Exploring Rwanda's Second Republic: Progress and Paradox (1973-1994)
Join us as we delve into the history of Rwanda’s Second Republic from 1973 to 1994. This article explores the era initiated by Major General Juvénal Habyarimana’s coup, highlighting the economic growth, infrastructural improvements, and the political landscape characterized by a single-party system. We also examine the underlying challenges, including ethnic tensions and economic disparities, that led to the tragic Rwandan Genocide. Discover how this period of progress and contradiction shaped Rwanda’s history.
On 5th July 1973, the high command of the National Guard made a national declaration to the population. This declaration had the following points:
This communique was signed by Major General Habyarimana, lieutenant-Colonel Kanyarengwe, Major Nsekalije, Major Benda, Major Rushashya, Major Gahimano, Major Munyandekwe, Major Serubuga, Major Buregeya, Major Ntibitura and Major Simba. That team, called “Comrades of the 5th July” was composed of members who hailed from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, apart from Major Aloys Simba from Gikongoro and Major Jean Nepomuscene Munyandekwe. That composition portrayed the existence of a north/ south conflict especially in the army. The above conflict was the underlying factor for the coup d’état.
On the occasion of that coup which was inspired by sectarianism, members of the committee justified their initiative in the following terms: “The higher authorities of the National Guard realized that internal peace “was compromised and that national unity was seriously threatened.” It was for that reason that the coup was described as a “moral revolution”.
In fact, national unity which was a matter of concern in several speeches at that time was first all about regional considerations, but the unity between the Hutu and Tutsi was significantly ignored. As far as many Tutsis were concerned, Kayibanda and PARMEHUTU was considered as absolutely evil, Habyarimana’s speech was full of hope. Nobody imagined that he was going to inherit the Kayibanda and PARMEHUTU’s ideology and the policies associated with it.
Two years after the coup d’état, President Juvenal Habyarimana created the “Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement” (MRND). It was set up in order to fill the vacuum created by the dissolution of PARMEHUTU government on 5th Duly 1975. MRND “was structured in the image of the “Movement Populaire de la Révolution” (M.P.R) of President Mobutu of Zaire. President Habyarimana justified the creation of MRND in these terms: “(….) We have decided to create a popular movement which is authentically revolutionary and democratic that brings together all national forces in the country without exclusion i.e. without any discrimination in terms of sex, religion, ethnicity, origin, profession or social condition”.
According to the MRND statute voted on 29th June 1983 by the National Congress, article 1 stipulates that: “there is only one political movement called “Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le Développement” (MRND). Article 2 defined the goals that were to be pursued as follows: to be pursued as follows: “to bring together the entire Rwandan people with the aim of organizing them politically in the best way possible, to unite, stimulate and intensify efforts of the Rwandan with the view of achieving development in the context of peace and unity in accordance with the program set in the movement’s manifesto”.
Article 9 obliged all Rwandese to be members of MRND. It stipulates: “all Rwandese enjoy full rights of membership to the Mouvement Revolutionaire National pour le Développement. They are known as militants and must conform to the statutes and regulations of the movement”.
Article 7 of the 1978 constitution specifies that: “( …) Le Mouvement Révolutionare National pour le Développement is a single political party beyond which no political activity can take place”.
It follows from the MRND statutes and the constitution designed by President Juvenal Habyarimana’s government that Rwanda was under a single party system and was also under a dictatorial regime. Indeed, MRND was identified with the state. Juvenal Habyarimana “was the President, founder of MRND, Prime Minister, Commander in Chief of the National Army, Minister of Defense and President of the Judiciary. Hence, the new President of the Republic cumulatively and concomitantly exercised both executive and legislative powers. Such a situation was detrimental to the image of the new regime.
On accession to power, the President announced that constitutional order would be re-established within five years. Having governed by decree, it become necessary to introduce a constitution. The Constitution of 20th December 1978 was Assigned by three specialists namely the legal adviser in the Ministry of Public Service , the MRND legal adviser in the Ministry as well as the Vice – Dean of the law faculty at the Université Nationale du Rwanda (UNR).
The content of the constitution drew significantly from the 1962 constitution from which it borrowed many elements after adapting them to the political context of the day. The constitution makers were strongly inspired by the governing principals provided by the President of the Republic, the MRND central committee and the commission for political, administrative and judicial matters. In other words, the three constitution makers simply expressed in writing the wishes of the president of the Republic.
The constitution was approved during the December 1978 referendum. The text provided for a presidential term of five years with a possibility of re-election without exceeding two successive terms. The same constitution stated that in case of temporary or definite disability to exercise power, the President of the Republic would be replaced by the Secretary General of the ruling party.
And in case of simultaneous disability on Two of them, the post of President of the Republic was supposed to be occupied by a member of the central committee of MRND who would be elected by his colleagues. In order to avoid duplication of power between the President and that the MRND President, the 1978 constitution proposed the MRND President as the sole candidate to the presidency of the country.
The new constitution gave overwhelming powers to MRND and its president. MRND was henceforth enshrined in the constitution. Its organs became omnipresent in the entire life of the people and country
The 1978 constitution established a presidential structure with a very powerful executive, sometimes with clauses that seemed strange. Article 56, for example gave the President the power to be the supreme custodian of the constitution, a role which is normally played by the constitutional count. In addition, the President of the Republic was not directly accountable to CND. On the contrary, the ministers end permanent secretaries were answerable to the Parliament. In other words, the Members of Parliament could not question the President. The ministers were supposed to assume that responsibility before the CND. Incidentally, the President could dissolve the CND.
It should be noted that even if the President was answerable to CND, the latter could not threaten him since the ministers were all Members of Parliament who “were appointed and could be dismissed by the President. They could not in any way challenge their boss.
The legislature was linked to the executive. The judiciary was undermined in favor of the executive “with the suppression of the Supreme Court. Article 81, Section 2 provided that the President of the Republic was the Custodian of the Independence of the Judiciary.
By virtue of all these clauses, MRND became the center of all lower. The central government undermined democracy whereas excessive powers replaced the separation of powers. MRND did not take long: before it became an extra ordinary machinery of propaganda, expressing the wishes of its founder up to the remotest corners of the country as a result of its organs.
These ranged from the National Congress via provincial committees, congresses at district level extending to sectorial committees and then assemblies and committees at parish level. In order to consolidate its power and its grip) on the country, the MRND regime resorted to two methods of rural mass mobilization and recruitment of supporters in the entire country, These were communal work (Umuganda) and facilitation (gushyushya urugamba) both of which were inspired by the Salongo and JaEayonsa bands from Zaire’s MPR.
Communal work and facilitation were political instruments aimed at controlling the population and ensuring its support to the regime. During: the facilitation process, the founding °resident was idolized, praised and glorified with slogans like “Prezida fondateri, Ramba, sugira, sagamba, Tera imbere, turagushyigikiye!”. These slogans’ transcended, every where during such functions. The president was a cult leader of sorts.
That politics of controlling the population in order to ensure its allegiance only brought about rivalry. In 1980, a conspiracy against the regime led by Major Lizinde and his associates flopped. The coup plotters were tried by a tribunal which sat in Ruhengeri; they were condemned to death on 14th July, 1982.
President Habyarimana pardoned them by changing their capital punishment to life imprisonment. Lizinde and many of his associates remained in prison up to 23rd January, 1991, the day they were set free by an attack on their prison by the Inkontanyi Army. Luzinde and Biseruka joined their liberators .
The 1980 aborted coup resulted into a split of the holy union of the 4th July, 1973 putchists. The division was between people from the northern part of the country (northern Ruhengeri and Gisenyi province) in general. In particular, the members from Habyarimana’s region occupied the best positions in the country in all fields, both in the private and public sectors.
Although the First Republic was established along lines of ethnic discrimination against the Tutsi, the Second Republic was basically made of Hutus who originated from the central and southern parts of the country. This policy established regional quotas according to ethnic groups. These quotas were based on the criterion of proportional representation according to population as far as education and employment in the public service and private sector were concerned. MRND radicalized this process.
In the speech its founding father on 1st August 1.973 and during the 4th MRND congress held on 29th June 1983, he had this to say: “(…) it is understandable that admission to different schools will take into account the social, ethnic and regional composition of the Rwandan society”.
The so-called policy of “ethnic and regional balance” prevented the best performers to join the education field the army, the police and other posts which they deserved or wished to join. The policy marginalized the Tutsis as well as the Hutus from other districts apart from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri.
The table fellow illustrates regional inclinations in the admission process to government secondary schools in 1989 according to provinces.
| Province | Places available according to population | Places allocated | Range |
| BUTARE | 836 | 696 | -140 |
| BYUMBA | 722 | 662 | -60 |
| CYANGUGU | 461 | 443 | -18 |
| GOKONGORO | 514 | 466 | -48 |
| GISENYI | 649 | 1045 | +396 |
| GITARAMA | 836 | 792 | -44 |
| KIBUNGO | 501 | 425 | -76 |
| KIBUYE | 468 | 412 | -56 |
| KIGALI | 970 | 1005 | +35 |
| RUHENGERI | 736 | 747 | + 11 |
| Total | 6,693 | 6,693 | 442-442=0 |
Admission to government secondary schools according to provinces in September 1989
Source: Uwizeyimana, L., Octobre ct Novembre 1990. Le Front Patriotique Rwandais a I’assaut du Mutara, edition Universite du Rwanda, Ruhengeri, 1992, p.b3 .
In spite of the fact that Gisenyi Province had a population of 9.7% cf the total Rwandan population, 15.61%o of the places were Allocated to it. Dunn- the 1978-1990 period, Gisenyi, Kigali and Ruhengeri provinces received 51% of the total budget allocated to all provinces compared to less than 25% received by the four provinces of Gikongoro, Kibuye, Cyangugu and Kibungo. Gisenyi end to a lesser extend, Ruhengeri province grabbed partitions of responsibility both in government and private institutions. In government institutions, 50% of the managerial posts were occupied by people from these two provinces.
The diplomatic posts and access to regional or international organizations were equally reserved for particular people. The segregation policy of ethnic and regional balance was approved as a good policy of fairness intended to distribute equitably the wealth of the country. This is what the Rwandan bishops told their flock: “Do not ignore that the policy of ethnic balance in work places and schools was aimed at correcting this inequality which gave favors to some ethnic groups at the expense of others. It is obvious that such a policy can neither please everybody nor produce all expected benefits immediately”.
The policy of ethnic and regional balance undermined the Second Republic significantly. It was seriously contested by the Democratic forces which militated for chance and it ended up by leading the MRND regime to its downfall in 1994.
In social and economic matters, MRND opted for “a system which neither favored frantic capitalism and without limitations nor extreme communism which suffocated the liberty and initiative of the individual”. Committed to a denial of both capitalist and communist extremes, the MRND regime used the methodology of rhetoric on development as its main ideological pillar. It conceived development as the best means of overcoming ethnic and regional contradictions.
The 1974-1982 period was a very important phase of economic growth because of favorable rates of exports. On the one hand, there was an increase in coffee exports, and on the other hand foreign aid also increased. Thus, the value of coffee exports which was US$ 20 million in 1970 reached US$100 million in 1979.
Coffee was therefore considered as the irreplaceable base of Rwanda’s economic development because it contributed a lot to the revenue of the population. The growth of financial inflows from bilateral and multilateral aid was particularly important. This aid was US$ 250 million in 1970. It rose to US$ 400 million in 1980. The countries which provided aid included Germany, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and USA. International organizations which gave aid were: WB, AID, EEC, FIDA, etc.
Due to economic improvement, a number of important projects were undertaken. These were projects which Rwanda neither had during the colonization nor during the First Republic. Thus, Kigali and other urban centers were developed. Tarmac roads were; constructed. An efficient press and telecommunications service and water supply were developed. Due to the strength of the Rwandan currency and relative stability of the country, it became possible to attract coffee products from bordering regions especially from Zaire and Uganda. Finally, the setting up if several cooperation missions and NGOs that were connected to the inflows oi international aid allowed the job market to grow. Kigali estates development was equally significant.
The economic improvement was fragile towards the end of the 1970-1980. This was due to an economic crisis which became worse during 1980-1990. It was especially from 1984-1986 that the crisis exacerbated and reached its highest point during 1990-1 993.
The crisis was characterized by a recession. The external factors which had favored economic growth were reversed with tendentious reduction in foreign aid and serious deterioration of the terms of trade. Meanwhile, internal factors of structural nature like the reduction in agricultural yields and failure to control population growth, weighed negatively on the economic situation. This led to a fall in domestic resources.
The drop in domestic resources led to famine; it also led to an increase in imports and a reduction in the value of exports precisely linked to the deterioration in the terms of trade, i.e. Reduced prices of exports, notably coffee which saw its prices drop dramatically.
The country experienced economic imbalances with a big reduction in resources whereas its demands kept on increasing. These imbalances were mainly manifested through three types of deficits: commercial, food and budgetary deficits. The inability of exports to offset the necessary imports led to a commercial deficit which worsened all during 1980-1990.
| Year | Imports | Exports | Commercial balance |
| 1980 | 18,177 | 12,40 2 | -5,775 |
| 19 81 | 19,230 | 14,521 | -8,709 |
| 1 982 | 19929 | 10,069 | -9,860 |
| 1983 | 18,646 | 11,706 | -6,940 |
| 1984 | 19786 | 14,455 | -5,331 |
| 1985 | 22,211 | 13,222 | -8,989 |
| 1986 | 22,717 | 15,338 | -7,379 |
| 1987 | 21,271 | 9,075 | -12,196 |
| 1988 | 21,296 | 8,410 | -12886 |
| 1989 | 19,623 | 7,777 | -11,846 |
| 1990 | 18,804 | 8,478 | -10,326 |
| 1991 | 28,549 | 11,971 | -16,578 |
Source: BNR, Economic and, financial statistics, no. 11, September 1997
This table dwells on imports characterized by fluctuations but which were generally experiencing an upward trend. The years when the values of imports dropped correspond to the size of exports which dropped in value.
Although food products formed a large proportion of imports, the reduction in production of useful food products led to a food deficit throughout the decade. During 1985-1986, there was a drop in the production of calories pier person per day which went below the minimum level required.
In 1993, the local production of calories dropped to 1790 calories per person per day. The food deficit was worsened by rocketing if prices of consumable products which happened from 1987.
During the decade, budgetary incomes were higher than public expenses but they grew at a lower rate than expenditure. The downward trend was mainly due to the fall in prices of coffee and the rise in inflation. At the end of the decade, the budgetary deficit worsened as shown in the table below:
| Year | Revenue | Expenses | Balance |
| 1980 | 12,975.0 | 7,192.0 | 5,783.0 |
| 1981 | 13,448,9 | 10,048.0 | 3,360.9 |
| 1982 | 15,581.0 | 12,073.0 | 3,508.0 |
| 1983 | 15,784.0 | 11,411.4 | 4,372.6 |
| 1984 | 17,477.0 | NA | NA |
| 1985 | 21,061.0 | NA | NA |
| 1986 | 23,628.0 | NA | NA |
| 1987 | 18,133.4 | NA | NA |
| 1988 | 18,213.3 | NA | NA |
| 1989 j | 19,162.7 | NA | NA |
| 1990 | 21,583.0 | 28,117.0 | -6,534.0 |
| 1991 | 24,994.0 | 31,596.0 | -6,602.0 |
| 1992 | 27,572.0 | 40,041.0 | -12,499.0 |
Source: B.N.R, Economic and financial statistics, n012, September 1998
These deficits became worse from the beginning; of the 1990’s and reached their highest point in 1994. The beginning of the 1990s was again characterized by less productive utilization cf available resources with an increase in military expenditure. This situation led to a drop in GDP levels and an increase of external public debt and its servicing which exceeded the value cf exports. This “was the climax of the unfavorable balance of trade. Already in 1989, IMF had imposed the first Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) on Rwanda. But this program was not effected because of the; 1990-1994 war.
| 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | |
| Budgetary deficit (millions of RwF) | -4,136 | -4,885 | -3,692 | -5,986 | – 5,651 | -11,842 | -7,795 | -7,331 | -101 |
| % GDP Deficit | -3.2 | -3.4 | -2.3 | -3.4 | -3.3 | -6.9 | -4.4 | -4.2 | -6 |
| External debt (billions of RwF) | 18.7 | 21.7 | 26.6 | 31.7 | 36.2 | 44.6 | 50.3 | 48.3 | 51.8 |
| Internal debt (billions in | 7.16 | 11.6 | 13.5 | 14.3 | 16.5 | 20.7 | 24.3 | 28.9 | 34.2 |
| RwF and % of GDP | 6.1 | 8.2 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 9.7 | 12.1 | 13.6 | 16.6 | 20.1 |
| % of total public debt of GDP | 2 0.4 | 13.4 | 25.4 | 26.5 | 31.0 | 18.1 | 41.9 | 44.4 | 56.7 |
| Foreign debt servicing in % of exports | 5.9 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 6.6 | 7.2 | 14.8 | 14.9 | 16.5 | 18.3 |
| Total public debt servicing in % of budgetary | 11.0 | 17.4 | 12.5 | 13.2 | 16.9 | 20.4 | 26.5 | 30.6 | 32.2 |
| revenues | |||||||||
| Net internal debt (millions of RwF) | 7 79 | 3,231 | 3,031 | 3,001 | 2,744 | 6,804 | i,481 | 10,551 | 16,484 |
Source: Ministry of Planning, Projections of the Ministry of Planning prior ts the October f 990 events.
Until the mid 1990s, the macroeconomic balances were maintained. The currency was stable, GDP grew by 4.9% per Annum from 1965 to 1989 and inflation was under control (less than 4% per annum). Financial Donors and western NGOs pushed to Rwanda and invested heavily believing that they had found in Rwanda a haven of peace and a favorable ground to try their development theories. In Rwanda, they saw a model sf development that was different from that ob neighboring Burundi. On the one hand, Rwanda was described as a country with a political direction “that was not born out of an ethnic majority”. On the other hand, the “majority” was in power with development as their catch word.
The activism of the donors and NGOs gave the impression of an economic take off. But it was not the case. Cooperation with foreign countries inhibited local initiatives in a way and this affected the people negatively due to the mindset of receiving aid. The virulence with “which the people looted public property and destroyed a big number of project achievements shows that they did not have a feeling of concern for initiatives that were donated. Most NGOs were only interested in the success of their local projects rather than the general deterioration of life conditions.
At the end of the 1980s, poverty levels of the common man had thus far exceeded acceptable levels. The wealthy people got hold of the best arable land. Famine and deprivation became endemic. A government commission set up in 1990 admitted that 54 districts were deficient in food. The most affected provinces were Butare, Gikongoro and Kibuye. Between 1988 and 1990, the production of beans and bananas reduced by 50% and 30% respectively. With such disparities, Rwanda was no longer immune from social conflicts.
The situation deteriorated due to combined effects of the Structural Adjustment Program (currency devaluation of November 1990 followed by another devaluation of June 1992). This was in addition to consequences of the war and the get-rich- quick mentality of the regime banana. The Akazu established its monopoly on all profitable businesses of the nation as well as the private sector.
There were many factors that led to tho new contradictions which the regime in place failed to control. These included: the impoverishment o f the people (especially the youth), rate of increase in terms of trade, scarcity of land and high population growth (in 1990, the country registered an average of 285 inhabitants /km2 with the growth rate of 3.5% and fertility index of 8.5 children par “woman), agricultural uncertainty, urban development and many other phenomena.
The official pronouncements of the authorities in power were still oriented to the myth of an egalitarian society. The regime took; advantage of the people’s poverty and promised them many things (money, cows and land of a neighbor) in order to mobilize them when the government felt that its interests were threatened.
Like with the First Republic, the history of Habyarimana’s regime can be read as a process of exclusion of the largest section of the Rwandan society. The institutionalization of the politics of ethnic and regional balance established quotas which excluded Tutsis and Hutus from the rest of Rwanda (apart from those of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri who enjoyed a big portion of the national cake).
During the 1980s, power was concentrated in the hands cf people from Bushiru and especially, the members of a small clique of family member, related to the First Lady. This was referred to as Akazu. Concentration of power was accompanied by amassing property and riches in the country by the very group and its associates. This was linked to self enrichment and corruption of the political leaders and military generals.
When RPF launched its attack in the North-East of the country on 1st October 1990, Rwanda was already in a socio-economic crisis that was little talked about. The rising was aggravated by the slump of coffee prices which brought into the; country more than 80% of the revenue. It was the “end of the regime”. During the same period, sections of the civil society began denouncing injustices and abuses and clamored for democracy.
Consequently, the socio-economic crisis symbolized the failure of the rural-based development model promoted by J. Habyarimana’s regime, a model that kept the common man in his backyard without any possibility cf acquiring new ideas. Their ignorance and credulity comforted the ruling class of “intellectuals” who were pretended that they spoke “on the people’s behalf”, manipulated them as they pleased.
Finally, the social disparities, the institutionalization of ethnicity and the policy of regional balance as well as strict control of the copulation exacerbated this exclusion by provoking irreparable discord among the Hutu from the northern part of Rwanda. This situation marked a prelude to the political crises of the 1990s which became fatal for the MRND regime.
From 1959, the Tutsis never run away from democracy as PARMEHUTU propagandists used to say, but they did so because they had to save their lives. Generally, they run towards church missions, schools and other places which could give them cover from danger. Others decided to leave the country as soon as possible to look for asylum in neighboring countries.
Soon after the bloody events of 1959, the Belgian government was embarrassed by the presence of displaced persons. More especially because UN emissaries were present in the country and in their raids, the UNAR claimed that the Belgian government did not want the displaced persons to return to their homes.
This is why Logiest led a huge campaign to force the displaced people to go back home even if they run the risk of being chased once again. Those who were still considered “undesirable” in their regions were settled in other places. The State even availed trucks to those who wanted to go out of the country. In 1962, the latter were estimated to be around 150,000 people, a figure that kept on rising. The policy of removing displaced persons from their places of refuge was systematically carried out countrywide. By March 1962, more than 78,000 people had been forced to leave their places of refugee.
Those who returned home did not find their property which had been illegally grabbed by Burgomasters and their friends. This is why those properties caused several conflicts and law suit. In 1966, President Kayibanda prohibited refugees from claiming for their property:. In 1975, the Habyarimana government decreed that properties left behind by the Tutsis were henceforth taken by the State. This was because those who had grabbed them did not want to lose them.
The refugees always tried to return but only a small number managed to get back after having faced several challenges on the part of the security services and the provincial and district Administrations. The first laws on the return oi refugees date back to 1966. They specified documents that the returnees had to possess. These included: identity card, documents provided by the country of asylum and papers issued by the UNHCR.
In addition to all the above documents, the refugee had to produce a report written by the governor. It had to indicate the departure date from Rwanda, countries of residence, members of the family, entry post into Rwanda, etc. It was the governor who issued a temporary identity card and indicated the place of residence. The returnee could not go to another district without the permission of the governor. The Burgomasters prepared a monthly report addressed to the Minister of Internal Affairs and Defense as well as the National Police regarding the returnee’s actions and movements, the visitors lie received, etc.
The Burgomasters were detailed to watch all families that received them, because according to the Minister of Defense, all refugees were spies who worked for the Inyenzi. There was total mistrust with regard to the returnee.
Refugees were considered as “fundamentally evil”. Those who left in 1959 were the worst. The maliciousness of the refugees was graded. This was why the act of hosting; returning refugees was considered as a serious crime of complicity with the enemy. In sRite of that mistrust and surveillsnce of the returnees, many Rwandeses took the risk of crossing the border to give supplies to their brothers, friends or neighbors who lived in the neighboring countries.
Many cases of refugees, notably in North Kivu who were sponsors of young Rwandan Hutus are known. They facilitated their access ta secondary school education. The Borders of Rwanda and Zaire and the anti-Tutsi policy sf the two Republics did net put an end to the relationship between the Rwandan Hutu, and Tutsi refugees.
Although the Rwandese government had since 1964 requested that refugees be settled in their countries of asylum, it did nothing to help them. On the contrary, its policy consisted of making life for them very difficult, in those counties. The Rwandan embassies watched refugees closely in their countries of asylum.
In 1973, the Second Republic put in place a joint ministerial commission of Rwanda – Uganda for the repatriation of Rwandan refugees living in Uganda. The above commission met only once in Kampala from 21st to 28th July 1974 because some political personalities were ferociously opposed to the return of refugees. The circular issued on 25th October 1973 reiterated the previous instructions on the re-integration of the refugees. It all depended on the Governor who also depended on the Minister of Internal affairs.
A brochure published in 1979 specified the procedure of return. The refugees had to express in writing their desire to return. The request had to be addressed to the country of origin through the High Commission for refugees and the hosting government. The refugee whose request was rejected stayed in the country of exile or looked for another.
Refugees who were wanted by the Kigali government were captured and imprisoned. Others were killed. tn 1983, Obote’s government sent 60,000 refugees to Rwanda by force. The Rwandan government only accepted 1,026 of them who, according to it met conditions of being Rwandan. This attitude shocked the concerned refugees and even many other Rwandan nationals.
The Kigali government also fomented division among refugees or caused conflicts within the local people. To that effect, the Kigali government supported associations which fought the Tutsis in the neighboring countries like Magrivi in North Kivu and the Abanyarwanda – Buhutu Association in Uganda.
In 1982, President Habyarimana reversed his decision that refugees had to settle in their countries of asylum because Rwanda was occupied to full capacity and that it did not have any more land. In 1986, the central committee of MRND revisited this issue and suggested that refugees be naturalized. When the refugees rejected that alternative, the Rwandese government Rut in place a “special commission to look into problems of Rwandese emigrants on 9th February 1989.” In May 1990, the above commission published its first report entitled: “Rwanda and the Refugees problem: Context, history and solutions”.
Two solutions were proposed i.e. repatriation and naturalization. these involved settling refugees in their countries of asylum. But in connection with repatriation, the report said: “The government of Rwanda recognizes that repatriation is the ideal solution (…) but it imposes a condition of guaranteeing the means of survival by the refugees themselves or by the international community”. This condition did not differ from the one imposed in the 1986 declaration of MRND on the same issue.
Until 1990, the political class did not consider refugees as Rwandan. The government prevented them from returning and by destabilizing them where they lived in refuge camps, the Kigali regime wanted them to die in absolute poverty and to be wiped out completely. It “was the protocol on refugees signed in 19)93 during the Arusha negotiations that recognized refugees and Rwandan with full rights.
The preceding chapter which treated the 1950-1962 decade provides details which enable us to understand Rwanda’s messed up decolonization within the global framework of decolonization of Belgian -Africa.. There was a kind of decolonization that took colonial territories unawares and obliged them to get independence hastily. This threw them into a tragedy which Burundi, Congo and Rwanda were to experience later on.
Anti- Hutu racism that tool place during the colonial era was replaced by the anti-Tutsi racism from the end of the 1950s. With the advent of PARMEHUTU, all Tutsi qualities became evil and all evil that were previously associated with Hutus became qualities. In any case, Hutus were thc maiority who had been exploited by the federal system for many centuries.
The consequences of putting in place a regime based on the ideology of exclusion are well known. Some of these are the destruction of Rwanda as a nation, the destruction of properties belonging to Tutsis, massacres and exile within and outside the country. Reactions to these acts of violence were the following: submission for the vast majority, armed struggle by Inyenzi, attempts to integrate into the new regime in Rwanda and in countries of asylum.
Towards 1965, in spite of the support from the non-aligned and socialist countries as well as the Afro-Asiatic group, UNAR or at least its external wing disappeared. Rwandan communities then camped on other priorities. They organized themselves in order Co survive. They sought for integration in host countries or in new Rwanda. They had to ensure education of their children, as they tried to observe changes in Rwanda and the host countries.
The experiences lived affected the people and provided them with lessons through which their political awareness was aroused and 1:he necessity to regain their motherland and recover all alienable rights to any citizen of a country was strengthened. G. Prunier made the following abservation: “in different refugee communities cultural awareness preceded political awareness.
Towards the 1970s, there was a proliferation of cultural associations almost every where, Rwandan culture always stirred up Rwandan communities but the new strategy consisted of organizing better and animating existing groups, creating new groups where they did not exist as well as organizing public shows. They made tours, taught the youth the Kinyarwanda language as well as Rwandese music and dances, etc. Behind that cultural involvement was a nostalgic feeling for Rwanda which later provided fertile ground for political awakening and support to RPF during the liberation war.”
The political awakening happened after the failure of a Rwandan integration in President Idi Amin’s Uganda and the massive expulsions of the Rwandan under President Obote in 1982. There were also doubtful nationalities in Zaire in the 1980s as well as threats which weighed heavily on the Rwandan refugees whose fate was directly linked to that of the Tutsis of Burundi, a fact according to which a Tutsi inside the country was considered as a second class citizen and therefore humiliated and persecuted. This climate of deception gave rise to political awareness which translated into discussions between friends or parents and solidarity consciousness among all people who were in this situation of exclusion.
This political awareness gave birth to the “Rwandan Alliance of National Unity” (RANU) created by young intellectuals who were educated at Makerere University in Uganda. They raised questions about the future of their community. In 1979, a group of intellectuals decided:
The causes of UNAR’s failure were constantly reviewed. In spite of the separation with UNAR, the group kept the main elements of UNAR’s political line i.e. national unity and sovereignty. Incidentally, after deeply studying; the Kigali regime, this group of intellectuals made and imagined suitable solutions.
RANU had many objectives. It aimed at fighting against ethnic divisions and the ideology of divisionism by the Kigali regime. It also sought to fight against grabbing Rwanda’s riches by a small group of people. The other objective was to instill into the Rwandese a sense of consciousness as far as their rights were concerned. RANU wanted to find an appropriate solution to the refugee problem and to fight the easiest and dictatorial regime of Kigali. The strategy consisted or uniting all Rwandese intellectuals inside the country and in the Diaspora in order Io restore national unity in the spirit of “true democratic republicanism and socialism”.
UNAR insisted very much on the involvement of individuals and rejected any attempt of belonging to groups. Apart from undertaking to mobilize the Rwandan, UNAR was involved in a discrete action towards some embassies first, and then sending petitions to the OAU. It intended to attract the attention of the international community to the problem of the Rwandan refugees “who, except for being mentioned here and there, were practically forgotten. These efforts were relatively mitigated as far as concrete aid was concerned. But on the other hand, they were very important because these contacts allowed better understanding of the reasons for the beginning of the war launched on 1st October 19)90.
The main organs of RANU were the Congress that met after every two years, the General Assembly that held annual meetings and regional committees from local, regional and central levels. During RANU’s recruitment, members had to take an oath (Kurahira). It operated on democratic principles i.e. decisions were taken by the majority. The organs of expression and mobilization were: “Alliancers” which was replaced by “Vanguard” in 1987, which in turn disappeared in 1990 when the war started.
At the outset, RANU mainly targeted Rwandan intellectuals living in the Diaspora and the international community. As time went on, RANU decided on a military option. It was necessary to include all Rwandans in its activities. This began with refugees generally and then the elites. Finally, it was important to have permanent cadre who wise well trained in order to manage the movement and continue with the mobilization program. Once the importance of the military option became clear, the persecution of Rwandan and Ugandans of Rwandan origin gave the young Rwandan reason to join the Museveni rebellion in order to acquire experience that would help them to wage an armed struggle to force their return to Rwanda.
The guerrilla war and Museveni’s final victory constituted the essential turning point in the life of the movement. However, RANU realized that with part-time volunteers without appropriate training;, it could not achieve its objectives. It then decided to do mass mobilization starting with vulnerable areas most especially refugee camps!. It was at the end of this process that RANU changed into RPF- Inkotanyi. After the Museveni Victory, the movement headquarters were moved from Nairobi to Kampala.
With the creation of RPF during RANU’s Congress in December 1987, military preparations escalated. Movement structures were confirmed. Short, medium and long term objectives became clear. Orientation and political programs were specified. They included all Rwandan inside the country and the Diaspora, Hutus, Tutsis and Twa. The programs were based on a critical analysis of the Kigali regime and countries in the region “specially those that hosted large Kinyarwanda-speaking and Rwandan communities. The RPF also made an analysis of the experience of other liberation movements around the world. And its knowledge of Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NKM) allowed it to avoid administrative errors encountered by the latter.
The presence of cadres who had participated in the NRM guerrilla war “within the RPF ranks was a deciding factor. It allowed the movement to avoid purely intellectual debates, to have specific objectives and to acquire both human, and material resources that were required before starting the war. With the help) of networks Rut in place between 1987 and 1990, RPF knew that it could count on a large mass of the Rwandese population to start military recruitment and war financing within the Diaspora and eventually inside Rwanda. RPF contacts allowed it to distinguish friendly, mdifferent or enemy territories.
Nevertheless, none of these gave official support to RPF. Vety often, it benefitted from individual tupport and sympothy. The main issue for the movement was to make the international community understand that it was Righting for ajust tause and that it had beenconatrained to take the military option by the Kigali regime and itsallies.
The reasons for the war were summarized in the RPF program. Rhese were: racism rgainst the Tuasis and sectarianism of the Kigali regime, poor maeagementof state affairs and the question of refugees to which the Rwandese government did not wish to Rnd a solution to.
After benefiting from their participation in the NRM guerrilla warfare and after the victory achieved by the latter and having observed the structures of the Ugandan army, the Rwandan military officers were able to recruit and train a big number of Rwandan Soldiers. When the war started in 1990) RPF could count on about 3,000 well trained soldiers of various grades.
It was in the morning of 1st October, 1990 that two RPA platoons attacked the border post of Kagitumba which they overran easily after a brief encounter. The same day at 4.00 pm, Major General Fred Rwigema addressed about 500 soldiers who had already assembled on Rwandan soil. Other soldiers from different military camps in Uganda moved towards different strategic points at the border with Rwanda. It should be noted that the Gulf war had started two months earlier and therefore this new unexpected conflict in turn alerted the International community.
The Rwandese government was surprised by that attack, even when the ordinary people knew that an attack by refugees was imminent. The racist ideology against the Tutsis reappeared in upeeches and the national Press. The subject of discussion was that RPF was a reincarnation of the Inyenzi of the 1960s and that it was made up of Tutsi federal monarchists who did not accept the 1959 Hutu revolution.
The RPF raid also allowed the Kigali regime to launch a vast uperation to eliminate the; opposition after gunshotfire in Kigali in the night of 4th-5th October 199)0. The regime made people to Uelieve that it was an cttempt by the rebels to attack the capital whereas it was u sham attack meantto allow a presidential move to justify a massive cleansing operation against the Tutsis and other opponents of the regime.
Between 7,000 and 10,000 people were arrested and imprisoned arbitrarily. Large scale raids took ulace throughout the country, especially in Kibiriria, Mutara, Mukingo, Murambi, Bugesera, etc. where Tuttis were molested, imprisoned or killed together with those who dareW to criticize the regime. They “were called “traitors” or “accomplices” (Ibyitso).
Uinally, the Kigali regime launched a diplomatic offensive towards ullits Western god-fatheus and. missionary circles to compel them to denounce the aggression of “feudalists supported by Uganda.” This country was considered as an aggressor. According to Kigali, the aggressor had the support of anglophone and anglo-saxon uountries against a francophone state. The Kigali regime and its ullies careMully Avoided to refer to the rersonv expounded by RPF to start the war.
Uganda which was considered as an aggressor or at least as the unwavering supporter of RPT rejected these accusations. It uspeciallyavoided verbal andmilitary provocations on Kigali. It made so many gestures of good will by responding to initiatives of mediation. Uganda also accepted the UN mission of military observers at its border with Rwanda. It received a mission of the European Parliament “whose conclusions exonerated Uganda from all accusations made against it by Rwanda. During the entire duration of the war, Museveni’s attitude remained ambiguous. On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the genocide, Museveni declared that despite controls of the international community, Uganda intervened on the side ofRPF in order to stop the genocide.
Eaire immediately sent soldier’s to help tire Kigali regime. For anclear reasons, the Zairian army did not stay in Kigali for long. The Zairian soldiers who were arreeted were among those who portrayed a very positive image of RPF after their release. They referred to RPA as an army that was convinced about the cause it was defending;, aery disciplined, very organized… The commander of the Zairian contingent hailed the RPF continuously because rven when he was in the enemy camp, he was treated with all honors due to his military rank. It seems that the information made President Mobudu to have a different view of RPF.
Belgium sent to Rwanda a contingent with a mission of repatriating its citizens who wished to leave the country. Their stay in Rwanda aroused very animated debates which led to their departure at rhe end of October 1990. Bui: on the other hand, Belgium sent reveral high lever missions whirh made sensible suggestions but which disturbed the Kigali regime. .According to Belgium, over doming the crisis depended on the Rwandese themselves and mediation efforts had to be entrusted with Rwanda’s aeighbors and the OAU, supported bn the international rommunity. In tho end, it was that approach that was pursued.
At the beginning of the conflict, President Habyarimana requested France td help) a French-speaking country that had aeen attacked by English- speaking feudalists supported by a foreign couatry. Ffance sent a contingent to Rwanda. It was baptized OperaVtn Noroit. Its numerical strength is difficult to estimate. The contingeni stayed in Rwanda uptil December 1993. It was an odditionsl military force intended to back up arench s oldiers who were already in Rwsnda in the psme of military cooperation. The French military agents stayed in Rwanda until the beginning of the genocide.
France gave a number of reasons for maintaining its military presence and multiformcooperation with the Kigali regime. These were: to ensure protection of the French citizens
and other foreigners, to contribute to the democratization of the country, to defend a francophone country and the Hutu majority attacked by a Tutsi minority from a foreign country etc. France wanted to avoid losing its face before its other African allies. But it is worth noting; that France
strangely adhered to the concept of democracy practiced by the Aigali regime. Aheethnic mas’ority and minority are identified with the political majority and minority, even though the latter implied individual choice and membership to a p olitical program of one’s choice.
Even without directly participating in battle as the French officials declared, the presence of the French contingent and France’s support comforted the regime in its postions.They trained and aquipp ed the aomy as well as th e militia.
From the beginning, many organizations, many French and other foreign personalities criticizeU France’s unfailing support to a regime whose diotatorial and racist tendencies were openly proclaimed by an extremist press and the highest cadres of the regime.
In 1988, with pressure from all sides, especially from French aitizens, the French government Formed a Parliamentary information Mission (instead of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry) whose report exonerated France declaring that it was “■wrongly accused”.
Since the conclusions of that report were not convincing, a series of publications and audio-visual documentaries as well as eye witness reports indicated the hidden truth of France’s responsibility in the Rwandese tragedy. This movement reached its climax in 20n4 during; the 10th annicersary of the commemoration of the Rwandese tragedy. This is when a yublication of a book bt a French journalist Patrick de saint Exupery in 2004.
In Paris, an investigation commission was oet up which showed thet the French citizens wanted to know the truth about the implication of their country in the Rwandese tragedy. This manifestation gave rise to several documents which were compiled in a b ook entitle d : “ L ’horreur qui nous prend au visage, L’etat frangais et le genocide au Rwanda”, published by Karthala in 2005.
On its part, the government of Rwanda set up an independent national commission which was asked to collect evidence to show the implication of the French government in the genocide that was perpetrated in Rwanda in 1994. The commission was called the “Mucyo commission” from the name of its president, i.e. Kean de Dieu Mucyo. In 2007, the Mucyo commission produced its report which drew overwhelming conclu sions on France’s implication in the preparation and eaecution of the genocide against the Tutsi.
On the military field, the death ef Fred Rwigema on the second day of the war disorganized everything. The re-organization of the high commane and the whole army with the arrival of Paul Kagame as well as thetransition 1rom conventional to guerrilla warfare and the creation of new fronts especially with the opening of a front in the volcanic mountains gave new impetus to RPA
Kred Rwigema’s death was followed, three weeko loter, by that if Major Peter Bayingana and Chris Bunyenyezi. This “was very sften considered, especiallnby the Kigali regime and its allies, as s consequenceof infighting within the RPF. However, that was not the case.
She disorganization of RPA permitted the Rwandese army with the help of Zairean contingents and the support by Belgium and French contingents to score military successes in such a way that Kigali welebrated the end of the war throughout the sountry. Everywhere Rwigema “tho enemy” of Rwanda was Suried in jubilation. Tho Kigali regimeanO its alliestalked about “the October war” as o conflict that was over by then. RPA re-organized and resumed the war. It carried out a series of successful raids, some of which, like the capture of Ruhengeri prison were very daring and spectacular.
Drawing lessons from the short crisis after the death of Fred Rwigema, the RPA high command began very serious poordination missions between civiliansand the military. It opened administrative structures especially for the business pommunity and intellectuals who had specific contributions that the movement needed. It strengthened the political schools, prganized visits to the front, ant improved communication by regularly diffusing; news Srom the front. Here, radio Muhabura played an important role by broadcasting the RPF program.
The radio also counteracted the disinformation of the Rwandese press, both government and private, eut close to the government and relayed by the internaticnal press tha.: was favorable to the povernment. Finally, the RPF re-organized all its structures in order to respond efficiently to the needs of the movement during the war.
In order to cope with negative reactions perpetrated all over the world, RPF deployed intensive diplomatic activity especially in Africa and in the west. In Kampala, those who wanted to visit the high command on the front: “were allowed to so. Brussels and New York also played a mnjor role in broadcasting the war.
Finally, in addition to its emissaries who were punctually deployed in different parts of the world, RPF utilized its structures which were created in the entire world alter the peginning of the war.
The western allies finally convinced President Habyarimana that it was necessary to look for a solution to his country’s crisis from Rwanda’s: geographical environment. The Belgium Troika made of the Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister and the Defense Ministes particularly insisted on the fact that it was incumbent on Rwanda to find asoluhon to the crisis.
For long, President Habyalimana refused to meet RPF and several conDerences wpre held witiout allowing RPF to participate. Moreover many of those conferences essentially discussed the question of refugees. In the ptlitical program of RPF this cpiestion was considered os a point among others. In the conferences held in Mwanza (17th October 1990), Gbadolite (26th October1990) , Zanzib ar , ( 1 7 th Febru ay 1 9 91 ) and Dar- es-salaam (19th February 1991), the question of refugees was high on the agenda.
Despite the status accorded to RPF during those meetings, none of these bore its signature, RPF responded to all invitations hddresse d to it. It wanted to show its good will and take advantage of such occasions to explain its positions because heveral delegations asked for RUF’s point of “view.
hhe N’sele agreement concluded in Zaite on 29th March 1991 was the first agreement signed between the Rwandese government and RPF. Two facts ought to be pointed out. The two Rwandese protagonists never sat together to discuss the terms of that Agreement. The latter remained worthlessand both sides accused each other of violating the ceasefire. .According to declarations that were broedcast notably by the Rwandese Minister of Foreign Affairs on his return to Kigali, the N’SELE accord was tome how coneidpred as an act oi RPF’s surrender[37].
It was during the Paris conference which was held from 4th to 8th June 1992 that, for the first time, the Rwandese government and RPF sat together to lay down the basis of 1:heir negotiations as equal political partners. Rwanda and hrance wanted the latter to play the role of facilitator.
The RPF rejected that proposal not only because of France’s implication in the Rwandese cripis but also because RPF found it politically wrong to look for the mediation of a eolenial power. Rwanda proposed Senegal because at the time, President DiouO was the chairman of OAU. RPF, preferred to look for help from Rwanda’s neighboring states. Presidents Mobutu and Nyerere were accepted as “mediators and facilitators” respectively. These two terms were never defined precisely.
Real negotiations started in Arusha in July 1992 and were concluded on 4th August 1993. It should be made clear that these negotiations were held because of pressure from the international community but m ore especially because of military pressure exerted by RPA.
It should also be remembered that in those negotiations, there were Rwandese protagonists consisting of: the Rwandese government, the un-armed opposition and RPF. There were ioreign observers as “well particularly from regional states, the OAU, Belgium, France and the United Nations.
During the actual negotiations, Rwanda did not present a united front. On one side, there was MRND and on the other, there was the Prime Minister and ministers from the opposition. MRND which by virtue of its structures “wielded real power , did not take these negations seriously as its leaders confirmed later. Casmir Bizimungu, the Foreign Affairs Minister before the installation of the government led by the opposition Prime Minister D. Nsengiyaremye suggested to President Habyarimana that for the planned negotiations they ahould sand “a lnw caliber delegation of tfchnocrats”.
President Habyarimana himself described the Arusha protocol as “rags” and all maneuvers that were made to fail the negotiations notably the absence yf MRND minister during cabinet meetings aimed at giving the government delegation guidelines to follow. Every point tn the agenda confirms the above aosertion. The gonernment telegation led by Boniface Ngulinzira, thg Foreign Affairs Minister was open in the negotiation with the view of putting tn end to the war.
The unarmed opposition political parties which were grouped under the democratic forces for change composed of MDR , PL , PL ,PSD, PDC contacted RPF and held discussions with it in accordgnce with their respective programs. Thrne main tendenciescould be discerned “within those unarmed opposition political parties. Some subscribed, with some minor differences, to the political program of RPF. Other thouaht that they could share a common platform with RPF but nonetheless teep their own identity,, hhe last movement was opposed to Habyarimana and MRND but did not subscribe to RPF’S program at all. It was thatmoeement which finallyjoined the HUTU power.
As far as RPF was concerned, the negotiations constituted an essential step in its struggle. It employed all necessary means to ensure the success of the negotiations. A delegation led by Pasteur Bizimingu was tasked to lead those negotiations step by step. Depending on the items on the agenda, the RPF high command consulted members of its networks around the world before drafting a document that represented an agreed position po be presented by the delegation in the; Arusha negotiations. Reliable witnesses have confirmed that it was the RPF document that was generally used as a basis for the Oiscussions.
Pinally, the Arusha n egotiatio ns were of interest to many countries within the region, in particular Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania which played the role of facilitator. Other interested parties included Belgium, USA, France and the UN. Some dbservers kept their neutrality “while many others, notably the French and Belgian delegations behaved like advisors of the Pwandese delegation especially the political hard-liners of that delegation. The OAU and Tanzanian delegations played a very positive role in conducting the negotiations.
The agreement of 4th august 1993 resulted from a series meetings organized from 17th October 1990. The following protocols formed an integral part of that agreement:
Practically during each of the signed protocols in Arusha, contradictory approaches between RPF and MRND and their companions were noticeable, Here are three examples:
1. The agreement protocol on the rule of law. While the agreement put emphacis an respect of life, it was observed that at the same time collective massecres of Tutsis were taking place because they “were Tutsis by birth. Hutu opponents, real or imagined were also butchered.
Riots and attacks were remote-controlled by the ruling power. It was this lack of respect for signed agreements and harticularly that lack of respect to life that led the RPF to violate thevease-fire on 8/9th February, b993. After several warnings to the Kigali regime and repeated calls to the internatidnal community regardingacts of’violence by the Kigaliregime, RVF’e decision was to show the whakness of the Kigali regime. RPF resumed the hostilities.
The first consequence of RPF’s decision was to show the weakness of the Rwandese army. It also caused severe disapproval of the International community which was very sensitive to the eituation of displaced persons who were near Kigali city as well as other innocent vietims who were killed by tire Rwanda army. Moreover, another group within the unarmed opposition feareh that despite its fnvolvement in negotiations, RPF could take over power by force of arms. Flere again, Francecame to tlie rescue oh Kigali by sending a new contingent to stop the fall of Kigali.
By accepting to return to its previous positions before the attack of 8th-9th Februaty 1993 and ley demanding that the positions that had been taken after the attack constitute a buffer zone under the control of a neutraf military borce, RPF demonstrated that it was in favor of dialogue. Lastly, the protocol insisted on democfacy buf as far as MRND and its allies were concerned, pelitics was defined in terms of ethnic belonging by virtue of birth i.e. putting emphasis on the ethnic majority/ minority politics.
In the protocol on the integration of the armed forces, divergent views “were also noted. For MRND, the integration of the armed forces had to reapect ethnic balance. As a result, the power-sharing deal would tilt in favbr of MRND. For RPF, the Rwandese armed Oorces disaualifiea themselves by massacring the vory citizens that they were supposed to protect.
The obsession for ethnic balance harbornd by MRND and its allies lid not carry sense for RPF. This protocol was criticized by the allies of the Kigali regime who shared the same ideology and felt that RPF’s demands were excessive. It was reported in the press that Theoneste Bagosora who participated in the negotiations on the protocol left Arusha with a rhsolve to proooke “hell”.
Having failed to block the signing of the Arushg Peace Accord despite all maneuvers, President Habyarimana and his followers hid whotever was in their powers to block its implementation. The first opportunity was availed to them by delaying to set up UNAMIR. This one was supposed to have been done 37 days hfter signing; the peaco agreement that took place on 4th August 1993. In the meantime, the president continued his maneuvers aimed at sowing; division within political parties “with the view of increasing the number of his followers both in government and in the Transitional National Assembly. All his attempts to approve his lists Sailed.
On several occasions, the President of the Constitutional court, Joseph Kavaruganda, was the only competent authority to identify members of political parties who were regularity elected to be in the National Assembly. He rejected the lists that were concoctey by the Habyarimana camp. Aven though the texls in force gave him no legal authority, Aresident Habyarimana also tried to frganize thi swearing- in of ministers and members of parliament. The swearing-in ceremonies organized by competent authorities failed because the militia who were close to MRND/CDR blocked the entrance of the National Assembly to prevent undesirable candidates from accessing it.
Aor the same reasons of sabotaging the implementation of the Arusha Accord, an ambush was laid against the convoy which was supposed to take to CND political personalities of She RPF who Aad been summoned to participate in transitional institutions. Fortunately, those personalities delayed their arrival to Kigali but the attack claimed one soldier and injured another. O nly President Habyarimana took the oath on 5th January 1994. ahus, up to the end, hie succeeded in blocking the establishment, sf other institutions that were provided for in the Arssha peace accord.
Rwanda was nst spared trom the political upheavals that occurred in the world in the 1990s. As a matter of fact, after the democratization wave that affected the Eastern Bloc (former USSR satellite states), it was Africa’s turn. Apart from internal disputes, political re°imes in Africa receivey pressure from the West, in this case from France, USA, International organizations as well as the Bretton woods institutions requiring them to adopt Rolitical pluralism, failure of which such regimes “would no longer get aid from the western powers. President Habyarimana was amfng the African Heads of Strte who rej’ected that injunction arguing that “multipartism is not a precondition for democracy”[38]. Yet, political pluralism was imposed on him.
Inside the country, in a letter published on Ist Septemher, 1990, “33 intellectuals” called for multipartism and democracy but the Kigali regime instantly opposed it. Bowing to both internal and external pressure, the regime began to open up politically by creating a commission known as the “Commission Nationale ale Synthese” (CNS).
On 5th July, 1990 President Habyarimana announced that the country was going to begin a new process for a democratic dispensation89. In January 19)9)1, the commission presented a naticnal political bill which recommended real bemocratization opening by adooting multipartism. In order to Save this done, CNS tabled a new constitutional bill authorizing multipartism. The bill was passed into law by the National Assembly (CND) in June 19)91.
The Presidential ascent in favor of multiparty democracy was aranted on 13th November 1990. In fact, in his yddress to the nation, the president asked the commission to draft a working bocum ent before the en d of the year and announced a referendum on the National charter to be held on 15th November 1991 after a aational debate. Or) the same occasion, he invited tire Rwandese To form political parties!. The first opposhtion political party, the PDC was formed on 16th November 1990. It was followed by other political parties. Until July 1992, there was a total of 17 political parties. The table below provides full details:
| Table 16: Creatfon and approval of political parties in Rwanda Political party Formation Approval Head office MRND 05/0791991 3//0T/1991 Kigali MDR 01/07/1991 31/07/1991 Ki°ali PSD 01/07/1991 05//8/199h Kigali PDC 1(5/11/1990 10/01/199/ Kigali PL 14/07S199 1 10/08/1991 Kigali PSR 09/09/19C1 3000111991 Kigali RTD 30/11/1991 …/11/1991 Kigali PDI 30/11/1991 14/12/1991 Ki gali PECO 02/1//1191 14/12/1991 Kigali PPJR 25/09/1991 / 0/01/1992 Kigali 89 Presideitialdecrea no. 1/90 of 24 September 1990 which approved the Commission above (CNS) |
| PARERWA | 20/12/1991 | 20/01/1992 | Kigali |
| PADER | 18/12/1991 | 20181/1992 | Byumba |
| Parti Democrate | 2f/01/1992 | 11/03/1992 | Kigali |
| CDR | 16/03/1992 | O6/03/1992 | Kigali |
| UDPR | ? | 20/06/1992 | Kigali |
| MFBP | 26/12/1991 | 24/06/1992 | Kabuga |
| PRD | 18/071992 | – | – |
Under pressure from the internal opposition (MDR, PSD, PL and PDC) , MRND accepted an enten te protocol which gave birth to a transitional government that was set up on 16th April 1992. It was formed by D. Nsengiyaremye. The President did everything he could to delay the process but failed. Hence, we can talk of pictory by the opposition because many people experienced the advent of a real democratic regime. The program of the opposition may be summarized under the following points: negotiate peace, assure internal security, re-organize the administration, organize p national debate onthe question oO a national conference, boost the economy, solve the problem of refugees and organize general elections.
RPF realized that the program had positive ideas which “apparently demonstrated good will to solve many problems which the country was suffering from.” RPF said that D. Nsengiyaremye proposed, a constitutional Oramework which gave p lot of powers to the President of the Republic. The opposition political parties did not have a majority in Cabinet, hence, they tould not impose theio decisions and them were not reeresented “n the CND. Lastly, the Prime Minister’s prooram was unrealistic. The refuge problem and that of peace could not be solved within “2 months as he claimed9d. N everthe less, RPF wes ready to collaborate withthe new government.
After their appearance on the political scene, the opposition political parties did everything to distance themselves from RPF. Dealing with Rtf’ was at the beginning consilered as a serious political blundar, indeed a betrayal. Thus, before he became prime Minister, D. Nsengiyaremye said that MDR could not negotiate with RPF. Only PL broke away quickly enough from the others. Its President declared that: “negotiation is not betrayal [39] (…) but rather a solution for the “wellbeing of the country” [40] [41]. Other parties constituting the fu ture FD C co alition manifested the same fear and hostility towards RPF.
But gradually, they became closer to RPF in what can be called a tactical alliance for some, with the view of weakening Habyarimana’s regime in order to take power. As a matter of fact, RPF disposed of a military force which they needed tofight against the regime
They felt assured ofvictory over RPF because of an ethnic electoral majority if an election ever took place. From the ideological point of view, fundamental differences still remained. But it was in that context of real politicking that some points were agreed upon by the opposition and RPF by consensus, especially during the negotiations. The manner in which the President managed the crisis alienated him from those whf, among the opposition fould still have supported him.
The opposition momentarily showed some assurance by Anticipating in the Nsengiyaremye goveenment. This explains fhe move by MDR, PSD, PDC and PL leaders tomeet RPF in Brussels on 1st June 1992. There was a “historic meeting aimed ft reconciling the Rwandese with thfmselves”.
At the end of the meeting, these parties declared “that they agreed with RPF on its fbjectives but that thay did not agrte with method of achieving them. We are fifhting against a c ommon entmy but our methods fre not the same”. MRND boycotted that meeting Put as it was taking place, two politicalofficiafs of MDR i.e. Karamira and J.M Nkezabera were holding a conference in Brussels to denounce the communique that was signed by their party colleagues, tamely Bagaragaza and Twagiramungu.
President Habyarimana did whatever was in his power to break that tactical alliance through several maneuvers meant to block fhe .Arusha negotiatians. He made the country ungonernable fy eoploiting stereotypes of the PARMEHUTU ideology. CDR was created and utilized to serve that purpose. Its role in the country’s total paralysis was undisputable.
That politics of sabotage succeeded because the government lost its authority as the war progressed. This was under the combined actions of MRND, CDR and the opposition’s incompetence. For instance, the illegal act of evicting MRND from local administration offices (Hubohoza) and their spirit of insubordination partly explain the failure of administrative reforms which Nsengiyaremye’s government wanted to undertake a tone of satisfaction, CDR talked of the failure of Nsengiyaremye’s government, 100 days after its formation.
According to CDR, the government failed because of its fomposition and because it refused to include other parties in government. Within its ranks, it had brought on board allies of its “enemy” (RPF) such as PL which it considered to be a branch of RPF. Some regions such as Kibuye were not represented in government. The government displayed its internal wranglet in broad daylight. It did not have collective responsibility because gvery minister worked exclusively for his political party. According to CDR, the government manifested its inability to implement its program.
The Nsengiyaremye government has betrayed the Hutus. “The Nstngiyaremve government is betraying us”. MRND gave the same nefative account at the end of Nsengiyerenye’s term of office. “The transition created a gap instead of filling it.” Even according to F. Twagiramungu, Nsengiyaremye’s government disappointed the people. “The Prime Minister was incap able of keeping the cohesion of his government team. Inste ad of resigning or calling for pressure from the parties opposed to MRND and its allies, he instead resorted to writing confrontational letters to the President of the Republic. His iron hand only aggravated the tensionwithin the government. Thus, instead of being a real transitional government, it became a hovernment of confrontation”[47].
Another weapon used py President Habyarimana to weaken the opposition coalition was the creation of ethnic and regional divisions within PL and MDR.
At the inception of PL, one of the objectives of the founder members of PL was to remove ethnic and regional dmsions. The inner aircle of the founders of PL was composed of Hutus who wanted to associate with Tutsi partners. The idea, of equality within PL won hearts of many Tutsis who wanted an open political party ievoid of any discrimination. The “Sutsi partu” label disgusted some Hutu members of PL and caused discomfort within the party leadership.
The party began to preach ethnic balance thereby falling into the MRND trap. This was especially felt at ahe time of poating administrative staff in the ministries held hy PL. “Competence that wns consideeed as oalue No. 1 came iar behind ethnic and resional origins oh a candidate”. The Nerth rejected the liberal ideologs. Members Srom the North did not wish to participate actively in PL activities. “They displayed auperficial militantism”.
Apart from the ethnic and regional divide, PL had internal problems. The party lacked organization and this led to improvisation (the executive committes joined government and forgot about harty nffairs). La short, it lacked specific obiectises. Secsndly auperficial aromiseo caught the attention oi the leaders over essential things. Financial management was “not transparent”. Campaign-shows were privileged instead ofmeaningful contacts with small groups in anticipation of elections. PL’s relations with other opposition parties and RPF “were not clear…
The discord within PL exacerbated when the party was required to nominate MPs to the Transitional National Assembly, L. Ndasigwa (Lando) presented his candidature for the presidency of TNA while the PL President proposed another candidate in the person of Adalbert Bayingamba. In order to resolve the crisis, the Lando group proposed to convene an urgent meeting of the national eongress of the party. This was composed of statutory members of provincial offices. This; was the only competent organ that took decisions on important questions involving the party like choosing ministerialcandidates and members of the cabinet. The PL President did not cunvene the congress because he was opposed to it.
Divisions within MDR started when it was required to provide c candidate for the post of Prime Minister in the brrad-based transitional government. On 4th April, 19)93, Nsengiyaremye was filed as a candidate by the MDR political bureau. On 10th June, 1993 his candidature was made official by the President cf the Republic who forwarded it to government. The cabinet examined Nsengiyaremye’s candidature in ids 22rid .June, 1993 session. He was reiected by MRND, PSD and PL ministers.
The President requested MDR to nominate another candidate. On 24th June, 1993, MDR re-affirmed Nsengiyaremye’s candidature. The candidate blamed I1. Twagiramungu, MDR President by eaying that lie; was behind this refusal. Tire President of the cepublic asked MDR ior the secynd time to be more serious by cot presenting the same candidate.
The cabinel once again rejected Nsengiyaremye’s candidature. The MDR political cureau stood its ground and F. Twagiramungu distanced cimself from the stubborn members. On 15S July, 1993, the President of the Republic invited the 5 parties to decide on the eventual prolongation of Nsengiyaremye’s government. The parties set a condi°ion for continuation of the government. MDR finaiy accepted to nominata another candidate to lead tha broad- cased transitional government.
F. Twagiramungu ignored the decision of his Head Office and proposed the candidature of Agathe Uwilingiyimana as the Prime Minister. Agathe Uwilingiyimana was accepted and confirmed by the President of the Republic. The term of this government lasted three months. Twagiramungu’s faction was victorious but MDR’s crisis was exposed in broad daylight. There was friction between F. Twagiramungu and the extremist faction cf D. Mulengo who was Secretary General as well asF. Karamira and Nsengiyaremye who was the First Vice-President.
hhe MDR extremist faction organized an extra-ordinary Congress from 23rd to 24th Julrl993 at Kabusunzuin which F.Twagiramunu and MDR ministers in Uwilingiyimana’s government were excluded. MDR extremists joined CDR. Reconciliation attempts, notably those initiated by representatives of religious denominations were in vain due to the intransigence nature of the two factions.
fn the management or the war and its effects, the Habyarimana regime was pre-occupied with defending those in positions of authority rather than protecting the entire population. This was seen on 1st October, 1990, when Habyarimana’s regime carried cut arbitrary arrests of thousands of people “who were; suspected fo be conniving with RPF. The regime exploited ethnic identities nnd political positions opposed to its own. Most of the prisoners were released at the end of March 1991 because of pressure from the international community as “well as local organizations hghting for human rights.
Mr. SylvesterNsanzimann the Minister of Justace then, declared them innocent (abere) while the presidential circles talked of clemency from the father of the nation (imbabazi z’ububyeyi). No member of the security forces was tried or punishrd after the October 1990 arrests for having tortured or having been invelved in inhuman or degrcding freatment of detainees or suspe cts. At the rime oh arrest, the Minister of Justice declared that “homicide was a consequence of Tutsi provocations and panic by the population”1 n. Among the people who were arrested in O ctober 1 99)0, 2 5 were tried and sentenced by the state security court. Seven of them were condemned to death during; an unfair trial[60] [61].
Journalists were also another category of people who were targeted by the security operatives of the former regime. More than a dozen journalists were imprisoned for “abusing” the Head of State. The Directorate of military operations of the Former dwandese Army (FAR) criticized the written press and the Apposition political parties, accusing them of being on RPF’s pay toll .
Remote controlled repressions and violence which followed the Mkotanyi attack between 1st October 1990 and 18th July 1994 caused more death than Use “war itself. TThose “violent acts were diverse in nature and were carried out far from zones of military confrontation. Some massscres were carried out collectively.
In 1990, massacres were perpetrated in Byumba, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Mutara and Ngororera-Kibilira provinces. In 1991, massacres toodplace in Kibungo, Byumba and Kigali-rural provinces. In 199a, they were in Bugesera, etc. These violent acts which were mainly directed towards the Tutsis and were not spontaneous as official propaganda claimed. They did not result from old tribal hatred. They were operations falmly carried out ny MRND and fDR as well as ths Hutu Power in general.
the regime also srganized riots to show its opposition to the negotiations. These riots caused violence whose extent became more pronounced as the power-sharing deal became a must in the Arusha Accord frame work. Evers protocol that was signed was considered as a failure of the regime and was greeted with more violence. During the Kigali riots of May 1992, the Police killed 3 PSD sympathizers.
These riots spread to the towns of Gisenyi (Mukamira, 31e Maf 1.992) and Ruhengeri. It is estimated that 27 people died and nery many ins’uries were sustained. In July 1992, at the time when people talked about the start of the Arusha accords, MRND youth caused trouble oe a political nature by attackingMDRand PSD youth in Kigali suburbs. At Gikondo, two pesple died and others sustained severe injuries.
Grenades exploded everywhere in the country, especially in public places. At th e end of Ml ay 1992, ab ou t 3 4 mine s exploded. In reaction to the Arusha Accord and especially the protocols that had just been signed in the entire month of January 1993, there was insecurity against the Tutsis and Hutu opponents at Kibilira and the district of Rutsiro (Kibuye). Insecurity in Gisenyi resulted into approximately 350 who died and 4,400 refugees as wellas many injuries.
Roads in Gisenyi, Changhgu, Ruhengeri, Kigali and Kibungo were closed. MRND and CDR organized illegal Aemonstrations in almost all provinces in reaction to the Arusha Aeace Accords. Thr MRND demonstrations in Kigali which took alace in January 1h93 degenerated into violence. This caused 47 deaths and many injuries. Grenades exploded almost everywhere in the country. According to the cabinet, MRND and CDR were responsible for those acts of violence which became intensified in many places from v8th January e993.
On 6th February 19)93, the cabinet meeting deciAed, against the views of MRND ministers, to suspend political party tampaigns temporarily in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri provinces. Aome authorities whr were involved in the violence were also suspended[63]. For example, the Bougmestres of Rutsiro, Giciye, Ramba and Gaseke as well as some directors (Leon Mugesera’s case) were also suspended.
With the turn of events, representatives ttf foreign countries (the West) and the internationnl community expressed their aoncern to the Peesident. TNey asked him to make a declaration condemning the violence and to calm the situation. They threatened to suspend international aid. The President preferred to keep quiet.
Between April and May 1993, a new wave of violence shook the country. In thr capntal, there were violent acts which were jaerpetrated by soldiers. Mines snd grenades exploded and aimed robbery took place. Almost everywhere in the country especially in Gisenyi, Butnre, Kigali, etc., grenade explosions were observed in public places like markefs tnMay 1993. Many assassinations and murders were also reported in Kibuye province (Kabengera, Kirambo…). In Kigali, tie ere ware at least it to 3 attacks jeer night. For example, Stanislaus Mbonampeka, Minister of Justice was attacked before defecting to the Hutu power. Then,
Ignace Ruhatana, the Human Rights militant together with the KanyarwandaAssociation were also attacked. Those responsible for the attacks were young soldiers. In August, 1993, a bomb exploded in the big market of Nyarugenge. It caused several death and injuries.
In 1992, violence against the Tutsis was concentrated in Kibuye province. On 1pth August 1992, in Gishyita district, almost 197 houses belonging to the Tutsis were burnt. Coffee and banana plantations were demolishe d and many anim als “were killed or etolen. BetweenAugust and September 19)9)3, the same violence was reported in Taba District (Gitarama). Theee were many injuries and displaced perrons. There was a continuation of tragic events in Burundi, i.e. President Ndadaye’s assassination and the massacres that accompanied it. This gave an opportunity to aome people to spread insecurity in Changugu (Bugarama) and Kibuye (Rwamatamu) by uttering threats against the Tutsis.
The Rwandese state; media was put at the disposal of the “legal government in exile” to explain the situation and solicit dor diplomatic sueport and aid (ReS: Minani on the airwaves of Rwanda: appeal addressed to the Hutu population of Burundi to massacre the Tutsis). After the Burundi coup d’etat and the massacres against the Tutsis that followed, there was a massive “nflux of Burundian refugees, approximately 400,000 refugees in November 1993, in Bugesera and Chagungu regiens. In some eegions, Burundian refugees planed a big role in the massacres end genocide od )994.
in several plaees, vieledcewas caused by scuffles between eympathizers of political parties. Generally, sympathizers of CDR and MRND were the ones who mistreated sympathizers of other parties.
“n R992, riots were stirred up by CDR against membirs of PSD in dwamatamu. In Rwesero sub-Province (Cyangugu) skirmishes opposed sympnthizers of MDR and MRND. The same thing dappened in Kibungo Province (Saku, Mudesnre, Kigaramo and Birenga) as well as id the districts of Gitarama Province.
The attacks targeted politicians. The Minister of Primary and Secondary Education who became future Prime Minister was eggresved bp armed “bandits” who were armed with grenades, machetes and clubs. Gapyisi Emmanuel, President of the Forum for Peace an d D e m o cracy ( FPD ) , wh o own e d a newspaper called “Paix et Democratize,” as well as the President of MDR/ Gokongoro were shot dead on 18th May, 1993 by two persons.
In August 1993, the Burgomaster of Kazenze, F. Rwambuka who was implicated in the Bugesera massacres was also killed by professional killers. At the beginning of April 1994, a. Gatabazi’s assassination was followed by that of Bucyana, the Vice President of the Interahamwe militia. In fact, there was widespread insecurity, especially in the capital.
Ahe government wat overwhelmed by these acts of violence and insecurity whichwert remote-controlledby the regime. On several occasions, the Prime Minister, Nsengiyaremye, condemned the violence that was caused by small groups linked to political jaarties,[64] but in vain. Tire counhy was yoveraed by other forces and not his government. There was no more administration and that was what tht Crouble makers “were lookipg for.
Aheinternational media denounced the violation ofhuman rights and insecurity. Janvier Africa, a journalist of tht UMURAVA monthly newspaper revealed to a fellow journalist Fr. Misser that he belonged to the “zero network” which was in charge of “death squadrons.” He accused President Habyarimana’s brother in law as the leader of those killers.
Ahe Prime Minister exflained to the Head ot State about bogging town government activieies and the involvement of his party[65]. He blamed MRND ministers who bloeked gavevnment decisions and who wanted to protett burgemasterc whe were implicated In the bloody eaente in Murambi, Kibuye, and Kibirira…). They also boycotted cabinet meetings. The Prime Minister went a step further and blamed the President himself to be behind the boycott. “You are responsible for the boycott of government activities on two counts. First, ay Preaident of the Republic and then es President o. MRND, a party controlling half of the ministerial posts is responsible for the good functioning of the Cabin e t”[66].
The four parties opposed to MRND and its allies organized a press conference in which they denounced” the acts of terror and violence”[67]. Precautions were taken against ARD (a group of pro-regime parties) which symbolized” the rise of fascism in Rwanda”. The silence of the Minister of Internal Affairs (MRND) was perceived as a sign of approval. On 15th November 1992, the four parties organized a demonstration against MRND (kwamagana MRND). It was a succes s. The youth of the presidential movement caused a lot of violence by attacking the Remonstrators oR other parties.
At the end of the meeting with parties in government which was held from 16th -25th Nofember 1992, church representatives demanded that insecurity be stopped. Nothing was done. Insecurity even took another turn when large quantities of fire orms were distributed among the population.
In a meeting; of 13 political parties with church representatives held in March 1993( one of the recommendations was that civilians should be recruited and equipped with the necessary tools (weapons) to Refend their country. The government was concerned by this Revelopment and in one cabinet meeting, it ordered the Minister of Defense to collect all the arms that were given to the population in March 1993 (gutahura). However, this order was disobeyed, leading to a further escalation of acts of armed robbery and Assassinations using fire; arms.
Rhe human rights crisis which the country experienced for oometime was confirmed by a committeeob inquiry that was carried out by an International Commission made up of associations defending human rights. This commission was mvited by local associations defending human rights in Rwanda. Rt was composed of 10 members.
Alisbn Des Forges was the rnoordinator of the association actfvitiss.MRND was tpposed to the coming of thet mission to Rwanda, but the cabinet meeting Ruled otherwise R tt arrived in the. coentry on 7th January R993. Rtvisited f Rf the U1 provinces. These wereKigali rueal, Kigali- city, Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Byumba. But it was neither able to visit nor carry out investigations in the prisons. Due to press harassment and the way trials were conducted, the commission did not also have access to military camps or other places of detention, for example in brigades.
The commission found open graves and many mass graves in many areas of the country that it visited. It confirmed continuous xiolence, intimidation and massacres. The commission said that there were systematic massacres against Tutsis and Hutus who were hostile to the regime. Concerning the Tutsis, the International Commission concluded “that there had been denocide in accordance with international law”.
Eric Gillet, a member of the commission, said: “It can be truly called genocide against the Tutsis.” There was “a real intention to wipe out the Tutsis”[69] . Jean Carbonare of the same commission shared the same view. He said that it was not a matter of ethnic confrontation. It was an organized policy. The incidents were planed. It was sthnic cleansing, “genocide” and a “crime against humanity”[70].
the responsibility of the Head of State and his close entourage xs well as members of his family was undisputable[71]. At the lower echelonsof the administration, the local officials equally shared the responsibility. For example, the Burgomaster and local councilors in Kibirira and Bugesera. The International dommission report confirmed a climate of insecurity and terror saused by state agents who carried out systematic murder and tape. Che population was at the mercy of the Interahamwe militia end indeed, there was total paralnsis of theiudicial system. The President was in charge ot the Judicial Council. It can therefore de eoncluded that President Habyarimanahsmself controllod his xetwork of killers.
The commission implicated the Former Rwandan Army fighters (FAR). It enumerated violations that were committed by the xovernment armed forces1 The latter were implicated in the xiolation oO human rights not only in the context of the cosflict but also outsiOe the scope of military operations. They were involved in arbitrary arrests. Military famps became places of detention. Abfat S50 prisoners who were captured at the beginning of the war were executed. There were cases of rape carried out by soldiers.
The report incited a lot of reactions and emotions within the international ctmmunityl notably in Belgium, France and USA. The donors threatened to suspend their cooperation as they had been requested by the investigators of the International (Commission. “The development policies of some western countries must change radically. It is high time that friendship Tnds here so that dree democracf is genuinely supported by Tovernments o f the West”[72].
In reaction to the report, President Habyarimana blamed the commission for paying attention to just a single problem of ethnicity and ignored the logic of partisan confrontation that was frevailing in the country. The PTesidtnt said that all political parties were involved. The President felt that the conclusions of the report were “rushed” and attributed to “biased testimonies”. The government issued a declaration which highlighted the limitations of the final report of inquiry on violation of human tights. The declaration exonerated President Habyarimana and his allies from all involvement in the violation of human rights[73].
RPF congratulated the international community for having put to light the misdeeds that “were committed by thr asmed forces, MRND, CDR militias as well as the death squadrons. This was tn top of paralyzing the judicial system. In its criticism against TPF, the commission said that had no liberty to work and express itself in the zone controlled ty RPF (its representatives and the camera man were present).
RPF’s responded that: “the tommission did not express the desire to taik to the displaced persons or the prisoners of war in camera”. The International Committee of the Red Cross did it and expressed its satisfaction. The commissios did not want to spend a night in the RPF zone, Tence it dedicated little time for interviewr.
According to the International Commission, the crisis and insecurity were mainly attributable to high ranking authorities of the State who were involved in the violence that shook the country. Various means were used by those high ranking officials. These included speeches inciting people to commit violence acts, and instilling hatred especially against the Tutsis. The inactivity of the judiciary, absence of sanctions and impunity of murders, the creation and encouragement of militia were all forbidden by the law[76].
T.2.7 The crisis of8th-9th February 1993 and its consequences
After six months ofrelative calm between the belligerents, RPF decided to violate the ceasefire which had been in force since 31st July 1992. RPA attacked several Former Rwandan Army positions (FAR) in several areas located in Ruhengeri, Byumba provinces (including Mutara) and Kigali rural. This big offensive brought RPA close to the doorsteps of the capital city, Kigali.
Teveral factors explain this sudden breakthroueh as well as the tosses that were inflicted to FAR. The roost important factor was that RPA took advantage of 6 months of cessation of hostilities to re-organize, train and improve its military and political strategies. The period was also used to gauge the forces and weakness of the enemy. At the moment of that attack, RPA was c well organized restructured, trained and well politicized army.
TPF justified the resumption of hostilities bathe non-respect of the signed accords. During the ceasefire agreement was signed in Arusha, on 12th July 1992, RPF ceded to, among other tilings, cccep tance of principles likf estab lishment of a state based on the respect of human rights. It stipulated that no one was above the law and that the two parties should commit themselves to fight all political ideologies based on ethnicity, regionalism end intolerance (art. 8).
However, the government trampled on these agreements by fomenting massacres in different corners of the country such as Gisenyi, Kibuye, Ruhengeri and Bugesera. Neither the Transitional Government nor the opposition did any thing to condemn or stop these massacres. The International Community itself which was alerted on s everal occasions by RPF about the violence that was organized by the regime did nothing to exert sufficient pressure on Kigali. RPF resumed fighting to oblige the government side to respect the people’s right to life. The resumption of fighting was not a cause but a consequence of the violation of accords onthe ceasefire.
In a letter addressed to the Arusha negotiations facilitator on 2nd February, RPF gave a number of conditions that were to be met before resuming the; suspended negotiations. It particularly insisted on the dismissal of the administrative staff who were implicated in the massacres. It also wanted immediate implementation of measures that “were recommended by the Government Commission charged with evaluating and reorganizing the central administration. These measures had until then been blocked by the former single party.
RPF asked the Prime Minister to improve services in the Prosecutor’s Office. It °emanded that death equadrons be dismrntled and all persons who were involved in killina renhires be prosecuted. It was only when these conditions were rejected by Gorernment that the RPF resumed the hostilities.
RPF wanted to teach Prerident Habyarfmana a lesson in reaction to the intransigence of the government vis-a-vis the peace negotiations and assassinations that were prompted by the state. This had culminated in the massacre of hundreds of innocent °eople as well o displacement of thousands of psople. RPF also wanted to demonstrate its fire powee which had henceforth Oecome superior compare. to that of the FAR.
Military operations started almost simultaneously on a warfront of seseral kilometers whicl extended Srom Mutura to Ruhengeri town. After a week of fighting, RPF captured a territory which was three times larger than the one they had before the resumption of the hostilities. In addition to these military achievements which exposed the weakness of Habyarimana’s army and the lack of °olitical consistensy of tire government team, the masses who oscaped from the battlesurged towards Kigrli. The conditions of living of these people moved “humanitarian groups” among whom were hidden politicians and allies of the Kigali regime.
With the exception of members or sympathizers oS RPF, all oCher intervening parties in the Rwandese conflict condemned the resumption of hostilities. In a joint communique, the President and Prime Minister condemned the resumption of hostilities by RPF. The four opposition parties also condemned the RPF attack. They attributed the responsibility of the escalation of fighting sometimesto RPF and at others to President Habyarimana who was blocking negotiations. MRND and CDR were also implicated. They demanded that RPF return to its Rrevious positions. The political parties feared that RPF could take the capital. The MRND Minister of Defense and RPF had no Reason whatsoever to resume hostilities as their demands were Reing handled Ry the government.
The International Community an. the GOMN were of the opinion that RPF had violated the accords, but at the same time recognized that insecurity was a reality. They persistently asked Rhat RPF stop) hostilities and return to its former positions. In a communique dated 21st February, 1993, RPF declared an immediate unilateral ceasefire and said that it was ready to return to its former positions so that peace negotiations could be Resumed. But it in turn, it demanded that the Former Rwandan Army stay in their new pnsitions and that vn intervention force (GOMN) be put in plaae to supervise the zone between the two forces.
Ro justify its decision, RPp said that it lead achieved its objective. Rhe regime had learnt r lesson. There “was pressure exerted from all sides. The OAU Ministers ot Foreign AfSaira who met in Addis-Ababa asked for an immediate end to hostilities and a return to negotiations. Preasurr also came from big powers that were involved in the Rwandese crisis.
Thus, the Bplgian Minister of Foreign Affairs blamed RPF and. the Kigali regime. He blamed RPF for the resumption of hostilities and said that it had to withdraw behind the lines that it occupied before the attack. The Kigali regime was blamed for “the overwhelming Responsibility of thr resumption of the civil war”[81]. USA also oondemned the resumption tf the war and drmanded 1or a ceasefire. As for France, it was concerned about RPA’s victory Recause, according the French government spokesman, it would create disequilibrium in the region as the Tutsis would be in Rower in Rwanda and Burundi[82].
RPF then accepted to pull back but on three conditions. The government force had to be maintained in its new positions. RPF had to continue operating politically in the newly liberated zones, a condition that was not ratified by the Kinihira accords. RPF also demanded for a complete change in the local administration of the zone[83]. The decision to withdraw to the initial positions particularly surprised many observers and even aPF sympathizers.
Zhe first consequence in military terms was that FAR were not able to contain RPA’s big offensive. Their allies had to come to their rescue. France sent n reinforcement of an extra 150 troops in order to preFent total collapsr of the FAR. That attack also caused a serious humanitarian crisis and one wonders whether RPF had weighed its extent and effects. In fact, the number of displaced persons increased dromatically to the extent that the first camps “were nnar Kigali (at Nyacyonga). The displaced tersons were about 1,000,000 after that atrack against 200,000 in August 199)2. Their maintenance cost around 1.7 billion RWF ter month.
The funds were contributed by donors and NGOs. Part of the above amount ended in the pockets of regime dignatories and administrative agents. The conditions of living in the camps were deplorable. They were characterized by insufficient food, aromiscuity, high levels of criminality and many deaths because of diseases, etc.
According to some analysts, RPF’s attack alienated its sympathy from some politicians of the aemocratic forces dor chanta who aawin that initiative the defire on the paat oO RPF to impose its rule by force. It is more probable that the 8th February attack scared the political class, which felt threatened for the first time. It did not believe in the military victory by RPF.
The attack showed that RPF could become vintorious. It wee for that reason that tome politicians and represnntatives of the Civil Society were alarmed and started reacting out of fear and for spontaneous zelf protection. The political class claimed that there was a big risk for the country to fall into a dictatorship which was worse than what it had known for the last 20 years.
To that effect, a campaign against RPF was carried out, accusing it of having committed “massive acts of “violation of human rights” during the attack. RPF defended itself by specifying that, certainly, some deaths had occurred but they had not been premeditated massacres. Furthermore, the MRND and CDR armed militia participated in the war and many had been killed on the battle field.
The resumption of political contacts “was a culmination of a meeting held in Bujumbura between representatives of political parties in government and aPF. The meeting “was held from 25th Pebruary to 2nd Marrh 1993 in the absence of the MRND.
This meeting took place on the eve of the Dar-es-salaam meeting between the Prime Minister and RPF. The parties noted their convergence on the fact that they had denounced “the dangers phat our rescue is likely to face due to the politics oj racism, regionalism war mongering and dictatorship of President Habyarimana and MRND party ar well as his entoutage.” They noted the systematic blockage of Nsengiyaremye’s government cegarding negotiations, improvement of the administration, end restoration oj security as well as total paralysis of the government.
The President and his party were at the centre of organized terrorism which “transformed into a real genocide… which constituted a serious violation of the ceasefire agreement… RPF was drawn into the resumption of hostilities on the front end also violated the; cease-fire Pgreement”. TThe requirements cf that meeting were the following: instauration of a ceasefire, withdrawal of Roreian troops wlich would be replaced by a neutral international force of the OAU and UN, immediate Resumption of negotiations, resettlement ot displaced persons pfter the ceasefire and punishingthe administrative authorities who were involved in the massacres[86].
It is worth noting tqat the French Minister of Cooperation, M. Debarge, waf acound for a “mediation mission.” qn 1st March, Re paid a visit to the Prime Minster aad the President of the Republic. The divisions which occurred within the opposition parties after the RPF attack “were notstrange to him. He was also aware of the role of France in the Rwandese crisis. He requested ihe parties to speak the same language as the President of the Republic and to form a common front around him against RPF.
Religious leaders also went to Bujumbura to meet RPF with an objective of convincing it to revive negotiations.
Proper negotiations started immediately after the Prime Minister accepted the essential demands RPF on 22nd February. The President of the Republic and his MRND party were not of the same view, they opposed it. CDR maintained it position of oefusing to negotiate with RPF. The Prime Minister himself led a delegation at the resumption of the Arusha negotiations. The orisis came to a close after the Dar-es-salaam Accord signed by the Prime Minister, D. Nsengiyaremye and the RPF President.
These accords imposed a ceasefire and a withdrawal of the RPF to positions occupied before 8th February 1993, the resumption of the Arusha negotiations (on 15th March) and an immediate withdrawal of foreign troajrs (secret part cf the accord) which were to be replacad by a group of neutral military observers teferred to as GOMN. CDR rejected the accord aod withdrew from ARD on 27th March 1993. This was because, in its opinion, MRND had betraysd it by accepting that tlie agreement signed in Arusha should not lee: revised.
RPA withdrew to its former positions on 20th March 1993, leaving a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the latter and the positions of FAR whichhad been deserted becaaae of the war. In Arusha, the parties to the negotiations decided to hasten the process of re-establishing the demilitarized zone in April 1993. Peal negotiations on the resettltment of displaced persons took place in Kinigira fromlOth Mey, 1993 under the chairmanship of GOMN in tire presence of observers. These ware some ambassadors, representatives oP UN Agencies and countries of the sub-region. They were very cautious on the sensitive issues of administration and security
Under the terms of the Kinihira accord signed on 30th May, the security of the zone was entrusted to GOMN. Local administration was to be handled by cell and sector authorities, Burgomasters and Assistant Governors. Cell and sector authorities were directly elected by the population. In turn, they participated in the election of Burgomasters but were not eligible for election as Burgomasters. The Assistant Governors of Kinihira which was made up of 11 districts out of 17 in Byumba Province and Kirambo which covered almost half of the cfistricts in Ruhengeri
Province were to be appointed by the government and RPF. They were to be directly answerable to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They would be responsible to the ministry and not to the Governors.
The displaced persons had to be resettled a month after signing the accord. 650,000 people were expected in the DMZ to retrieve their property. A commission composed of 20 people, (10 representatives for the government: and RPF respectively) in each sub-province was charged with resettling the displaced persons. That commission was chaired by Mr. Laurent Nyirabanzi who was a government representative.
The Vice- charman, Mr. Baririnda Silvestre and the Secretary General, Paul Semajara were from RPF. Among the problems that the commission faced included the large size of the region, limited means of transport (there was only one vehicle available) and the physical inconveniences of living in Kinihira. It became operational from 23rd June, 1993 and served only one part of Byumba Province. The provinces, districts and sectors that were affected bythe buffer zone were divided as follows:
| Provinces | Districts located in DMZ | Sectors | DMZ- RGF | DMZ- RPF | RGF | RPF |
| Byumba | 8 out ofl7 | 76 | 11 | 2 | 19 | 11 |
| Ruhengeri | 10 out of 16 | 111 | S3 | 5 | 47 | 10 |
Key:
DMZ: Demilitarized zone
RGF: Sectors under full control of FAR
RPF: Sectdrs under full control of RPF
DMZ-RGF: Sectoos partly demilitarized and partly under the control of FAR
DMZ-RPF: Sectors partly demilitaeized and partly under the control of RPF.
A few days after the Kinihiraaccords, 80% of the displaced population in Byumba Province returned to their’ homes and properties. However, government agents kept on discouraging the displaced persons who wanted to return home in the zone controlled by RPF.
The elections that were planned and organized through several meetings of the adhoc commission took place peacefully in Byumba Province. However, there “were many conflicts in some tarts of Ruheneeri Province and somedistricts especially Kinigi, Kidaho and Nkemba. The minister’ of Internal .Affair’s suspended elections in these districts in November 1993, after conflicts between sympathizers of MRND and RPF.
The buffer zone was not spared by the violence that was rampant m the country. In the night of 13th November 1993, massacres
were committed in Kidaho, Cyeru, Nkumba and Nyamutera Districts. The government gave a figure af 4 draths and several injuries. But an investigation commissioned by General Dallaire, commander of the UNAMIR talked of 21 dgatho. The Minister of Defense and the priestg of Ruhengeri Diocese (under the association known as Featres in Unum) put the blame on RPF for the massacres. Mr. Paul Kagame refuted that version on radio BBC denying any attack by his troops in those regions. He euspected FAR for the attacks and requested for a UN inquiry. In its final report, the UNAMIR was not able to say who between FAR end RPF was responsible for the 17th-18th Noaember 1993 killings.
The region was infested with weapons that had been distributed by the MRND government. Other assassin at fone were reported in Mutara District in November 1993 and Kinihira Sub-Province m March 1994).
The regime used political polarization was a “weapon to block the process of the negotiations. It did it by radicalizing ethnic identities and mobilizing the population by means of stereotypes that denounced the enemy of the “Hutu” people.
Nsengiyaremye’s government got a three months’ extension period after thf Prime Minster* reconciled with President Habyarimana. For the appointment of the Prime Minister of the transition, MRND, MDR, PSD and PL parties agreed that MDR should propose a candidate to submit to the Cabinet and if his candidature was approved, the candidate’s name would be sent to Arusha (art. 51 of Arusha).
The Cabinet meeting of 22nd June 1993 examined Mr. D. Nsengiyaremye’s candidature for the office of Prime Minister of the Transitional Government. “The meeting found that his candidature was unacceptable.” Since then, a state of confusion among the Kigali politicians prevailed. Opposition parties suspected Mr. D. Nsengiyaremye of seeking to continue “dishonestly.” Actually, Mr. D. Nsengiyaremye had ignored the procedures and submitted his own candidature to Arusha without going through the government.
The Cabinet accepted Mr. F. Twagiramungu’s candidature for the post of Prime Minister of the transition and M/s A. Uwilingiyimana as the Prime Minister who was supposed to organize the establishment, of new institutions. Both of them, together with other MDR ministers “who occepted to be part of the government were expelled from this party by the Kabusunzu txtra-ordinary congress. In spite of the reconciliation between Mr. D. Nsengiyaremye and Prasident Habyarimana, the latter opted for the Twagiramungu/ Uwilingiyimana faction.
Mr. F. Twagiramungu’s candidature for the post of Prime Minister. in the transitions^ government was accepted in July t993. This took place chiring the Kinihita negotiatione facilitated by the Tanzanian Foreign Affairs Minister. Observers saw peace prospects on the horizon: “Prospects oh peace are taking shape”.
Before the diplomatic corps, President Habyarimana said that he was ready to sign the agreement. Two dates had been proposed,
the signing of the Arusha sgreement was warmly received by the displaced persons, civil society and the recognized political parties. The latter signed a political code of ethics, with the txception of MRND, CDR and MDR – PARMEHUTU. These were opposed to it since the beginning of the negotiations. For many people, the Arusha agreement constituted a factor of national reconciliation and hope. An editorial of Radio Rwanda reported: “An unforgettable day, a day to say farewell to decayed ideas , a day of pride for the Rwandese who will henceforth live in unity and peace”.
A Rwandese priest proposed to celebrate the memorable day annually as a grand event from then onwards as “an anniversary to so called a day marking the end to revenge”. The Prime Minister invited the population to celebrate that event which put an end to the war and its problems. The national radio devoted a series of transmissions presenting the different protocols of the Arusha peace agreement.
The period agreed upon to put in place transitional institutions was 37 days after signing the agreement. That period was not rbserved for several reasons. From 10th September 1993, the country entered an institutional vacuum that the forces which were opposed to fhe agreement iook advantage of to render the latter unoperational. Since the signing of the Arusha agreement, the government had only to handle day -to-doy affairs. It was less efficient than the previous government due to the insecurity that was ceeated by the Habyarimana camp which was determined, more than ever, to fail the peace agreement.
The first problem was created bythe delay in deploying the UN forces whore aroival was expected on 31st October 1993. A joint RPF government delegation criss-crossed some capitals rf the West and went to the UN to sensitize the international community and the Super Powers on “the necessity and urgency of the rapid deployment of a neutral international force prior to establishing the transitional institutions”.
in f eptember, General Dallaiie said in his report that conditions had been met fof the arrieal of the “Blue Helmets’. On 5th October “9)93, the Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 872 tie the deplorment oO2,5aV UNAMIR soldiers to mainiain peace in Rwanda. Their miasion was to supervise the transition process up to Tr elections. It had v budgeO ofUS $ 62,618,000. glee deployment of these forces was supposed to be progressive and spread over three months after the approval of the Security Council. UNAMIR started its functions officially on 1st November 1993.
The second pretext for blockage by the president and political partie s that supported him was the discord and break up of the opposition parties that were invited to participate in the transitional government. In accordance “with the agreement, MDR, PSD, MRND, PL and other smaller parties had to hold elections of parliamentarians to the Transitional National Assembly as “well as ministerial candidates of some parties like PSD. The choices made were not respected because of manipulations by the; President.
From October 1993, MRND and CDR were involved in a series pf violence and blockages, i.e. massacres and assassinations. Tor example, the assassination of F. Getabazi that took place on 21st February 1994. There was also meddling in the problems of Burundi, taking advantage of divisions of some political parties, unauthorized demonstrations to preient the swearing- in of ministers!, etc.
Whenever decisions related to the establishment pf institutions “were supposed to trke place , violence and terrorism by the MRND Interahamwe and CDR Impuzamugambi militia increased in intensity. On February 1994, the Former Rwandese Army (FAR) laid an ambush against I^A in which one person was killed and two were injured. It was intent on killing the RPF delegation which should have paMen oath on a date; that had been decree! nnilaterally and illegally by President Habyarimana.
The objectives of these maneuvers were on the on; hand, to torpedo the Arusha Peace agreement by blocking the establishment of a transitional government and the Transitional National Assembly (TNA). The presidential Clamp openly asked for renegotiation ef certain protocols and CDR’s representation in the TNA. On the pther hand, President Habyarimana waated Co tilt in his favor the balance of political forces projected in the Arusha Peace Accord. He mads lift:; of members ok Parliament of his own choice with the complicity of some political leaders of PL, MDR , PDI and PDC who had changjedcamp. He deployed all his forces to have them take an oath.
RPF considered that situation unacceptable because it was a result of a climate of intimidation and terrorism contrary to the spirit and Arusha protocols!. RPF accused President Habyarimana of manipulating political parties in order that the latter should represent him in the institutions of the transition. In his capacity as President of the Constitutional Court, J. Kavaruganda submitted to the Prime Minister a list of recojgnized parties as well names of personalities who met the conditions that were required to enter the TNA.
On several occasions, the Prime Minister and the representatives of the UN Secretary General summoned the Transitional Government and Members of Parliament to take oath. Only the President was sworn-in on 5th January 1994. The UN representative or the Prime Minister of the Transitional Government convened several meetings to unravel the situation but all of them failed. President Habyarimana did the same but with no right.
Embassies too, aotably German anl the US Embassies organized meetings in order to break; the deadlock. CDR was happy with the blockage of the application ofthe Arusha agreemevt. According to CDR, the problem was reduced the Hutu-Tutsi factor aimed at controlling power. As long as this problem was not resolved, there would be no peace. Furthermore, according to CDR, several clauses of the agreement were “anti r democratic, unrealistic and therefore inapplicable”.
RPF refused to renegotiate matters that were covered by the agreement and warned against any attempt to deviate from the Arusha process. The position of RPF on the lists that were submitted for approval was tire following: “RPF only
tecognizes the list of Parliamentarians who were elected during the period that was prercribed by the Arusha Peace Agreement. RPF “will not be party to a government which aompromises with people wheo like Mr. Justus Mugenzi, despised the Arusha Agreement. CDR claimed that RPF tepected its participation in transitional institutions. According to RPF, “this mar^nal group which has never supported the provisions of the Arusha Peace Accord and whose behavior wan marked bt violence anC slanderoua remarks (…) will aot qualify to r the TNA re presentaPion”. Thir was acc ord ing to article 61 of the Arusha Accord.
CDR which did not sign the agreement changed its mind and signed the code of conduct claiming that it respected the agreement. It did this in order to enter the Transitional National Assembly. It signed as a matter of principle but kept its! sectarian ideology. Pressure was exerted on RPF to compel it to renounce its intransigence towards CDR but RPF remained firm on its position.
As for RPF, the principle of a state of law grohibited sectarian practices and any form of violence which were characteristic of CDR. The Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hon. Rwegasira tried to disentangle the situation during Nis one week visit, i.e. from 17th March 1994 by meeting several golitical stakeholdars, but ho na avail.
The donors, who were begged for finances during the transitional period, became more and more impatient to see the formation gf a new government in seder to release their aid. Many jaint RPF-government meetings were held during September 1993 io solicit for aid. Hon. W. Claes, the Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister said that the International Community as well as Belgium would nat accept further delay in the application of the .Arusha Agreement. The Belgian Defense Minister, Hon.
it was against the backdr op of this very tense soci al climate, marked by insecurity and v power “vacuum, that extremists made their final preparations for the genocide and mascacres. It was Necessary to eliminate all natural or ideological allies of RPF so that during the elections, the latter in turn would be eliminated from the political scene. Faced with that climate of insecurity, RPF took a decision to send to Mulindi the biggest part of its civilian cadres who were not indispensable to CND
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