Exploring Rwanda’s Second Republic: Progress and Paradox (1973-1994)

Join us as we delve into the history of Rwanda’s Second Republic from 1973 to 1994. This article explores the era initiated by Major General Juvénal Habyarimana’s coup, highlighting the economic growth, infrastructural improvements, and the political landscape characterized by a single-party system. We also examine the underlying challenges, including ethnic tensions and economic disparities, that led to the tragic Rwandan Genocide. Discover how this period of progress and contradiction shaped Rwanda’s history.

The Beginning of Rwanda’s Second Republic

On 5^th July 1973, the high command of the National Guard made a national declaration to the population. This declaration had the following points:

• Mr. Kayibanda is discharged of his duties as president of the Republic.
• Major general Juvenal Habyarimana will assume the constitutional prerogative of head of state.
• The government has been forced to retire and be temporarily replaced by a “committee for peace and national unity” composed of 11 officers and presided over by Major General J. Habyarimana, until total re-establishment of peace in the country.
• The national assembly is dissolved.
• Political activities are forbidden throughout the entire territory of the Republic. The various organs of the party are dissolved.
• Rights and liberties were guaranteed by the 24^th November constitution, with the exception of 10 articles which have been suspended.

This communique was signed by Major General Habyarimana, lieutenant-Colonel Kanyarengwe_, Major Nsekalije, Major Benda, Major Rushashya, Major Gahimano, Major Munyandekwe, Major Serubuga, Major Buregeya, Major Ntibitura and Major Simba. That team, called “Comrades of the 5^th July” was composed of members who hailed from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, apart from Major Aloys Simba from Gikongoro and Major Jean Nepomuscene Munyandekwe. That composition portrayed the existence of a north/ south conflict especially in the army. The above conflict was the underlying factor for the coup d’état.

On the occasion of that coup which was inspired by sectarianism, members of the committee justified their initiative in the following terms: “The higher authorities of the National Guard realized that internal peace “was compromised and that national unity was seriously threatened.” It was for that reason that the coup was described as a “moral revolution”.

In fact, national unity which was a matter of concern in several speeches at that time was first all about regional considerations, but the unity between the Hutu and Tutsi was significantly ignored. As far as many Tutsis were concerned, Kayibanda and PARMEHUTU was considered as absolutely evil, Habyarimana’s speech was full of hope. Nobody imagined that he was going to inherit the Kayibanda and PARMEHUTU’s ideology and the policies associated with it.

Creation and institutionalazation of MRND

Two years after the coup d’état, President Juvenal Habyarimana created the “Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement” (MRND). It was set up in order to fill the vacuum created by the dissolution of PARMEHUTU government on 5^th Duly 1975. MRND “was structured in the image of the “Movement Populaire de la Révolution” (M.P.R) of President Mobutu of Zaire. President Habyarimana justified the creation of MRND in these terms: “(….) We have decided to create a popular movement which is authentically revolutionary and democratic that brings together all national forces in the country without exclusion i.e. without any discrimination in terms of sex, religion, ethnicity, origin, profession or social condition”.

According to the MRND statute voted on 29th June 1983 by the National Congress, article 1 stipulates that: “there is only one political movement called “Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le Développement” (MRND). Article 2 defined the goals that were to be pursued as follows: to be pursued as follows: “to bring together the entire Rwandan people with the aim of organizing them politically in the best way possible, to unite, stimulate and intensify efforts of the Rwandan with the view of achieving development in the context of peace and unity in accordance with the program set in the movement’s manifesto”.

Article 9 obliged all Rwandese to be members of MRND. It stipulates: “all Rwandese enjoy full rights of membership to the Mouvement Revolutionaire National pour le Développement. They are known as militants and must conform to the statutes and regulations of the movement”.

Article 7 of the 1978 constitution specifies that: “( …) Le Mouvement Révolutionare National pour le Développement is a single political party beyond which no political activity can take place”.

It follows from the MRND statutes and the constitution designed by President Juvenal Habyarimana’s government that Rwanda was under a single party system and was also under a dictatorial regime. Indeed, MRND was identified with the state. Juvenal Habyarimana “was the President, founder of MRND, Prime Minister, Commander in Chief of the National Army, Minister of Defense and President of the Judiciary. Hence, the new President of the Republic cumulatively and concomitantly exercised both executive and legislative powers. Such a situation was detrimental to the image of the new regime.

On accession to power, the President announced that constitutional order would be re-established within five years. Having governed by decree, it become necessary to introduce a constitution. The Constitution of 20^th December 1978 was Assigned by three specialists namely the legal adviser in the Ministry of Public Service , the MRND legal adviser in the Ministry as well as the Vice – Dean of the law faculty at the Université Nationale du Rwanda (UNR).

The content of the constitution drew significantly from the 1962 constitution from which it borrowed many elements after adapting them to the political context of the day. The constitution makers were strongly inspired by the governing principals provided by the President of the Republic, the MRND central committee and the commission for political, administrative and judicial matters. In other words, the three constitution makers simply expressed in writing the wishes of the president of the Republic.

The constitution was approved during the December 1978 referendum. The text provided for a presidential term of five years with a possibility of re-election without exceeding two successive terms. The same constitution stated that in case of temporary or definite disability to exercise power, the President of the Republic would be replaced by the Secretary General of the ruling party.

And in case of simultaneous disability on Two of them, the post of President of the Republic was supposed to be occupied by a member of the central committee of MRND who would be elected by his colleagues. In order to avoid duplication of power between the President and that the MRND President, the 1978 constitution proposed the MRND President as the sole candidate to the presidency of the country.

The new constitution gave overwhelming powers to MRND and its president. MRND was henceforth enshrined in the constitution. Its organs became omnipresent in the entire life of the people and country

The 1978 constitution established a presidential structure with a very powerful executive, sometimes with clauses that seemed strange. Article 56, for example gave the President the power to be the supreme custodian of the constitution, a role which is normally played by the constitutional count. In addition, the President of the Republic was not directly accountable to CND. On the contrary, the ministers end permanent secretaries were answerable to the Parliament. In other words, the Members of Parliament could not question the President. The ministers were supposed to assume that responsibility before the CND. Incidentally, the President could dissolve the CND.

It should be noted that even if the President was answerable to CND, the latter could not threaten him since the ministers were all Members of Parliament who “were appointed and could be dismissed by the President. They could not in any way challenge their boss.

The legislature was linked to the executive. The judiciary was undermined in favor of the executive “with the suppression of the Supreme Court. Article 81, Section 2 provided that the President of the Republic was the Custodian of the Independence of the Judiciary.

By virtue of all these clauses, MRND became the center of all lower. The central government undermined democracy whereas excessive powers replaced the separation of powers. MRND did not take long: before it became an extra ordinary machinery of propaganda, expressing the wishes of its founder up to the remotest corners of the country as a result of its organs.

These ranged from the National Congress via provincial committees, congresses at district level extending to sectorial committees and then assemblies and committees at parish level. In order to consolidate its power and its grip) on the country, the MRND regime resorted to two methods of rural mass mobilization and recruitment of supporters in the entire country, These were communal work (Umuganda) and facilitation (gushyushya urugamba) both of which were inspired by the Salongo and JaEayonsa bands from Zaire’s MPR.

Communal work and facilitation were political instruments aimed at controlling the population and ensuring its support to the regime. During: the facilitation process, the founding °resident was idolized, praised and glorified with slogans like “Prezida fondateri, Ramba, sugira, sagamba, Tera imbere, turagushyigikiye!”. These slogans’ transcended, every where during such functions. The president was a cult leader of sorts.

That politics of controlling the population in order to ensure its allegiance only brought about rivalry. In 1980, a conspiracy against the regime led by Major Lizinde and his associates flopped. The coup plotters were tried by a tribunal which sat in Ruhengeri; they were condemned to death on 14^th July, 1982.

President Habyarimana pardoned them by changing their capital punishment to life imprisonment. Lizinde and many of his associates remained in prison up to 23^rd January, 1991, the day they were set free by an attack on their prison by the Inkontanyi Army. Luzinde and Biseruka joined their liberators .

The 1980 aborted coup resulted into a split of the holy union of the 4^th July, 1973 putchists. The division was between people from the northern part of the country (northern Ruhengeri and Gisenyi province) in general. In particular, the members from Habyarimana’s region occupied the best positions in the country in all fields, both in the private and public sectors.

Worsening of the crises

a. Ethnic and Regional Balance

Although the First Republic was established along lines of ethnic discrimination against the Tutsi, the Second Republic was basically made of Hutus who originated from the central and southern parts of the country. This policy established regional quotas according to ethnic groups. These quotas were based on the criterion of proportional representation according to population as far as education and employment in the public service and private sector were concerned. MRND radicalized this process.

In the speech its founding father on 1^st August 1.973 and during the 4^th MRND congress held on 29^th June 1983, he had this to say: “(…) it is understandable that admission to different schools will take into account the social, ethnic and regional composition of the Rwandan society”.

The so-called policy of “ethnic and regional balance” prevented the best performers to join the education field the army, the police and other posts which they deserved or wished to join. The policy marginalized the Tutsis as well as the Hutus from other districts apart from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri.

The table fellow illustrates regional inclinations in the admission process to government secondary schools in 1989 according to provinces.

Province	Places available according to population	Places allocated	Range
BUTARE	836	696	-140
BYUMBA	722	662	-60
CYANGUGU	461	443	-18
GOKONGORO	514	466	-48
GISENYI	649	1045	+396
GITARAMA	836	792	-44
KIBUNGO	501	425	-76
KIBUYE	468	412	-56
KIGALI	970	1005	+35
RUHENGERI	736	747	+ 11
Total	6,693	6,693	442-442=0

Admission to government secondary schools according to provinces in September 1989

Source: Uwizeyimana, L., Octobre ct Novembre 1990. Le Front Patriotique Rwandais a I’assaut du Mutara, edition Universite du Rwanda, Ruhengeri, 1992, p.b3 .

In spite of the fact that Gisenyi Province had a population of 9.7% cf the total Rwandan population, 15.61%o of the places were Allocated to it. Dunn- the 1978-1990 period, Gisenyi, Kigali and Ruhengeri provinces received 51% of the total budget allocated to all provinces compared to less than 25% received by the four provinces of Gikongoro, Kibuye, Cyangugu and Kibungo. Gisenyi end to a lesser extend, Ruhengeri province grabbed partitions of responsibility both in government and private institutions. In government institutions, 50% of the managerial posts were occupied by people from these two provinces.

The diplomatic posts and access to regional or international organizations were equally reserved for particular people. The segregation policy of ethnic and regional balance was approved as a good policy of fairness intended to distribute equitably the wealth of the country. This is what the Rwandan bishops told their flock: “Do not ignore that the policy of ethnic balance in work places and schools was aimed at correcting this inequality which gave favors to some ethnic groups at the expense of others. It is obvious that such a policy can neither please everybody nor produce all expected benefits immediately”.

The policy of ethnic and regional balance undermined the Second Republic significantly. It was seriously contested by the Democratic forces which militated for chance and it ended up by leading the MRND regime to its downfall in 1994.

b. Economic Development

In social and economic matters, MRND opted for “a system which neither favored frantic capitalism and without limitations nor extreme communism which suffocated the liberty and initiative of the individual”. Committed to a denial of both capitalist and communist extremes, the MRND regime used the methodology of rhetoric on development as its main ideological pillar. It conceived development as the best means of overcoming ethnic and regional contradictions.

The 1974-1982 period was a very important phase of economic growth because of favorable rates of exports. On the one hand, there was an increase in coffee exports, and on the other hand foreign aid also increased. Thus, the value of coffee exports which was US$ 20 million in 1970 reached US$100 million in 1979.

Coffee was therefore considered as the irreplaceable base of Rwanda’s economic development because it contributed a lot to the revenue of the population. The growth of financial inflows from bilateral and multilateral aid was particularly important. This aid was US$ 250 million in 1970. It rose to US$ 400 million in 1980. The countries which provided aid included Germany, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and USA. International organizations which gave aid were: WB, AID, EEC, FIDA, etc.

Due to economic improvement, a number of important projects were undertaken. These were projects which Rwanda neither had during the colonization nor during the First Republic. Thus, Kigali and other urban centers were developed. Tarmac roads were; constructed. An efficient press and telecommunications service and water supply were developed. Due to the strength of the Rwandan currency and relative stability of the country, it became possible to attract coffee products from bordering regions especially from Zaire and Uganda. Finally, the setting up if several cooperation missions and NGOs that were connected to the inflows oi international aid allowed the job market to grow. Kigali estates development was equally significant.

The economic improvement was fragile towards the end of the 1970-1980. This was due to an economic crisis which became worse during 1980-1990. It was especially from 1984-1986 that the crisis exacerbated and reached its highest point during 1990-1 993.

The crisis was characterized by a recession. The external factors which had favored economic growth were reversed with tendentious reduction in foreign aid and serious deterioration of the terms of trade. Meanwhile, internal factors of structural nature like the reduction in agricultural yields and failure to control population growth, weighed negatively on the economic situation. This led to a fall in domestic resources.

The drop in domestic resources led to famine; it also led to an increase in imports and a reduction in the value of exports precisely linked to the deterioration in the terms of trade, i.e. Reduced prices of exports, notably coffee which saw its prices drop dramatically.

The country experienced economic imbalances with a big reduction in resources whereas its demands kept on increasing. These imbalances were mainly manifested through three types of deficits: commercial, food and budgetary deficits. The inability of exports to offset the necessary imports led to a commercial deficit which worsened all during 1980-1990.

Year	Imports	Exports	Commercial balance
1980	18,177	12,40 2	-5,775
19 81	19,230	14,521	-8,709
1 982	19929	10,069	-9,860
1983	18,646	11,706	-6,940
1984	19786	14,455	-5,331
1985	22,211	13,222	-8,989
1986	22,717	15,338	-7,379
1987	21,271	9,075	-12,196
1988	21,296	8,410	-12886
1989	19,623	7,777	-11,846
1990	18,804	8,478	-10,326
1991	28,549	11,971	-16,578

Source: BNR, Economic and, financial statistics, no. 11, September 1997

This table dwells on imports characterized by fluctuations but which were generally experiencing an upward trend. The years when the values of imports dropped correspond to the size of exports which dropped in value.

Although food products formed a large proportion of imports, the reduction in production of useful food products led to a food deficit throughout the decade. During 1985-1986, there was a drop in the production of calories pier person per day which went below the minimum level required.

In 1993, the local production of calories dropped to 1790 calories per person per day. The food deficit was worsened by rocketing if prices of consumable products which happened from 1987.

During the decade, budgetary incomes were higher than public expenses but they grew at a lower rate than expenditure. The downward trend was mainly due to the fall in prices of coffee and the rise in inflation. At the end of the decade, the budgetary deficit worsened as shown in the table below:

Year	Revenue	Expenses	Balance
1980	12,975.0	7,192.0	5,783.0
1981	13,448,9	10,048.0	3,360.9
1982	15,581.0	12,073.0	3,508.0
1983	15,784.0	11,411.4	4,372.6
1984	17,477.0	NA	NA
1985	21,061.0	NA	NA
1986	23,628.0	NA	NA
1987	18,133.4	NA	NA
1988	18,213.3	NA	NA
1989 j	19,162.7	NA	NA
1990	21,583.0	28,117.0	-6,534.0
1991	24,994.0	31,596.0	-6,602.0
1992	27,572.0	40,041.0	-12,499.0

Source: B.N.R, Economic and financial statistics, n⁰12, September 1998

These deficits became worse from the beginning; of the 1990’s and reached their highest point in 1994. The beginning of the 1990s was again characterized by less productive utilization cf available resources with an increase in military expenditure. This situation led to a drop in GDP levels and an increase of external public debt and its servicing which exceeded the value cf exports. This “was the climax of the unfavorable balance of trade. Already in 1989, IMF had imposed the first Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) on Rwanda. But this program was not effected because of the; 1990-1994 war.

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Budgetary deficit (millions of RwF)	-4,136	-4,885	-3,692	-5,986	– 5,651	-11,842	-7,795	-7,331	-101
% GDP Deficit	-3.2	-3.4	-2.3	-3.4	-3.3	-6.9	-4.4	-4.2	-6
External debt (billions of RwF)	18.7	21.7	26.6	31.7	36.2	44.6	50.3	48.3	51.8
Internal debt (billions in	7.16	11.6	13.5	14.3	16.5	20.7	24.3	28.9	34.2
RwF and % of GDP	6.1	8.2	8.5	8.3	9.7	12.1	13.6	16.6	20.1
% of total public debt of GDP	2 0.4	13.4	25.4	26.5	31.0	18.1	41.9	44.4	56.7
Foreign debt servicing in % of exports	5.9	5.6	5.7	6.6	7.2	14.8	14.9	16.5	18.3
Total public debt servicing in % of budgetary	11.0	17.4	12.5	13.2	16.9	20.4	26.5	30.6	32.2
revenues
Net internal debt (millions of RwF)	7 79	3,231	3,031	3,001	2,744	6,804	i,481	10,551	16,484

Source: Ministry of Planning, Projections of the Ministry of Planning prior ts the October f 990 events.

Effects of the Crisis

Until the mid 1990s, the macroeconomic balances were maintained. The currency was stable, GDP grew by 4.9% per Annum from 1965 to 1989 and inflation was under control (less than 4% per annum). Financial Donors and western NGOs pushed to Rwanda and invested heavily believing that they had found in Rwanda a haven of peace and a favorable ground to try their development theories. In Rwanda, they saw a model sf development that was different from that ob neighboring Burundi. On the one hand, Rwanda was described as a country with a political direction “that was not born out of an ethnic majority”. On the other hand, the “majority” was in power with development as their catch word.

The activism of the donors and NGOs gave the impression of an economic take off. But it was not the case. Cooperation with foreign countries inhibited local initiatives in a way and this affected the people negatively due to the mindset of receiving aid. The virulence with “which the people looted public property and destroyed a big number of project achievements shows that they did not have a feeling of concern for initiatives that were donated. Most NGOs were only interested in the success of their local projects rather than the general deterioration of life conditions.

At the end of the 1980s, poverty levels of the common man had thus far exceeded acceptable levels. The wealthy people got hold of the best arable land. Famine and deprivation became endemic. A government commission set up in 1990 admitted that 54 districts were deficient in food. The most affected provinces were Butare, Gikongoro and Kibuye. Between 1988 and 1990, the production of beans and bananas reduced by 50% and 30% respectively. With such disparities, Rwanda was no longer immune from social conflicts.

The situation deteriorated due to combined effects of the Structural Adjustment Program (currency devaluation of November 1990 followed by another devaluation of June 1992). This was in addition to consequences of the war and the get-rich- quick mentality of the regime banana. The Akazu established its monopoly on all profitable businesses of the nation as well as the private sector.

There were many factors that led to tho new contradictions which the regime in place failed to control. These included: the impoverishment o f the people (especially the youth), rate of increase in terms of trade, scarcity of land and high population growth (in 1990, the country registered an average of 285 inhabitants /km² with the growth rate of 3.5% and fertility index of 8.5 children par “woman), agricultural uncertainty, urban development and many other phenomena.

The official pronouncements of the authorities in power were still oriented to the myth of an egalitarian society. The regime took; advantage of the people’s poverty and promised them many things (money, cows and land of a neighbor) in order to mobilize them when the government felt that its interests were threatened.

Like with the First Republic, the history of Habyarimana’s regime can be read as a process of exclusion of the largest section of the Rwandan society. The institutionalization of the politics of ethnic and regional balance established quotas which excluded Tutsis and Hutus from the rest of Rwanda (apart from those of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri who enjoyed a big portion of the national cake).

During the 1980s, power was concentrated in the hands cf people from Bushiru and especially, the members of a small clique of family member, related to the First Lady. This was referred to as Akazu. Concentration of power was accompanied by amassing property and riches in the country by the very group and its associates. This was linked to self enrichment and corruption of the political leaders and military generals.

When RPF launched its attack in the North-East of the country on 1^st October 1990, Rwanda was already in a socio-economic crisis that was little talked about. The rising was aggravated by the slump of coffee prices which brought into the; country more than 80% of the revenue. It was the “end of the regime”. During the same period, sections of the civil society began denouncing injustices and abuses and clamored for democracy.

Consequently, the socio-economic crisis symbolized the failure of the rural-based development model promoted by J. Habyarimana’s regime, a model that kept the common man in his backyard without any possibility cf acquiring new ideas. Their ignorance and credulity comforted the ruling class of “intellectuals” who were pretended that they spoke “on the people’s behalf”, manipulated them as they pleased.

Finally, the social disparities, the institutionalization of ethnicity and the policy of regional balance as well as strict control of the copulation exacerbated this exclusion by provoking irreparable discord among the Hutu from the northern part of Rwanda. This situation marked a prelude to the political crises of the 1990s which became fatal for the MRND regime.

The Problem  of Rwandan Refugees

From 1959, the Tutsis never run away from democracy as PARMEHUTU propagandists used to say, but they did so because they had to save their lives. Generally, they run towards church missions, schools and other places which could give them cover from danger. Others decided to leave the country as soon as ^possible to look for asylum in neighboring countries.

Soon after the bloody events of 1959, the Belgian government was embarrassed by the presence of displaced persons. More especially because UN emissaries were present in the country and in their raids, the UNAR claimed that the Belgian government did not want the displaced persons to return to their homes.

This is why Logiest led a huge campaign to force the displaced people to go back home even if they run the risk of being chased once again. Those who were still considered “undesirable” in their regions were settled in other places. The State even availed trucks to those who wanted to go out of the country. In 1962, the latter were estimated to be around 150,000 people, a figure that kept on rising. The policy of removing displaced persons from their places of refuge was systematically carried out countrywide. By March 1962, more than 78,000 people had been forced to leave their places of refugee.

Those who returned home did not find their property which had been illegally grabbed by Burgomasters and their friends. This is why those properties caused several conflicts and law suit. In 1966, President Kayibanda prohibited refugees from claiming for their property:. In 1975, the Habyarimana government decreed that properties left behind by the Tutsis were henceforth taken by the State. This was because those who had grabbed them did not want to lose them.

The refugees always tried to return but only a small number managed to get back after having faced several challenges on the part of the security services and the provincial and district Administrations. The first laws on the return oi refugees date back to 1966. They specified documents that the returnees had to possess. These included: identity card, documents provided by the country of asylum and papers issued by the UNHCR.

In addition to all the above documents, the refugee had to produce a report written by the governor. It had to indicate the departure date from Rwanda, countries of residence, members of the family, entry post into Rwanda, etc. It was the governor who issued a temporary identity card and indicated the place of residence. The returnee could not go to another district without the permission of the governor. The Burgomasters prepared a monthly report addressed to the Minister of Internal Affairs and Defense as well as the National Police regarding the returnee’s actions and movements, the visitors lie received, etc.

The Burgomasters were detailed to watch all families that received them, because according to the Minister of Defense, all refugees were spies who worked for the Inyenzi. There was total mistrust with regard to the returnee.

Refugees were considered as “fundamentally evil”. Those who left in 1959 were the worst. The maliciousness of the refugees was graded. This was why the act of hosting; returning refugees was considered as a serious crime of complicity with the enemy. In sRite of that mistrust and surveillsnce of the returnees, many Rwandeses took the risk of crossing the border to give supplies to their brothers, friends or neighbors who lived in the neighboring countries.

Many cases of refugees, notably in North Kivu who were sponsors of young Rwandan Hutus are known. They facilitated their access ta secondary school education. The Borders of Rwanda and Zaire and the anti-Tutsi policy sf the two Republics did net put an end to the relationship between the Rwandan Hutu, and Tutsi refugees.

Although the Rwandese government had since 1964 requested that refugees be settled in their countries of asylum, it did nothing to help them. On the contrary, its policy consisted of making life for them very difficult, in those counties. The Rwandan embassies watched refugees closely in their countries of asylum.

In 1973, the Second Republic put in place a joint ministerial commission of Rwanda – Uganda for the repatriation of Rwandan refugees living in Uganda. The above commission met only once in Kampala from 21^st to 28^th July 1974 because some political personalities were ferociously opposed to the return of refugees. The circular issued on 25^th October 1973 reiterated the previous instructions on the re-integration of the refugees. It all depended on the Governor who also depended on the Minister of Internal affairs.

A brochure published in 1979 specified the procedure of return. The refugees had to express in writing their desire to return. The request had to be addressed to the country of origin through the High Commission for refugees and the hosting government. The refugee whose request was rejected stayed in the country of exile or looked for another.

Refugees who were wanted by the Kigali government were captured and imprisoned. Others were killed. tn 1983, Obote’s government sent 60,000 refugees to Rwanda by force. The Rwandan government only accepted 1,026 of them who, according to it met conditions of being Rwandan. This attitude shocked the concerned refugees and even many other Rwandan nationals.

The Kigali government also fomented division among refugees or caused conflicts within the local people. To that effect, the Kigali government supported associations which fought the Tutsis in the neighboring countries like Magrivi in North Kivu and the Abanyarwanda – Buhutu Association in Uganda.

In 1982, President Habyarimana reversed his decision that refugees had to settle in their countries of asylum because Rwanda was occupied to full capacity and that it did not have any more land. In 1986, the central committee of MRND revisited this issue and suggested that refugees be naturalized. When the refugees rejected that alternative, the Rwandese government Rut in place a “special commission to look into problems of Rwandese emigrants on 9^th February 1989.” In May 1990, the above commission published its first report entitled: “Rwanda and the Refugees problem: Context, history and solutions”.

Two solutions were proposed i.e. repatriation and naturalization. these involved settling refugees in their countries of asylum. But in connection with repatriation, the report said: “The government of Rwanda recognizes that repatriation is the ideal solution (…) but it imposes a condition of guaranteeing the means of survival by the refugees themselves or by the international community”. This condition did not differ from the one imposed in the 1986 declaration of MRND on the same issue.

Until 1990, the political class did not consider refugees as Rwandan. The government prevented them from returning and by destabilizing them where they lived in refuge camps, the Kigali regime wanted them to die in absolute poverty and to be wiped out completely. It “was the protocol on refugees signed in 19)93 during the Arusha negotiations that recognized refugees and Rwandan with full rights.

Armed intervention of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (1^st October, 1990)

a. Distant and immediate causes

The preceding chapter which treated the 1950-1962 decade provides details which enable us to understand Rwanda’s messed up decolonization within the global framework of decolonization of Belgian -Africa.. There was a kind of decolonization that took colonial territories unawares and obliged them to get independence hastily. This threw them into a tragedy which Burundi, Congo and Rwanda were to experience later on.

Anti- Hutu racism that tool place during the colonial era was replaced by the anti-Tutsi racism from the end of the 1950s. With the advent of PARMEHUTU, all Tutsi qualities became evil and all evil that were previously associated with Hutus became qualities. In any case, Hutus were thc maiority who had been exploited by the federal system for many centuries.

The consequences of putting in place a regime based on the ideology of exclusion are well known. Some of these are the destruction of Rwanda as a nation, the destruction of properties belonging to Tutsis, massacres and exile within and outside the country. Reactions to these acts of violence were the following: submission for the vast majority, armed struggle by Inyenzi, attempts to integrate into the new regime in Rwanda and in countries of asylum.

Towards 1965, in spite of the support from the non-aligned and socialist countries as well as the Afro-Asiatic group, UNAR or at least its external wing disappeared. Rwandan communities then camped on other priorities. They organized themselves in order Co survive. They sought for integration in host countries or in new Rwanda. They had to ensure education of their children, as they tried to observe changes in Rwanda and the host countries.

The experiences lived affected the people and provided them with lessons through which their political awareness was aroused and 1:he necessity to regain their motherland and recover all alienable rights to any citizen of a country was strengthened. G. Prunier made the following abservation: “in different refugee communities cultural awareness preceded political awareness.

Towards the 1970s, there was a proliferation of cultural associations almost every where, Rwandan culture always stirred up Rwandan communities but the new strategy consisted of organizing better and animating existing groups, creating new groups where they did not exist as well as organizing public shows. They made tours, taught the youth the Kinyarwanda language  as well as Rwandese music and dances, etc. Behind that cultural involvement was a nostalgic feeling for Rwanda which later provided fertile ground for political awakening and support to RPF during the liberation war.”

The political awakening happened after the failure of a Rwandan integration in President Idi Amin’s Uganda and the massive expulsions of the Rwandan under President Obote in 1982. There were also doubtful nationalities in Zaire in the 1980s as well as threats which weighed heavily on the Rwandan refugees whose fate was directly linked to that of the Tutsis of Burundi, a fact according to which a Tutsi inside the country was considered as a second class citizen and therefore humiliated and persecuted. This climate of deception gave rise to political awareness which translated into discussions between friends or parents and solidarity consciousness among all people who were in this situation of exclusion.

This political awareness gave birth to the “Rwandan Alliance of National Unity” (RANU) created by young intellectuals who were educated at Makerere University in Uganda. They raised questions about the future of their community. In 1979, a group of intellectuals decided:

1. To create a forum in order to meet and engage in debates concerning the Rwandan community that was scattered all over the world without any spokesman;
2. To create a core group to fine-tune the objectives of the forum.

The causes of UNAR’s failure were constantly reviewed. In spite of the separation with UNAR, the group kept the main elements of UNAR’s political line i.e. national unity and sovereignty. Incidentally, after deeply studying; the Kigali regime, this group of intellectuals made and imagined suitable solutions.

RANU had many objectives. It aimed at fighting against ethnic divisions and the ideology of divisionism by the Kigali regime. It also sought to fight against grabbing Rwanda’s riches by a small group of people. The other objective was to instill into the Rwandese a sense of consciousness as far as their rights were concerned. RANU wanted to find an appropriate solution to the refugee problem and to fight the easiest and dictatorial regime of Kigali. The strategy consisted or uniting all Rwandese intellectuals inside the country and in the Diaspora in order Io restore national unity in the spirit of “true democratic republicanism and socialism”.

UNAR insisted very much on the involvement of individuals and rejected any attempt of belonging to groups. Apart from undertaking to mobilize the Rwandan, UNAR was involved in a discrete action towards some embassies first, and then sending petitions to the OAU. It intended to attract the attention of the international community to the problem of the Rwandan refugees “who, except for being mentioned here and there, were practically forgotten. These efforts were relatively mitigated as far as concrete aid was concerned. But on the other hand, they were very important because these contacts allowed better understanding of the reasons for the beginning of the war launched on 1^st October 19)90.

The main organs of RANU were the Congress that met after every two years, the General Assembly that held annual meetings and regional committees from local, regional and central levels. During RANU’s recruitment, members had to take an oath (Kurahira). It operated on democratic principles i.e. decisions were taken by the majority. The organs of expression and mobilization were: “Alliancers” which was replaced by “Vanguard” in 1987, which in turn disappeared in 1990 when the war started.

At the outset, RANU mainly targeted Rwandan intellectuals living in the Diaspora and the international community. As time went on, RANU decided on a military option. It was necessary to include all Rwandans in its activities. This began with refugees generally and then the elites. Finally, it was important to have permanent cadre who wise well trained in order to manage the movement and continue with the mobilization program. Once the importance of the military option became clear, the persecution of Rwandan and Ugandans of Rwandan origin gave the young Rwandan reason to join the Museveni rebellion in order to acquire experience that would help them to wage an armed struggle to force their return to Rwanda.

The guerrilla war and Museveni’s final victory constituted the essential turning point in the life of the movement. However, RANU realized that with part-time volunteers without appropriate training;, it could not achieve its objectives. It then decided to do mass mobilization starting with vulnerable areas most especially refugee camps!. It was at the end of this process that RANU changed into RPF- Inkotanyi. After the Museveni Victory, the movement headquarters were moved from Nairobi to Kampala.

Beginning of the war and its consequences

With the creation of RPF during RANU’s Congress in December 1987, military preparations escalated. Movement structures were confirmed. Short, medium and long term objectives became clear. Orientation and political programs were specified. They included all Rwandan inside the country and the Diaspora, Hutus, Tutsis and Twa. The programs were based on a critical analysis of the Kigali regime and countries in the region “specially those that hosted large Kinyarwanda-speaking and Rwandan communities. The RPF also made an analysis of the experience of other liberation movements around the world. And its knowledge of Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NKM) allowed it to avoid administrative errors encountered by the latter.

The presence of cadres who had participated in the NRM guerrilla war “within the RPF ranks was a deciding factor. It allowed the movement to avoid purely intellectual debates, to have specific objectives and to acquire both human, and material resources that were required before starting the war. With the help) of networks Rut in place between 1987 and 1990, RPF knew that it could count on a large mass of the Rwandese population to start military recruitment and war financing within the Diaspora and eventually inside Rwanda. RPF contacts allowed it to distinguish friendly, mdifferent or enemy territories.

Nevertheless, none of these gave official support to RPF. Vety often, it benefitted from individual tupport and sympothy. The main issue for the movement was to make the international community understand that it was Righting for ajust tause and that it had beenconatrained to take the military option by the Kigali regime and itsallies.

The reasons for the war were summarized in the RPF program. ^Rhese were: racism rgainst the Tu^asis and sectarianism of the Kigali regime, poor maeagementof state affairs and the question of refugees to which the Rwandese government did not wish to Rnd a solution to.

After benefiting from their participation in the NRM guerrilla warfare and after the victory achieved by the latter and having observed the structures of the Ugandan army, the Rwandan military officers were able to recruit and train a big number of Rwandan Soldiers. When the war started in 1990) RPF could count on about 3,000 well trained soldiers of various grades.

It was in the morning of 1^st October, 1990 that two RPA platoons attacked the border post of Kagitumba which they overran easily after a brief encounter. The same day at 4.00 pm, Major General Fred Rwigema addressed about 500 soldiers who had already assembled on Rwandan soil. Other soldiers from different military camps in Uganda moved towards different strategic points at the border with Rwanda. It should be noted that the Gulf war had started two months earlier and therefore this new unexpected conflict in turn alerted the International community.

Reaction of the Rwandan government

The Rwandese government was surprised by that attack, even when the ordinary people knew that an attack by refugees was imminent. The racist ideology against the Tutsis reappeared in upeeches and the national Press. The subject of discussion was that RPF was a reincarnation of the Inyenzi of the 1960s and that it was made up of Tutsi federal monarchists who did not accept the 1959 Hutu revolution.

The RPF raid also allowed the Kigali regime to launch a vast operation to eliminate the; opposition after the gunshot fire in Kigali on the night of 4^th-5^th October 199)0. The regime made people believe that it was an attempt by the rebels to attack the capital whereas it was u sham attack meant to allow a presidential move to justify a massive cleansing operation against the Tutsis and other opponents of the regime.

Between 7,000 and 10,000 people were arrested and imprisoned arbitrarily. Large-scale raids took place throughout the country, especially in Kibiriria, Mutara, Mukingo, Murambi, Bugesera, etc. where Tuttis were molested, imprisoned or killed together with those who dared to criticize the regime. They “were called “traitors” or “accomplices” (Ibyitso).

Initially, the Kigali regime launched a diplomatic offensive towards all its Western godfathers and missionary circles to compel them to denounce the aggression of “feudalists supported by Uganda.” This country was considered as an aggressor. According to Kigali, the aggressor had the support of anglophone and Anglo-Saxon countries against a francophone state. The Kigali regime and its allies carefully Avoided referring to the reasons expounded by RPF to start the war.

Reaction oi the International Community

Uganda which was considered as an aggressor or at least as the unwavering supporter of RPF rejected these accusations. It especially avoided verbal and military provocations in Kigali. It made so many gestures of goodwill by responding to mediation initiatives. Uganda also accepted the UN mission of military observers at its border with Rwanda. It received a mission from the European Parliament “whose conclusions exonerated Uganda from all accusations made against it by Rwanda. During the entire duration of the war, Museveni’s attitude remained ambiguous. On the occasion of the 10^th anniversary of the genocide, Museveni declared that despite controls of the international community, Uganda intervened on the side of RPF in order to stop the genocide.

Zaire immediately sent soldier’s to help the Kigali regime. For unclear reasons, the Zairian army did not stay in Kigali for long. The Zairian soldiers who were arrested were among those who portrayed a very positive image of RPF after their release. They referred to RPA as an army that was convinced about the cause it was defending;, aery disciplined, very organized… The commander of the Zairian contingent hailed the RPF continuously because rven when he was in the enemy camp, he was treated with all honors due to his military rank. It seems that the information made President Mobudu to have a different view of RPF.

Belgium dispatched a contingent to Rwanda with the aim of repatriating its nationals who desired to depart from the nation. They left Rwanda at the end of October 1990 after their visit sparked intense discussions. However, Belgium sent a number of high-level missions that troubled the Kigali administration despite their sensible advice. Belgium claimed that the Rwandese themselves were responsible for handling the problem and that the OAU, with help from the international community, and Rwanda’s neighbours should be tasked with mediating it. That was the strategy that was ultimately adopted.

President Habyarimana asked France for assistance at the start of the conflict because his country, which is French-speaking, had been assaulted by English-speaking feudalists who were backed by a foreign nation. A contingent from France was sent to Rwanda. We called it Operation Noroit. It is hard to gauge its numerical strength. The contingent remained in Rwanda until the end of December 1993. For the sake of military collaboration, it was an unconventional military unit sent to support veteran soldiers already stationed in Rwanda. The military operatives from France remained in Rwanda until the start of the genocide.

France provided several justifications for continuing its multiform cooperation and military presence with the Kigali administration. These included defending a francophone nation and the Hutu majority from attacks by a foreign Tutsi minority, as well as ensuring the safety of foreign nationals and French residents alike. They also included democratizing the nation. France did not want to look foolish in front of its other friends in Africa. It is noteworthy, however, that France oddly upheld the Kigali regime’s interpretation of democracy. Ethnic majority and minority are synonymous with political majority and minority, despite the latter implying personal preference and affiliation with a political agenda of one’s choosing.

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