We have seen in the previous
topic trends suggesting that policymakers outside the continent attach a low
priority to conflicts in Africa on the whole. This topic aims to investigate
why. The decisions of policy makers are formed, to a certain extent, according
to internal dynamics, but they are also subject to influences from other
actors.
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| Decision-making in Conflicts resolution |
Internal Dynamics
At the level of international
organisations, we can focus on the decision-making within the UN Security
Council and also on the agencies involved in providing humanitarian aid. We
have already discussed how the decisions of the Security Council are the result
of compromise and power politics among its members, but how does this work? The
five permanent countries on the Council have the power of veto, and thus can
unilaterally reject decisions that they feel do not serve their interests.
They
can even veto the placing of an item on the Council agenda for discussion.
There may also be a certain amount of behind-the-scenes ‘trading’ over issues, country A will allow an initiative of country B in return for country B
supporting an initiative raised by country A. Non-permanent members can also
wield some influence if their” diplomatic capabilities are strong, but
this can be difficult when their term is only two years.
Perhaps more
importantly, in the case of conflict in Africa, where there is a lack of
interest among members in general, it is extremely difficult to generate
support for timely and substantive initiatives. Without a dedicated leader to
raise the issue and see it through to the adoption of effective decisions,
issues simply do not rise up the agenda.
it is donors who decide how much money will be given to alleviate suffering in
a particular emergency, but it is the agencies that decide the amount of the
appeal. Although these appeals supposedly are determined based on needs
assessments, they appear to be, more often than not, supply driven rather than demand driven.
Major donors tend
to give large amounts of aid after political change that they wish to support,
hence the massive amounts of aid to Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq immediately
following regime changes seen as favourable to the donors. This is ‘good for
business’ for the aid agencies, who welcome the income for their activities.
Agencies are also sensitive to which emergencies are unlikely to attract
attention and funding, and therefore find themselves forced to draft
‘realistic’ appeals.
Some steps have been taken to improve this situation
somewhat, however, with the introduction in 2005 of the Central Emergency
Response Fund (CERF), which seeks to pool resources that are not earmarked or
responses to specific appeals, allowing OCHA greater freedom in responding to
neglected emergencies.
At a country level, decision-making mechanisms are highly
complex, and their nature depends highly on the individual country in question.
In general, the decision-making process in responding to conflict depends
largely on three main actors: the executive branch, the legislative branch, and
the bureaucracy. Their common mandate is to protect their own national
interest, though the perception of the actors of what exactly this entails may
be quite diverse. The level of power in each case depends on the political
system, the perceived importance of the issue and the level of agreement among
these actors. In some instances, the personal dedication to a particular cause
by an individual within these groups can have considerable influence.
Overall,
geopolitics is a major factor in much of the decision making of policymakers —
how important is a region strategically, and how much does it affect the
security and economic interests of the nation? The relatively high strategic
relevance of Africa during the Cold War saw a significant decline in the 1990s.
but it did not mean that all interest was lost.
There are a number of forces at
work in this regard: African oil makes up a significant part of Western
consumption (although it is concentrated in a few countries); the US desire to
contain hostile Sudan influenced much of its policies on the continent; France
feels a need to protect its influence and interests on the continent,
particularly from Anglophone domination; and China is expanding its trade
promotion to meet the needs of its growing economy. But because of the overall
decline in strategic relevance of the continent, most of the powerful states
appear content to remain on the sidelines as long as they can protect their
limited interests.
Relations with other states
also have an impact. Some policymakers may be pressured by other states to do
something in response to conflict. This may be because initiating states need
to attract the support of other states to improve the effectiveness of their
action, enhance the legitimacy of their position, or to reduce spread the risk
in the case that the results are less than desirable.
This may lead to a
‘bandwagon effect’, where others feel compelled to raise their voices or
participate in action of some form out of peer pressure. The reputation of
their state is an issue for policymakers. Policymakers are typically, however,
risk averse, and will be hesitant to engage in any action in which the risks
(to their troops, finances or reputation) are high. Thus, the low geopolitical
importance of Africa means that there is less incentive to be proactive.
Within national governments, there may
be significant divergence of views on how to respond to certain issues. While
ministries of foreign affairs have traditionally dominated issues of foreign
affairs, increasing globalisation has meant that more actors are becoming
involved and there are more channels for communication on issues of foreign
affairs. Executive policymakers may become targets of pressure from opposition
parties, from politicians with strong personal views, from ministries
(particularly foreign affairs and defense), and from government-run aid
agencies.
The ministry of defense may be willing to contribute troops to an
intervention in Africa, for example, but the foreign ministry, with other
priorities, may view this as a waste of resources, something that is more
trouble than it’s worth (Gordon, Miller and Wolpe, 1998: 16-17). The low
strategic interest means there is less cohesion in policy — it is more
difficult to build consensus for strategy and action within the branches of
government.
Media Influence
The media influence the
decision-making process of the policymakers because in many ways they form the
link between the policymakers and their constituencies. Rightly or wrongly,
policymakers tend to view the media as the mouthpiece of public opinion.
Policymakers considering a potential course of action in response to a conflict
will most likely consider the possibility of media support for such action
before making the decision.
attention on a single conflict and to utilise oversimplified and emotive
reporting that clearly identifies ‘villains’ and ‘victims’ (as we will see in
the following unit) also serves as pressure on policymakers to do something in
response to conflict, even where there may be no threat or benefit for their
own national interest. Where policymakers already have a clear policy set out,
they are likely to resist such pressure, but where there is apathy or clashing
opinions within the policymaking circle, the use of such sustained media
pressure is likely to have an effect.
But
pressure by the media to do something’ where there is no genuine interest, may
result in piecemeal ‘actions by policymakers designed simply to alleviate the
pressure, rather than actually contribute to conflict resolution. Such actions
may be largely for show, with little impact on the ground. Furthermore, even
though the media potentially have the power to force the policymakers to pay
attention to a particular conflict, they rarely exercise this power with
regards to conflicts in Africa (recent attention on Darfur is a rare
exception), so their influence is somewhat irrelevant in Africa.
Public Influence
In
procedural democracies (where the public has the power to punish and reward
politicians at election time based on their actions and their promises) the
public has influence over the policymakers through the ballot. But it is not only
at election time when they can exert this influence (although at election time
it may well be at its strongest).
The public can lobby, petition, or use other
forms of advocacy, to encourage their representatives to act in a certain way.
In large enough number they can even
demonstrate on the streets if they feel strongly enough about an issue. In the
case of a conflict or humanitarian crisis, the reputation of policymakers can
be damaged through public disapproval if they remain idle. Policymakers may look
not only at the levels of media coverage, but also at public opinion polls on
any given situation.
Among public actors, certain
interest groups may hold greater interest and greater power in influencing
policymakers. Such groups include ethnic or religion-based groups (diasporas), as well
as business lobbies. In the West, the Jewish lobby is particularly influential
in encouraging policies favourable for Israel, largely because of the amounts
of money it contributes to the campaign funds of politicians.
Lobby groups for
Africa are less organised and less powerful. Sometimes pressure may come for
action in opposite directions from different lobby groups. In the case of US
policies on Sudan, for example, Christian lobby groups were pushing for greater
pressure on the northern government to protect the Christian groups in the
south, but at the same time, oil companies were lobbying for a more
conciliatory stance to enable them to access oilfields in Sudan.
It is
difficult to pin down, however, how much influence the public in general on,
the policymakers, and conversely, how much the policymakers are influencing the
public by utilising and manipulating public opinion to their advantage. The
policymakers may also misread public opinion, especially if they are influenced
by powerful interest groups that may have the minority opinion. Furthermore,
public interest is more likely to be primarily concerned with domestic issues
rather than distant foreign conflicts. Foreign conflicts rarely become election
issues unless their own country is involved. Africa in particular is usually
seen as being distant from the interests of the Western public, unless they are
substantially galvanised by media attention.
Academic Influence
Academics also have the power to influence policy makers.
Experts in the field of international relations, politics and security (but
outside the government) may be commissioned to conduct studies on security
issues affecting their country or the interests of their country. They may
conduct workshops and conferences on particular topics that bring in both
academics and policymakers to debate on a particular foreign affairs topic.
Policymakers involved in foreign affairs are also likely to read journals, and
op-ed piece in the newspapers written by academics that are relevant to their
activities.
Perhaps more importantly,
specialists with academic backgrounds in international affairs are increasingly
being drawn in by bureaucracies and governments to serve as consultants,
advisors and other positions. Governments fund
think tanks to encourage research in certain areas that will benefit the
formulation of their policies. This gives academics a certain amount of
influence. As a result of this process, there are a number of high profile
policymakers who have come from academic backgrounds, including Sadako Ogata
(former head of UNHCR), Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, and Condoleezza
Rice (former and present US Secretaries of State).
Finally, policymakers may rise to positions due to
ambition for power and influence, but they are also concerned about their
legacy, i.e., how they, will be remembered in history (particularly during their
final terms in office). In this sense, it is not necessarily the active
influence of academics on policymakers, but more the role itself of academics
as the recorders of history that influences policymakers to attempt to
contribute to the resolution of international issues for which they will be
‘remembered in a positive light. The decision of former US President George Bush
senior to intervene in Somalia, and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s recent
rhetoric on Africa in general may be a reflection of such a concern for their
legacy.
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