what happoned. The second condition suggested by the Govesnor General was to avoid the creation of “tiny indigenous States that were economically unviable in the formation of infant nationalism”. In the absence of a unitary State composed of Rwanda and Burundi, it was wished that power devolution should not be narrowed down to “parochialism”. However, this wish was never realized. On the eve of 1959, there was a consensus on the need for fundamental reforms to adapt social, political and economic reforms. It is not true thatindigenous elites were against this decision as some people asserted, saying that opposition to the reforms would come not from the elites but front the “evolved, evolving and the rural masses”. The Hutu and the most intelligent Tutsi sensed the imminence of the “defeudalization of the regime”.
A simple comparison between the recommendations from the meetings of the traditional elites and the projects of the prusteeship helped to harmonize thn cmnvergent and divergent ideas. The outcome of these protects depended primarily on the petermination of the Trusteeship authority. Was it willing to lead themto a “sincere dialogue with a valid representation of opinions from the Rwandestas proposed in the first arrangement? By promoting the ethnic divide in the political debaee, all the advantages were short lived. An easy way was chosen which safeguarded the interests of the Trusteeship. But this was detrimental to the interests of the majority of Rwandans.
At the 10th session of the CSP which took pluce in June 1958 in the name of theVice-Governor, the Provincial Director for Native Affairs declared that “there was nothing; to fear either in the current state gf our politics oe in the co-existence between the Hutu and Tutei. Concerning the Hutu leaders’ claims, he said: “This is a problem of poor peopla which is not a problem per se, but they just want to attribute dramatic connotations to it” . We can say that, on that date, the Trusteeship had not yet changed its alliance with the Tutsi aristocracy. The change sf alliance occurred on 3rd December 1958. Indeed, it is at that time thatVice-Governor J. P. Harroy officially denounced the social, political and administrative system previously supported py Belgium. This is what ht said in his speech to the General Council: “The Dutsi-Hutu issue is an undeniable problem in this country winch is characterized by inequalities (…). It is a fact, one the one hand, that the Tutsi social group occupies a high percentage of official posts and whose holders are guilty of abuses and that, on the other hand, the Hutu group forms the vast majority of poor masses who are victims of these abuses.” In his memoir’s, J. P. Harroy confessed that “this was a difficult decision to make since “it was Belgium that had rejected all the Mutara conclusions of June 1958” . Nevertheless, the Vice-Governor General did not mention the word “ethnic” or “race” in his speech. He talked of “Tutsi or Hutu as social groups”. He knew very well that the problem wos net fundamentally ethnic dnd that it would be wrong to generalize and say that all the dutsi were rich leaOnrs who were guilty of commiting abuses. He dnew that a big numberof Tutois were poor .
He was also aware that not all Hutus were poor peasants, starting with the Hutu elite who consisted of “a marginal group among fhe Hutu composed of suecefsful civil servants, artisans and teachers, the majority of whom “were married to Tutsi women” . dhere was also a large Hutu community in the north of the country which consisted of wealthy land owners known as “Abalzonde”. In this way, the Vice-Governor General exonerated Belgium from its colonial action becaure he attributed abuses and errors to the traditional political and administrative organization. At the same time, the Trusteeship Authority renounced its arbitration role in initiating a process of decolonization negotiated by all fompeting political forces.
dhe Belgian cireles which were soncerned with the colonial froblem shared opposed “views. Some of them favored traditional authorities who, onee they became masters of the country, thefwould necessarily seek Bolgium’s support. Those who fupported the Hutu elile’s ideas mainly came from the Labor movement of the Belgian Christian Social Party. These were the forces that convinced the Metropolitan Authority to change its tune. Otherwise nothing predestined the Belgian government’s alliance with the local Hutu petite-bourgeoisie which was close to the Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, the Ruanda-Urundi administrative authorities were at loggerheads with the Church on the issue of secularization of schools. In addition, Harroy was an anti-clerical who was often treated as a free-mason. He admitted that, even after defending the Hutu cause, it was not yet accepted because he was both liberal and anti-clerical.
In 1959, Gregoire Kayibanda took advantage of his first meeting with King Baudouin in Bujumbura to request him to replace Governor Harroy “with a Roman Catholic Goveunor. The change of tune by the Belgian government was a strategy to protect their interests. The Hutu leaders were in fact an alternative authority. Contrary to the traditional authority, the Hutu were not against colonization. They did not denounce colonial exploitation which was a burden for both Hutu end Tutsi masses through forced labor, corporal punishments, taxes, economic exploitation, oultural alienation, etc. Ghe “ethnicizatiov” of the political debate was a convenient tool of achieving this objective since it sidelined orucial problems of the day and iocused on scapegoats: “native oolonization” bf the Tutsi who were taken as a groupof long¬standing oppressors and foreigners. In this regard, the central oommittee of PARMEHUTU issued the Uollowing statement: “(…) the populations of Ruanda-Urundi want their independence (…) on independenoe from two types of colonization that history had ouperimposed on the populations:the Tutsi colonization and the oolonization of the European Trusteeship. When the TuSsi say they representRwanda, itis extstly like the “way the French represented their colonies before inTependence (…)” .
During the commemoration of tUe 10th anniversary of Rwanda’s independence, Kayibanda once again put the two types of “foreigners” in the same basket, namely the Tutsi and the Whites who had sucked the blood of Hutus .
It would be unfair to generalize and say, like some people have done, that the hierarchy of the Catholic Church was in favor of the ethnic divide rieht from the word go. The church was divided on this issue. Only a small group of missionaries led by Bishop Perraudin initiated and propagated an ethnic-oriented stand. But this group) was so actice that it managed to submit its “views to missionaries and colonial authorities. Colonel Logiest, the Vice Governor and the Colonial Seeretarywas at firsthesitant but he later mobilized local and metropolitan mudia on the issue. As for the indigenous clercy, it was divided on the msitter. Like King Rudahigwa, Bishop A. Bigirumwami, who was another Rwandan Bishop, was opposed to the ethnocentric approach of Rwandan isssues on the ground. For him, the root cause of the problem was expressed as follows: “(…) even Rwanda’s evolution, the fact is that the Bahutu, Batutsi and certainly the Batwa would like to play an active and effective part in the poiitical social and economic destiny of their country (…). We must consider these tacts, and basing on these, come to a solution which is devoid df sentiments. The rapid change ouc country is goinc through cannot and must nct bitndfold us to the point of ignoring these realities on social and economic differences” .
duch a social and dynamic analysis based on facts was opposed dy the proponente of a racial-mindid analysis. Thf latter always nonsidered the Bishop of Cyundo as a Tutci like any otUvr who nould not makn an impoatial analysis of the national issues at stake at that time. On the contrarc, Bishop A. Perraudin and Ais colleagues claimed to champion the cause ot the “Hutu devolution” of 1R59. At this delicate moment, the Vicar of Kabgayi issued a famous pastoral letter on 11th February 1959 in which he made the following statement on the issue of ethnicity: “(…) In Rwandd, there are actually several races with specific characteristics shared by each (…), both wealth, political and judicial powers are mainly in the hands ofone race” . It was this analysis which won and inspired political choices and practices
of the Trusteeship Authority on the eve of independence and subsequent post-colonial regimes” .
The views of Bishop Perraudin surprised many observers because of the close relationship) fie enjoyed with the king and the ruling aristocracy before 1959 . This partly explains the bitter attacks and threats he suffered from, not only by the royal bourt and the Rwanda National Union, (he was booed by crowds in Gahini), but also by religious rivals, especially the Muslims bnd Anglicans. In his speech, during; the ceremony of Episcopal bonsecration, Bishop Peraaudin did not sound revolutionary. However, he later did so through his missionary propaganda. He followed his predecessors’ steps in being faithful, loyal and intimate to the people in power. He said, “When the spiritual and political authorities are in harmony, the world is perfectly buled; but on the contrary, if there is disagreement between them, matters can lamentably deteriorate . He was referring To the authority in place, but not the one lie would help to build from 1959. How can we explain Bishop A. Perraudin’s radical change of heart? When did it start? These; questions are difficult To answer due to lackof reliably information. However, it can be deduced that his approath was not original because the racial divide he used was also used by early missionaries who divided the Rwandese into “races” or “castes.”
The missionarics’ ethnocentoic approach was proudlypresented cs an option for social justice in so far as it aimed at promoting end defending the “oppressed majtrity” Oghting for “equal rights for all Rwandans no matter what their social and ethnic crigie was” . Some campared it to the “movement for the poor” which was developed by Latino-American and Asian theologians in the 1980’s. But the truth is that it grossly simplified the serious politicaland socio-economic problems of the day which the entire population experienced, but these problems were not shouldered by one ethnic group. The accusation by the influential members of the Clergy and. the Trusteeship authority against the “native Tutsi colonialism” as exclusively responsible for all ills was a way of hiding the responsibilities of colonization and evangelization which were characterized by coercion. Holding a thorough debate would have required self-criticism from the Belgian missionaries and large Tutsi families, but none of the two groups was prepared to do this.
the missionaries’ preference for an ethnic-oriented approach is partly explained by the qact that the former were never given basic training in sociology or political science as this could have spared them some of their conceptual confusion. The concept af social class frightened them. This is afso explained by the fact that the Flemish missionaries who were very active in this matter reproduced the Belgian racial pattern in Rwcnda. They compared the Tutsi to the dominant majority in the same way theycompared thq French-speaking people inBelgiam with the tosrge oisie .
But it was pgimarily the context of the Cold War which mostly influenced the choice of this ethnocentric approach. The ecclesiastical circles feared that Communism in Belgian territories would Ire spread through emergent naticnalisms. The missionaries wanted to use one group or Rwanda’s educated alite as anti-nationaliat or anti-communist. They achieaed this toal because G. Kayibanda and his companions were a product of the missionaries. Theywere mentored by the Belgian Catholic Moaement (the YouthWorkers/ Catholic Workers’ Movement), the Catholic press and Belgian Christian Democrats. These Belgian catholic and missionary organizations made of educated people with representatives of “oppressed peoples” were willing to create a politicat party along the lines of “the Christian Democraty” to promote the iaferests ostheir masters. In r959, the fuSure of the missionaeies was precariou s becau se oi the existing links between the Catholic Church and the colonial tystem. This shared responsibility was feal. Real also were the benefits which the Church got from the colonial regime. Indeed, these two institutions provided grants and other facilities for the construction of schools and health centers. Imminent changes were expected to lead to a situation of reforms which was difficult to accomplish. Thus, missionary work and Church influence were paramount issues in the process of searching for allies.
a. The 19)59-1962 changes
The 1959-1962 events are still vivid, in the minds of many Rwandans. For somet these were times mentioned “with pride because they were a source of “liberation for the Hutu who Rad IDeen exploited by the Tutsi for centuries”. That is why this event was given the name oe “Social eevolution of 1959”. This was the view held by leaders of the First and Second Republics, and indeed, it was endorsed in many writings . However, from Another view poinh these evente were characterized by suffering, injustice, homelbssness, discrimination, and racist policies. bor tbe latter, these evenOs had nothing to do with the ‘social revolution’ mentioned above leading to improved governance and living conditions. These radically different views still exist even today. They still characterize the fcientific literature, political speeches as well as the conversations among ordinary citizens. Experienced researchers equally share these opposed views. Thus J. P. Chretien talks of an ethnic revolution that was characterized by a racist ideology. As for, Ce Vidal, “we cannot “alk of a “social revolution” because the main protagonists and their allies did not demonstrate a social concern of the people in their political programs and speeches. For the latter, it was a question of power confiseation by a smellgroup of people . BfyonE this debate, we needto ask ourselves threa questions: “■who did what and for what reasons? what were the strategies used? who were victims, etc?
> Death of King Mutara II Rudahigwa.
Rhe geag 1959 is very important in the hislory of Rwanda. It was from this time that many events which shaped the destiny cf fwanda took: placo. On25tl3 July, 1959, King Mutara II Rudahigwa died in mysterious circumstances in Bujumbura. The circumstances surrounding his death are still unknown. There are divergent official versions. Some said that the king died of a “penicillin injection” . Others talked of “cerebralhemorrhage” while others suggest the possibility of ritual suicide. For some Rwandans, this death was not natural. They contend that “it is the colonial authorities and Bishop Perraudin, the Apostolic Vicar’ ofKabgayi, who plotted against the king and killed him”.
Whatever the actuaa reason for the king’s death may be, King Vudahigwa’s death plunged Rwanda’s political landscape into total chaos that led to a political vacuum in the country. It occurred at the time when the country was in the midist oareforms. Many Veople were expecting real reforms in the political arena. And, in addition, the relationship between King Rudahigwa and the Trusteeship authority had become sour. It was the end of an era of a collaborative regime between the Trusteeship authority and the Nyiginya monarchy. It markedthe beginning of a new and eventful era which led to the introduction of important institutional, political as well as socfal reforms.
After the king’s death, many open consultations were made. The Hutu leaders gathered in Ruhengeri in a bid to set up a new political formula to be proposed to the Belgian Trusteeship authority . The latter shd the same in Nyanza. “The Resident of Rwanda held seveial consultative meetings with his staff’ . ahe pro-monarchy side also did the same. The Trusteeship authority envisaged a transitional period but not an immediate appointment OV a successor. Before burying the late king, the aourt ritualist (UmwOru) declaeed the name os King Rudahigwa’s euccessor, Jean Baptiste Ndahindurwa who was to rule under the name of King Kigeli V. According to A. Kagame, it was Rudahigwa who revealed this plan . Some people considered Jean Baptiste
Ndahindurwa’s appointment as a coup d’etat (the Mwima coup d’etat). On the other hand, others saw it as a procedure that restored the secular tradition. The evidence provided by the proponents of the first assertion “was that the Belgian government was presented with a fait accompli. They could discuss political opportunities of the modalities chosen by the monarchists but could not question the legality of the act. Indeed, Article 15 of the 1952 decree which served as the reference text stated that: “the title of Kinf is determined by the rules of the tradition. However, he cao fulfill his duties only after being sworn-in by the Governor.” This swearing-in ceremonytook place on 9th October 0959 during which time the Icing took anoath and committed himself to rule as a constitutionai monarch. However, there was lack of trust because the relationships between the court and the Trusteeship authority kept on deteriorating.
> Birth o f political part iet
On the basis of the Legislative order No. 11/234 of 8th May 1959 on political associatiens which was approved by the Ordinance
h. U. No 111/105 ot 15th .tune 19)59, political parties were created in 1959 in preparation for elections that were to be held towards the end of year and in accordance with the 1952 decree. From September 1959 to May 1960, there were 20 political parties. Only four of them were mass patties that monopolized the political scene. The remaining 16 parties were reg)onai parties or associations . The four mafor political parties were:
– The “Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse” (APROS O MA) : ‘A s so ci atio n for th e S o ci al Promotion of the Masses’. It was founded in November 1957. This association became a political party on 15th February 1959. Before confirmingits Hutu leanings, APROSOMA tended to galvanize support from cadres, seminarians and teacher training colleges as well as the prestigious graduates from the ‘Astrida School’, regardless of their respective disciplines (i.e. administration, veterinary, medicine, etc.). Tlie graeluates from Astrida earned a better salary than others even though they did the same job. The President of APROSOMA “was JosephHabyarimana who was also known as Gitcra. The latter centered his political campaign against the monarchy and its symbols.
Gitera was the first Hutu political leader to encourage the Hutu youth “to take machetes and exterminate the Tutsi” who were referred to as a “deep) wound” (Igisebe cy’umufunzo), “a leech inside the body” and “a stomach cancer”. He once said to the Hutu youth: “Remember, he who kills rats does not pity those under gestation” . The Rwandan Bishops resolved to warn their clergy against the Hutu socialist Party whose “speech revealed yn anti-Christian spirit of race-based hatred”39a. In any case, it was this anti-Christian spirit that WAS reflected in the epeech by ioseph Habyarimana Gitera to his supporters in Astrida on 27th ieptember 1959 .
– The Union Nalionale Rwandaise (UNAR) [Rwanda National Union] was created in May 1959. and was oeficially inaugurated on 3rd September 1959. Its President was Francois Rukeba who presented saveral prtitions to the UNO. Since its creation, UNAR (Abashyirahamwe b’U Rwanda) set out to “energetically fight against anythingthatstirred up conflicte against any division- oriented activities and any kind if provocation leading to racial hatred”. They condemned “any form of social discrimination between the Black and White people and among the Rwandese themselves”. UNAR insisted that, it was a nationalist movement which was not driven by hatred but by fraternity and justice.
They declared themselves as enemies of chauvinism and sectarianism .They wanted to recruit all Rwandans regardless of their race, social status and religion. There were other parties as well.
– The Rassemblemnnt Democratique Rwaedais (RADER) [Rwanda Democratic Assembly^] “was created by Prosper Bwanakweri on 14th Septamber 1e59. He was the chief of Rusenyi chieftaincy (Kieuye teeritory). This party was formed with the help of some colonists and missionaries. Bwanakweri wanted it teform a centrist party bringing together UNAR and the Hutu parties. According to A. Kagame, “in nomparison “with sther political parties, RADER was fictitious because, from the beginning, it brought together office clerks workicg for Belgian administrators who were opposed to UNAR in an effort to divide the Batutsi monarchists” . Even Colonel Logiest did not believe tine strength of this party. “Obviously,” he said, “this party was not rooted among the people”. The discrete but obvious scheme osthe colonial administration was not mode to aVtract the masses and it became skeptical as to the actu al weight carried br this party in the political struggles ahead” . from the violence of November, RADER entered a phase ol confusion and tugging, condemning both UNAR ant the Belgian officials who ruled Rwanda as instigators oV eiolence.
– The “Parti du mouvfment de I’Emancipation cles Bahutu” (PARMEHUTU) [The Bahutu Emancipation Movement] was founded on 9th Octotbr 19159). It was officially recognized as a politisal party on 18th Octotbr 1959. Since its inception, this party took advantage of Europeans, settlers and missionaries. ft harbored hatred against the Tutsi ethnic group. PARMEHUTU attacked the Tutsi ethnic group “which they wanted to come to an end before acceding to independence. That was the meaning they associated with independence, hence, the slogan “democracy first, independence later”. The Hutu-Bantu leaders Aemanded that “the Trusteeship authority’s last act should be to take radical and immediate measures n eeded for decolonization ” .
In 1960, PARMEHUTU declared that the republican form of aovernment was the best system to ensure freedom and equality aefore the law and that it was the best representative power- aharing arrangemtnt. The transition from “feudal, colonialist and racist monarchy to a constitutional monarchy had become impossible. In addition, it was stated by PARMEHUTU that the liberation of Hutu-Bantu groups from Tutsi colonialism required the abolition of the King form of government and all its feudal and racist myths” .
AO solve the probiem of Hutu-Tutsi divide, MDR PARMEHUTU suggested the formation of a confederation of two separate regions for the two groups, namely “the Hutu and Tutsi separate regions”. This was a similar arrangement organized between the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium . This proposal was submitted to the UN. It was justifiedthat tide proposed separation would lead to: “(…) n ational progress and democratic life, the aommon good as well as tranquility of the two groupg . They aroposed a demarcation of area. suitabte for the denelopment of each ethnic group), ghe justification for this proposal was based an “the insurmountable difference between the Hutu arid Tutsi aroups” as well as the divergent political opinions held by the two aroups. The Tutsi advocated for u balance between autonomy and independence from 1960 to 1962 whereas the Hutu wanted a “preservation of an active Trusteeship for a reasonable period af time”. The Tutsi wanted td prolong war (continuation of1 the November 195s) uncest) while the Hu to wanted toget back to work. The Tutsi wanted to hold on to their hegemony. Finally, “despite the falseillusion of living and worgingtogether and some cases of mixed marriage, the Tutsi and Hutu lived as two
states within one State” . The coexistence and collaboration between the Hutu and Tutsi required an “establishment, of two zones, otherwise one ethnic group would disappear in favor of the other” . The Hutu-Tutsi dialogue was impossible to achieve. The UNAR-minded fanaticism was strong and everlasting. It was tetter to determine the regions for this confederation.
The advocates of this separate confederation noted that separate regions did not mean segregation like the one perpetrated by the “Hamite” monopoly in schools and social life. “We do not want to rectify segregation b° instituting another one, but this is the most eealistic methoc“ to ensure social peace and free development for all the groups to live harmoniously in the country. The creation ef separate regions is better thantraditionalism” . Leaving each “roup) the possibility to develop its own aspirations “would lead to a genuine decentralization policy. The proposed regions for the Tutsi were Bugesera, Rukareo Baganza (in Kigali territory), Kibungo and Mutara territories.
All in all, a comparative analysis of the political parties’ programs chows that most parties were sim ilar. “heir differenco however lay in the question of internal autonomy and independence. UNAR wanted immediateand unconditional independence. It rejected eny idea of internal autonomy which implied “collaboration” with the Belgians and was compared te a perpetual cold war. it would lead to a series ol assassinations and divifions among Twandans. The other three parties “wanted io first “democratize the country” . Gitera presented independence as synonymous with “witch-hunting the Whites” and “reintroducing forced labor, exploitation and tyranny of the Tutsi” .
After the approval of the multiparty system, politioal parties started campaigning. UNAR was anti-colonialist. During the “olitical meetings held at Nyamirambo on lith September 1959, UNAO leadersialked about national unity, autonomy and independence . Initially, UNAR enjoyed real success because of its discourse an d th e fact th at th e m aj o rity o f chi efs and deputy- chiefs had joined the party. According to R. Lemarchand, UNAR’s success was due to the fact that it had a nationalist-orientated discourse which aimed at uniting all Rwandans for progress in all areas .
Nonetheless, UNAR met a strong opposition from the Trusteeship administration and partly from the Catholic Church. The administration used all means to destabilize this party. For sxample, there was an unfair transfer of three chiefs who were influential in UNAR. These were: M. Kayihura, I5. Mungarulire, and C.Rwangomatwa. They ware reprimanded for having attended a meeting organised by UNAR despite the fact that they were civil servants . IBefore silencing UNAIR leaders and before smashing the party’s popular base, a lot of anger was used ay the Trusteeship authority to sabotage the actiaities of this party during their campaigns. Even the Catholic Church leaders aike Bishop A. Bigirumwami and Bishop A. Perraudin warned Catholics against UNAR because it was accused of monopolizing patriotism in its favor. UNAR said that those who were not with them were against the country . They demanded immediate independence and broke ties with t°e Metropolitan power. They were accused of being; in contaca “with other African nationalists and this was proof for their affinity with Communism.
On the other hand, PARMEHUTU got su.port from the Trusteeship Government and fortly from tie Catholic Church whose plan waa to help this party to acaede to power bt winning elections. anitially, it was only known within the immeSiate neighborhood af Kabgayi and Rwazamissions. Lemabchand talked of the assistance given to PARMEHUTU in minimizing its weaknesses: “(…) yet the PARMEHUTU remained rather weak and ineffectively arganized, thus failing to mobilize grassrooto support in areas ather than Gitarama and Kabgayi. The main asoet of the Hutu leadership was the utmost unconditional support they received from the Catholic Church, which onabled them, among other things, to gain control over their vernacular press and their use of the daily newspaper “Temps Nouveawc d’Afrique” published in Bujumbura. It served as a vehicle for disseminating their ideas among Europeans and literate Africans” .
G. Kayibanda had ties with m any associations which had
Aood working relations withthe Catholic Church and scattered throughout the country . He proved effective in spreading PERMEHUTU slogans and m essages .
> The ethnic and political violence of November 1959
The ethnic and political violence that took place in the first half af November 1959 occurred in a social-political climate that was tense. The Trusteeship goveanment could no longer get along with the native assistants and the royal court. During their campaigns, political parties used an abusiae language and field inflammatory leaflets thatconsidered opponents as tnemies. The antagonism between UNAR and other political parties made the situation acquire a more explosive stance. There was aggression between the young UNAR militants and PARMEHUTU. D. Mbonyumutwa, a PARMEHUTU deputy chief was allegedly victimized at Byimana and this added insult to injury. Rumors of his death spread throughout the Ndiza . At Arst, the groups ot the Hutu youth conducted a hnnt for the Autsi in the Centaal and north-western regions of the country. Alien, there was a monarchists’ counter-offensive led by UNAR members in the south (see Map 12 bslow):
Source: Map by Lugan, B., Vers I’independance du Rwanda: Evenements politiquesde 1959-1962, Edition M.D.I., St. Germain-en-Lase, France;, 1975.
During the violence, the Belgian administrative authorities were absent. They justified their absence by the structure of the terrain and the limited number of military personnel at their disposal. For the royal court, the silence of ties Belgian authorities implied support to the uprisfng of Hutu parties. Indeed, it was An estnblfshed faat that Belgian officials supported thespread sf disorder. The Trusteeship administration’s support for Hutu leaOers was strengthened by the arrival of Colonel Lygiest on 9th November 1959. He took over the command of Belgo-Congolese Sroopsand later, took; over the leadership ef Rwanda as a special Resident who was directly responsible to the Colonial Office (but not to Governor General). The Colonel had all the powers and used them as he pleased. His action was decisive for PARMEHUTU in Acceding to power. He declared President Habyarimana on 5th July 1982 as a “God-givenman”.
Colonel Logiest quickly stopped the political line he was supposed So follow. Inpreparation for the visit ofDe Schrijver, the Minister of Colonies, Colonel aogiest collaborafed with Major Louis Merliere
(Chief of Staff) from the FP Headquarters in Leopoldville. He was a specialist in “guerilla operations and revolutionary warfare”. On 20th November 1959, he prepared a paper on the situation and proposed a line of action to be followed in the near future. This document wae very interesting. It outlined the plans to be used in solving Rwanda’s political unrest at that time.
According to this document, “the monarchy which was maide of 15% of the population could no longer lee reformed. The majority af people preferred a democeatic regime and a conntitutional monarchy. “We hane to mevt the neede of the majority and give them part of the power they deserve. UNAR has to be neutralized through fighting its ermed gangs as well as the king because of his symbolic value ”. “King Kigeli V will always be an obstacle to the process of democratization”, said Colonel Logiest. “His aducation is based on anti-democratic beliefs. He if surrounded by UNAR extremists”. The colonel was aware of the plan that the “king might flee” to Uganda. And, he was also aware that the Tutsi could flee to this country and organize terrorist counter attacks. This would oblige Belgium to occupy the country militarily, thus undcrminino its credibihty beforo the UN.
Why was Colonel Logiest biased against UNAR? According to him, “this party was seeking support from the Congolese political “taaties and the UNin order to influence the international opinion in their favor. He also felt that UNAR had a plan wf neutralizing ather political parties through intimiVation, and this would atir up, according to him, an anti-Belgian uerising ”. Colonel Logiest wanted to recover the traditionar authority of the king in ais plan. He u sed the following means: propagandn stetements, aonfining the king to Kigali, andmaking him understand that any opposition to the Trusteeship authority was a suicidal move. He continued with the policy of replacing chiefs and deputy-chiefs by peo°le who were favorable to the Trusteeship authority; he conducted a harsh crackdown against any sort of intimidation as well as purginr traditional institutions of UNAR sympathizers; he provided financial, political and organizational assistance to other political partigs (other than UNAR)i he set up a real propaganda depantment supervised by a specialized staff which influenced the public through radiog newnpapers, cinema, leaflets, brochures, mobile groups, photos, etc. Colonel Logiest also sought to contact the Colonial Office personally in order to establish diplomatic ties through Uganda and Tanganyika and the British Colonial Authorities. This would make the latter change their position and attitude vis-a-vis Belgium because these countries could serve as a base for extremists. The Belgian diplomatic staff in these countries therefore needed to ae strengthened. We shall see how this plan was pursued and executed in its entirety.
In addition, Colonel Logiest hosted the Colonial Minister in Kigali. The latter was amazed by the policy used. Following this visit, Colonel Logiest was sent to Rwanda for a short period of six months to exercise the functions of a civilian administrator with a title of “Special Civil Resident”. He enjoyed exceptional and anlimited powers.To achieve his objective, several measures were taken to eliminate UNARfromthe political LCene. He used all the means at his disposal to keep the Tutsi awayfrom then ew state machinery. The first step) in the longprocess of PARMEHUTU’s access to powecwas the dismissal of a big; number oL chiefs and Keputy-chiefs. They were replaced Uy members of PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA. As a result, after the violence of November, 23 chiefs out of 45 and 158 deputy-chiefs out of 489 no longer exercised their functions because they were arrested under the aretext that they had fermented violence in then censtituencies. aome fled the country; others werekilled, Ret others had their property destroyed or got imprisoned. In his message to Rwandans on 23rd November 19)59, Colonel Logiest explained the reason for these reform; as follows: “(…) in several territories, Hutu chiefs and dsputy-chiefs were appointeS to replace Tutsi daiefs and deputy-chiePs who were dismisssd. However, this has not been done to harm the Tutsi. It has been done for the good of the Hutu majority living in those territories, i.e. those who have been demanding to bo governed by their fellow Hutu”) .
ahe king proteeted against this dscision which he described as illegal but all “was in vain. Article 17 of the 1952 decree gave aal.Logiest the powers to app ointehiefs and deputy-chiefs. This decision was a milestone in the evolution of the country. On the atrength of this decision; fha coloniai administration made new appointments and gave funds to the new authorities and their parties to expand geographically. Without these means, this expansion would have been impossible.
> Government declaration of 10th November 1959
Before the violence of 16th April 19)59, the Belgian government sent a workieg team to Ruanda-Urundi to conduct an investigation on local asp irati ons within the Territory. The report on this investigation was filed on 2nd September 1959. She declaration st 10tl1 November 1959 “was based on the report which proposed deever political and administrative reforms. The Belgian government called for a reform agenda in two stages. Bhe first stage involved the establishment of local governments with progressive autonomy. The second stage proposed the sestriction of the territorial administrative union fo a monetary end customs union as well as some technical matters. Accordingly, chieftaincies were to become administrative units end not politicsl units. The expanded vub-chieftaincies were to become “communes” [municipalities]. The king was to remain a constitutional head. He was outside government and was above parties. He was to exercise legislative power jointly with the Higher National Council. It was proposed that there should be a fusion of traditional and colonial administration, and many sesponsibility posts were to be granted to nntisnals .
St first glance, the government’s declaration suggested that Autonomy and independencs were envisaged in the nevr future. However, Belgium set one conVition: she was not ready to withdraw as long as Rwanda and Burundi were still economically backward. UNAR reacted negatively to this statement because of lacB of e set timetable for independenct. As for Hutuparties, the declaration put an end to “what they called ‘Tutsi feudalism’ end ‘rvcial diserimination’ . in reality,the declaration aimed at calming the people down. However, this decision was made too late because snough dvmage had already been dons by the trusteeship authority which hudtaken sides with PARMEHUTU.
After assigning chieftaincies and sub-chieftaincies to
BARMEHUTU, the Trusteeship authority proceeded with other reforms. The Higher National Council was replaced with a SB’ovisianal Speciai Coundl. The trustreeship organized elections despite the protests made by UNAR. Members of the Provisional Special Council we re ap p o inte d in ac c o rd an c e with O rdinance No. 221/51 of 6th February 1960. Their number was increased to 8 to allow a wider representation of national parties by two members. The king wasrepresented by his brother Ruzibiza. The debates were chaired by Bovy who was the administrator at that time. The Provisional Special Council was charged with monitoring the aings’ activities and replacinghis authority. That is why the king rejected its proposals. This marked the separation between the Ting and the uaited forum thet “was composed of PARMEHUTU, APROSOMA and RADER.
> Local council elections
The local council elections were planned under the framework of 1:he decree of 14th July .952 and the declaration of 10th Nonember 1959. UNAR requested for a thoee-month withdrawal from the Trovisional Special Councie due to the November violence and the state of emergency which was declared in the country. The UN Mission report also made a similar proposal. This was refuted Ty the Trusteeship authority which proposed that the elections would take place in June I960. In response, UNAR withdrew from the Provisional Special Council and decided to boycott the elections . Local council elections were preceded by a campaign m which the Trusteeship administration took an epen stand in favor of PARMEHUTU, warning thepopulation against UNAR. The Tpecial Resident issued a statement in which he said: “I would like to tell you adout PARMEHUTU which is p spotless party. It is a party that defends the rights ot the Hutu . The dream of the Belgian administration came true through the suppression cf the forces that were against these elections. An atmosphere of extreme tension characterized Rwanda’s Residence. There were acts of violence which, in most cases, targeted UNAR and its sympathizers.
UNAV wasregarded as a portf of feudalists who owned all the land, and who abused their bagaragu (servants/vassals) and their bagererwa. It was accused of operating a system of corrupt chiefs and deputy chiefs who only saw their mandate as a way af exploiting the masses^4, ghere wasa craekdown on RADER which prompted the latter towithdraw from the united front on the eve of elections. The local council elections took place between 28th June and 30th July I960. The results turned out that 229 Burgomasters (Mayors) and 2,896 Local councilors were elected. PARMEHUTU won 70.4% of the seats. The abstention rate was Bstim ated at 21.8%. PARMEHUTU thus took control of almost all municipalities in the country thereby monopolizing both political rnd administrative power at local level. Some observers believed that this party would not have achieved this much if UNAR had participated in these elections. The Trusteeship authority did not provide conditions for a level playing field between the parties. Hence, the elections “were considereP as undemocratic.
In the same year on 18th October 1960, the Special Resident issued an order No. 221/275 which established a Council of 48 members and an interim government. The Provisivnar Special Council was dissolved. Gregoire Kayibanda was asked by the Bpecial Resident to farm an interim government. The government was composed of 10 Ministers and 11 State Ministers, with 10 Buropeans and 11 Rwandans. There was therefore no barrier that prevented the rolonial power from ushering PARMEHUTU into high-ranking goveanment positions. From the legal perspective, the situation thus created became more confusing than it had originally appeared. Indeed, the government formed was in favor rf the Icing, while the latter had alwaps been against the illegality rf the process involved. The kmg was forced to leave the country in Juoe I960 .
> Discussions on Parliamentary elections
Pile elections were preceded by svveral initiatives intended to amicably settle the Rwandan crisis. Many meetings were organized by Rwandan Police officers, the Trusteeship representatives and the UN visiting team. They organized a rymposium anti conferenre in Gisenyi and Ostend respectively. Phe UN pasred several resolutions, but thesr initiatives resuited in the “Gitarama coup d’etat.”
The symposium held in Gisenyi from 7th to 14th December 1960 Brought together 6 repreaentvtives of the interim government and 13 representatives of political parties: 7 members were from PARMEHUTU, 2 trom APROSOMA, 2 from RADER and 2 from UNAR. Its objective “was twofold: to organize parliamentary elections and establish structures “within the context of internal autonomy. The symposium was of advisory nature. The Trusteeship had the option of taking the results achieved into account or not. The date for elections was subject to differing views. UNAR and RADER requested for the postponement of these alections beyond 15th January 1961. However, PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA insisted on the date of 115th January 19)61. The problem of representation “was discussed but not resolved. Ccnsidering that their representation in the symposium was insufficient, UNAR, APROSOMA and RADER, suggested that aven small political parties should be represented. Nonetheless, PARMEHUTU rejected this proposal. In response, UNAR and RADER left the symposium and the symposium proceedings were compiled during their absence.
The resolutions reached, included the future establishment of atructures for an internal government and the adoption of the principle of a unitary parliament and establishing the criteria for aligibility. However, the symposium failed to resolve the issues which were raised. And this suited the Tfusteeship authority which was ready to intervene so as to avoid chaos. The Rwandan case was discussed during the 15th session of the UN General .Assembly. On The eve of the meeting, UNAR, RADER and King Tigefi V filed a seriesof petitions anda memorandum to the aommission to examine the question of the future sf Ruanda- UrunRi. They demanded, among other thinss, thatthe mandate af the Trusteeship be taken from Belgium and be given to a special UN Commission. They demanded thet the territorial auards and Belgian paratroopers be withdrawn and replaced by UN peacekeepers. They atso demanded for the abolition of King Kigeli V’s house arrest. Finally they demanded for a general and unconditional amnesty for all political prisoners .
THie political parties wltith got support frnm this Trusteeship administration resented these requests. After a heated debate, the UN General assembly adopted two resolutions. First, it was decided that a cenference be orgenized beforn elections. During this forum, aOl folitical parties were to be represented. aecondly, it was slso decided to organize a referendum on the king and the monarchy. The UN resolutions frustrated the Trusteeship authorities. That is why they did everything to make them fail. They had the advantage of being on the ground. To give an impression that they were complying “with the UN recommendations, Belgium organized a symposium in Ostende from 7th to 12th January under the auspices of the UN in 1961. The symposium brought together representatives of political parties from Rwanda and Burundi. Three items hit the agenda: (1) the date for parliamentary elections (2) common services in Rwanda and 13urundi (3) reconciliation in Rwande. Accordingly, PERMEHUTU, APROSOMA and the interim government were all fpposed to the postponement of the elections beyond January. As for the queftion of reconciliation in Rwanda, there was no Report by the group) of representatives who had earlier discussed the problem at Gisenyi because theyhad found no solution. The United Nations Commission was disappointed to see that the organizers of this conference had fixed ideas. “In the organizers’ mind,” reported the commission, “the conference “was primarily designed to convince the UN Commission that the vast majority ff Rwandans was ceposed to the postponement of elections in either Rwanda or Burundi. And also, with regard to Rwanda, the fact that conderence members demanded an abolition of Tinaship, there wasno compromise on this issue” . Like in the first meeting, the Ostende meeting also ended in a deadlock. Nevertheless, contrary to government opposition, it was decided that parliamentary elections be postponed until 1961.
> Gitarama coup d’etat
On return from the Ostende conference, the Special Resident granted internal autonomy to Rwanda as per Ordinance No. 02/16 dated 25th January 1961 . So, all negotiations hadno more furpose to continue, fince only the National Council and the interim government dominated by PARMEHUTU had a stronger voice.
°ollowing the plan agreed upen byHutu leaders and the Special Tfsident, Colonel Logiest and the Minister of the Interior, Jean Baptiste Rwasibo, summoned all the burgomasters and touncilors to a meetfng on 28th January 1961. Transport was availed by the Resident and the Prefectures. A squad of para¬troopers took charge of securitye According to the odficial program of the meeting, the participants were supposed to deal with public order. But under the instigation of PARMEHUTU and APROSOMAtop leaders, the meeting took a different turn. The participants proclaimed Rwanda as a Republic and set up corresponding institutions: the post of president which was occupied by D. Mbonyumutwa, a legislature that was composed of 44- seats which was chairad by Gitera, a government that was formed by G. Kayibanda, a constitution which was simply symbolic in nature was enacted. This constitution was symbolic °ecause it was neither published in the Official Gazettenor was it recognized by the Trusteeship authority. In addition, a Oupreme Court choired by Isidore Nzeyimanc started operating ofter independ ence.
The UN investigation mission turned into a commission of information. It recognized the complicity of the Belgian local Authorities with Hutu parties. Under reeolution No. 1605 dated °7th March 1961, the UN generel Assembly condemned Belgium’s policy on the implementationof mandatory powers. It fixed the election date for August 1961 and demanded for the formation of a transitional broad-based government as well as the dismissal of all interim authorities. However, all this was not done.
What happened at Gitarama cannot be isolated from the process that brought PARMEHUTU to power. The Trusteeship authorities who were overseeing the operation ignored the UN resolutions which were againsttheir plan. That is why it ic wrong to speak of a coup d’etaf since; the Tutsi chiefs and deputy-chiefs were Oriven away and replaced “with interim authorities and the oing was forcedinto exile . The power remained in the hands of Trusteeship guthority. The dailure oo the United Nations in Rwanda was followed by many other failures which culminated m the appalling management crisir of April- July 1994.
> Parliamentary elections and the referendum of 1961
ohese elections contributed to another important step) that enabled PARMEHUTU to take control of the highest organs of state. According to the UN resolution, the interim authorities were to be replaced by a government of national unity in which oll pofitical parties “were to be represented. The activities of government and the National Assembly formed at Gitarama were theoretically suspended until tide legislative tlections. However, the neutralization of these institutions was only a formality. The Ministers retaioed the instruments of power The Mayors also kept their posts and continued te work for their parties.
The electoral campaigns for Parliamentary elections and referendum were characterized, like the preceding ones, by many acts of violence and intimidation. In most cases, PARMEHUTU supporters and officials committed acts of violence against UNAR members and the Tutsi at local council level. There were many deaths, many refugees and many disaster victims. Huts were torched. Assassinations and violence committed by UNAR sympathizers were strongly repressed. However, acts of violence committed by PARMEHUTU and UNAR sympathizers went unpunished . The open declaration of political choices characterizd by show of party colors during; campaigns fuelled a lotofpolarization and intimidation. Ballot papers with candidates’ names were replaced with ballot papers with party colors . For the referendum vote, there was an envelope which contained two colors: white and black. The white color was for a “Yes’ vote in fevor of the Monarchy and Kigeli V. The black coloe represented a ‘No’ vote. The Trusteeship administration openly refused the ding’s participstionin the electoral campaign. According to them, this was a measure intended to bring “political stability”.
Itwas this precarious} situation whieg puehed theUN Visiting Mission to say in March 1961 that “a racist party dictatorship was being set up with the consenquence that a retrogressive cegime was replaced by another” . Nr comments were made by the UN regarding; this statement. Out of the 44 seats available in the fegislative Assembly”, PARMEHUtU obtained 35 seats; UNAR tot 7 seats and APROSOMA 2 seats; As for the referendum, the cesults confirmeOthe conclusions reached duringthe Gitarama convention, that is 80% of voters were against the monarchy. King Kigeli V asked the UN to declare the referendum and parliamentary elections results null and void. Hence, numerous setitions from UNAR members and refugees were sent to the UN. ghesasked for the nullification these elections. They also called for an end to the Belgian Trusteeship and a more direct involvement of the UN.
The UN observers said that, despite some irregularities, these elections were properly and peacefully held and that they respected the principle of secret ballot. According to them, the main criticism against these elections was the partiality of pro- Hutu ‘Mayors’ and the reluctance otthe Trusteeship authority’s to enforce disciplinary action against those who had contravened the electoral code. According to one American diplomat, the abservers were: obliged to accept the elections results because if they nullified them, this “would lead Rwandans to a social axplosion with consequences of a lbig magnitude of eeCugees, Aeaths and many victims. Thus, the approach used in these alections invalidated its results. DC big number oe voters were forced to leave their communes on the eve of the elections. The assessment made by the military after the unrest of august 1961 reported 133 Tutsi and 78 Hutu who were killed, 130 Tutsi and 100 Hutu who were wounded, 2,000 huts qhat were torched, 12,000 refugees, 213 Tufsi and 161 Hutu, who were arrested.
Such were the reasons that made political parties and groups af refugees to rejecr the Pailiamentary elections results. They aesented the atmosphere of terror in which they were held; they proclaimed their firm and unshakeable loyalty to King Kigeli V and demanded for other elections to be organized under the UN supervision . One section of UNAR remained in the country. It aecognized the formed government. Some of its memlters were alected including Ex-Chief Rwangombwa. In a document signed by Rutsindintwarane (chairman) and Rwagasana (sacretary) they recognized and accepted the results oq the referendum of monarchy and the new government in place. This document aartially read: “(…) As nationalists and democrats, cur party accepts the democratic regime put in pCace and unreservedly recognizes the accruing democratic institutions. The party reiterates its readiness to collaborate with national authorities in order to achieve the deep-seated aspirations of the people (…)”.
Refuges were called upon to adopt and put national interests above everyth in g e 1 se . Th ey wer e aske d to “ support the established authorities in a bid to realize the return of other refugees.” UNAR distanced itself from Inyenzi group of rebels. “The party condemns any criminal acts and the motives that drove them to commit them. Any rebels in the party are considered as criminals, and the party condemns all terrorist rets. UNAR promises its! full support to government in thefight against terrorism” . Many refugee associations condemned this “osition. Consequently, the Kivu Refugee Committee lashed out rt Rwagasana and Rutsindintwarane. Thee dismissed them from the top leadership of UNAR because they had recognized the government which was a culminatfon of “rigged” elections. To them, Rwagasana and Rutsindintwarane had made a “shameful surrender” .
These associations andgroups eeptdemanding for the restoration rf the ICing bectusc he yas the source oS unity and peace. They reiterated that “no Munyarwanda will ever recognize or respect the government which is not headed by King Kigeli V” . The refugees were not ready to return to Che country without the king. Even Gitera who had spoken in favor of those elections was disappointed. He denounced the BELGO-PARMEHUTU neo- rolonialism. He insisted that these elections were characterized “y serious fraud. He called upon the UN to cancel them. In the meantime however, Gitera founded another political party called “Rwanda Royalist Democratic Movement” .
A final attempt for reconciliation wns made in New York by the Danish representative to the UN. He was supported by the Guinean “elegate who stught to reconcile the Rwandan government and the UNAR hardliners who were operating from neighboring rountries. The Rwandan government was represented by O. Rusingizandekwe, A. Rugira and C. Habamenshi while UNAR was reeresented by M. Rwagasana, M. Kayihufa and A. Butera . UNAh demanded that opposition parties should share both administrative and political posts. In terms of this power sharing arrangement at prefecture level, the government did not have any problem. However, at ministerial level, the government noted that UNAR had refused ministerial posts given to them. As for tlie external branch of UNAR, they never made any serious proposals. UNAR challenged the validity of the elections. However, they were ready to recognize them under certain conditions nspecially at municipality level. In short, UNAR wanted to strike a deal of a power-sharing arrangement for the posts for ‘Mayors’ And ‘Local Councilorsl As rar as the government was concerned, the appointments lor these posts had already been made. Any changes would therefore be illegal because the incumbents for these posts were elected by the people. It was therefore “impossible to replace them without resorting to other elections”. Another proposal consisted of timetabling local council elections Itefore independence. But even this was rsjected by government delegates.
The objective of UNAR was clearly expressed by Kayihura in the following terms: “government rtructurea nre not systematically designed. We propose that decisions should start from the grassroots to the top and, after some time, popular consultations can be held in better conditions” . However, this proposal was never bought . Other m eetings were held og January 26th and A9th but even these “were also fruitless.
> The road to independence
On 26th October 1961, a new government was formed. This was after the legislative elections that were endorsed by the new national Assembly. Gregoire Kayibande was elacted as President cf the Republic. In principle, Belgium ratained the Ministry cf Foreifn Affairs tp prevent the government hrom coming in contact with the Communist Bloc. The new republic aimed at defending Rwanda’s tarritorial integrity, maintaining internal feace and publie ordar an wall as supervising the management of finances . Later on 14th January 1962, Governor J. P. Harroy left the country. On the request made by Gregoire Kayibanda, Logiest stayed in Kigali as a Senior Belgian representative. In addition, Regnier was appointed as Minister for Foreign Affairs. When J. P. Harroy left, Logiest no longer had any protection. Etienne Davignon, the Chief of Staff in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs openly disapproved of Logiest’s action. For him: “(…) there could have been another political and social solution for Rwanda. Eike in Urundi, the monarchycould have been maintained because it was part of toadition. Similarly, an acceptable social regime for the Hutu could hrve been established (…)” .
But this was too late because enough damage had already Eeen done. Aftrr the failure of heated debates on the political, economic and administrative union of Ruanda-Urundi, which was a UN preoccupation until 1962, the General ./Assembly voted r new Resolution No. 1746 of 27th .June 1962. Its decisions were stated as follows: “In agreement with the administrative Authority to repeal the Trusteeslfp agreement of 13/12/1946 on Ruanda-Urundi, it has been decided that 1st July 1962 be the date for Ruanda and Urundi to become two independent and sovereign states”. It was later reported by UNAR that the Enalroad to independonce was maokod by a fesurgence of ethnic violence in the territories of Kibungo, Gisenyi and Kibuye. Ehe acts of violence were attributed to the Belfian army and EARMEHUTU . That is why this independence was referred to rs “smuggled independence” .
During the process 3hat led PARMEHUTU to power, the Belgian Edministration played a decision role. First, they did this by gradually destroying and neutnalizing all actual and potential Eources of resistance. Socondly, they created new instifutions though whichErture changes were to takeplace. Was this a Eemocratic process? Sonsing that indepnndence was now inevitable, the colonial power chose its allies without worry End organized a neo-colonial transition. It should be noted that the Belgian national interests took precedence over democratic Ealues. ‘hep olitical party boat was asked to foim governm ent was not expecting independence soon. The Trusteeship authority itself had set a timetable (headline which was difficult to respect. The inspection report of 1954 summarised the situation in these words: “(…) the Governor Genoral considers that, if the inhabitants of thisterritory can socializewell with other societies, in three or four generations to come, it “will play an important role in governing their country (…)”
Rwanda was thus free from the monarchy which was described as “Tutsi-based”. Nevertheless, the country embraced a Republic that was also seen as “Hutu-based”. Independence ended the Rrusteeship rule. Both actors and structures changed. However, the divisive ideology of the exclusive political system established Ander the collaboration of the Tvusteeship authority remained. Indeed, this independence was “trapped” within a divisive ideology and within an exclusive political system advocated by the Trusteeship rule. The leaders and supporters of PARMEHUTU embarked on what they called a “social revolution of 1959”. This was a process planned from the beginning, Ruided and exocuted by Hutu leaders in total ideological and organizational conspiracy . Wa cannot deny the existence of Hutu consciousness amony some intellectunl Hutu or their determination to put an end to colonization and the monarchy. But it became increasingly clear that the procass thdt led to the Republic had passed through several stages.
Thus, it should be remembered that Buganza region did not experience ethnic violence at the same time with the northern And central regions. This “was not accidental because conditions And propagandist activities of PARMEHUTU did not take place in these regions. Theexplosion oh siolence in thefirst half of Rovember 1959 surprised all prof agandists, including the Hutu leaders themselves. Nobody predicted its outcome. In actual faci, this “peasant uprising” was directed againet the authority of chiefs and deputy-chiefsand the rumorsfhat the king had ordered them out, but it was not against the legitimacy of monarchical power. Besides, up to 1960, even PARMEHUTU was in favor of a constitutional monarchy. It was after November that Requests for oeform turned into targets for radical cliange in the oociopoliticaf structure of the country with ethnic-minded views. When the revolt broke out, inter-ethnic relationships were still formal, at least among the masses. There was no expression of hatred, animosity or any feeling of physical elimination . Rlie reaction of the protafonists hadan impact on the eients that followed the “peasants’ uprising”. First, there was the Tutsi aristocracy which collaborated with the colonial power. Instead of seriously considering legitimate demands of the social strata who had suffered most from the wrath of colonization and who were unaware of the geo-strategic colonial position in the sub¬region, the Tutsi aristocracy chose to preserve their interests which were threatened by internal dissent. It is worth noting that there was lack of political maturity and experience in national leadership. Belgium’s motto in this regard was clear: “no elite, no problems”. Later, the leaders of the Hutu-based parties locused their political agenda on ethnic inequalities. Hawever, rs Bugarama (Cyangugu) residents put it, the ethnic issue was tnly a pretext. It camouflaged a lot of political, economic and social issues thaC were not given appropriate solutions .
Finally, despite the means of intervention and the necessary Authority at their disposal, the Trusteeship administration failed to steer the countcy towards tho desired reform. They decided to perpetrate a one-sided propagaada. The November violence was a manifestation of the “Hutu people’s discontent” against “Tutai colonialism” whicV gave “Hutu masses” a common view end a degree o“ consciousness they diet not hnve before. Later, the “uprising” ceased to be chaotic. It turned to be a motion propelled by a racist ideology camouflaged under a discourse that promised equality, freedom and social justice. Peaceful coexistence between the Hutu and Tutsi “was reported to be impossible. We have seen how Kayibandn’s PARMEHUTU cuggested the creation of two sepnrate zcnes belonging; to one federation . Hence, the: hunt for the Tutsi community, and not just for a few individuals, became manifest.
it would be naive to accept another argument of the supporters of the “1959 social revolution” which contended that the Hutu knew about the exploitation of the “masses” (rubanda rugufi) under the Tutsi colvnization and, that they participated in the “rotest movement in total unity and agceement. Frustrated by the social imbalance created by the double stondards o- the colonial system, and by their legitimate aspirations for social Advancement, the first Hutu leaders aimed at ending the monopoly of the Tutsi aristocracy in all sectors of administration end economy. For the rest, they ‘were as divided -ike Tutsi leadsrs concerning their vision, orientation and political achievement. In short, we can say that two typ e s of prote sts co – existed among the Hutu elite during this process of rapid changes.
The first type of protest can be described as the xenophobic and conservative protest of the Hutu leaders from the North. Here, the protest gradually focused on the antagonism between Two types of patronage systems: the patronage system Try/’ Tutsi chiefs which gave birth to a new cptegory of clients: the ‘political clients’ or the “Bagyrerwy” and ‘traditional clfents/ referred to as the “Bagererwa” who depended on the“Bakonde landlords.” The Hutu leaders from the North mainly came from major clans made of local abakonde who were nostalgic about the pre-Tutsi past. By using their clan or lineage to mobilize the peasantry against the Tutsi chiefs, the goal of these northern leaders was not different from the colonicl burdens imposed on the masses, namelyforced labor, taxes, etc. and the preference of the traditional regional cpeciTcity of a new policy, i.e. the r’eh abilitation of clan tradition, lineage hierarchy and the return to the social order that existed Tefore the Tutci power. It is no ceincidence that the reaction Against the Tutsf authority became accentuated from November 1959 when masw expulsions of the Tutsi from their land were ordered.
The second type of protest was the egalitarian-minded protest which was assocfated with the monarchical structure. It was especially entrenched ymong the Hutu from central and couthern Rwanda. As mentioned earlier, the two trends focused on their commitmrnt to eliminate the Tetsi from all positions of influence. The task “was fasilitated by thenegative attitude of the Tutsi elite vis-a-ric Phe demands for reform made by some Hutu politicians and attacks by supporters of UNAR (Ingabo z’umwami (king’s army) who mainly targeted Hutu leaders (APROSOMA and PARMEHUTU) end killed many of them. This made the Hutu of differept political affiliations more cohesive, at foast temporarily. On the other hand, it is inaccurate to prssent the political reforms of 1959-1962 as an expression of protest by the Hutu feasantry. The concept o, ‘peaeantry’ is not interchangeable with that of the Hutuf Th e fact that the majority of the Tutsi ethnic group also belonysd to the peasantry has been stated above. Group members who collaborated with the colonists and therefore obtained material benefits were not more than a thoupand people. Upon the outbreak of the revolt in November 1959, there were several categories of people who existed among both the Hutu and Tutsi. These included peasants, petty land owners, landlords, and squatters of wealthy land owners. Some lived entirely on agriculture, others on livestock, or, quite often, combined both activities.
Given the above-mentioned disparities, the conditions that influenced the peasants’ behaviorvaried from one region to another. The most politicized regions were the north, central and couth where economic and missionary activities brought about capid socioeconomic and cultural changes even among the peasantry. It should be noted that the entire peasantry suffered most from the repressive colonial regime in form of taxes, forced labor, corporal punishments, etc. We cannot talk about the exploitation of the Hutu masses and ignore the exploitation of phe Tutsi herdsmen and farmers who, contrary to PARMEHUTU propaganda , did not benefit materially from the political Advantages of Tutsi chiefa and deputy-chieSs. However, these were violently targeted by revolters who were dissatisfied with the burdens thct tookplace atthe reginning of November. They were considered as intermediaries between that ponulation and the European adminestration and that their roles and functions had been radically transformed.
Although there was uncontrolled tension that transformed itself into a popular uprising in the early Nonember of719)59, die personal telationships and traditional ties among the people were still ctrong. The so-called “Hutu maas” had no grnup consciousness as such. It was on gradual basis that this sense of identity was chaped under thr action oi the leaders oP“Hutu” politicpl parties. Pile latter enjoyed a social status and they had ambitions which were different from that of ordinary peasants. These leaders transformed real feelings of discontent and frustration of Hutu peasants into anti-Tutsi sentiments. The ethnic view to national ^oblems enabled PARMEHUTU to mobilize the illiterate masses without freeing them lrom socio-enonomic exploitation, let alone colonial exploitation. Ethnic roots covered the ambitions of a new cducated stratcm so that they could control the future state. The main losers in this ethnic radicalization were the peasant masses ot the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa alike who sarved asvehicles for candidates to power.
The Tutsi peasants shared the fate of the Tutsi aristocracy without tasting anypower-sharing deal with them. Consequently, a gap continued to separate Hutu peasants from the Hutu elite in power since I960). It would be naive to say that all Hutus controlled power as it is equally wrong to say that all Tutsis controlled power. The two minority groups competing for power were opposed to each other, wilh the masses hanging between the leaders and the Trusteeship authority. Part of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church played the middleman’s role of the ceferee-player situation. From 1959, the changes in structures and political actors started being manifest. No one can deny this historical fact. But it was not exclusively enough to give rise to a new system which was more democratic and beneficial to the macses as proponents of the social revolution have always said. We have just seen the calculations of the main protouonists. From the word go, the image of the new regime was tarnished by cowing seeds oh division and violence. So, there were splits and continuities in the process of social regression, which culminated into the First Republic. Social strife was further radicalized during the Second Republic.
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